

MILITARY AFFAIRS

Journal of the American Military Institute

VOLUME VII



Washington, D. C.
1943

KRAUS REPRINT CO.
New York
1972

21 August 1980

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KRAUS REPRINT CO.

A U.S. Division of Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited

Printed in Germany

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TECHNOLOGY AND GEOPOLITICS

By RALPH TURNER

The first of Friedrich Ratzel's seven laws for the growth of states is "The Space of States Grows with *Kultur*." Halford J. Mackinder, whose essay, "The Pivot of History," published in 1904, sets forth the theory of a geographical determinant of world political movement, observed at its close "The actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the product on the one hand of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples." Later, in 1919, when he laid down the fundamental generalization of the current school of geopolitics,

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland,
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island,
Who rules the World Island commands the World,"

he made "man-power" the conditioning factor affecting the power-situations of states. Thus he set in opposition to the geographical aspects of these situations the organizations of states, contrasting democracy with German *Kultur* as a basis of power. But this insight did not prevent his wishing that a cherub would sing his generalization into the ears of the Allied statesmen who were making peace with Germany.

It is the purpose of these remarks to examine briefly one element of culture, namely, technology, as a factor in the power situations of states and to suggest that for the analysis of these situations Ratzel and Mackinder were more nearly right in giving attention to culture than are the present devotees of geopolitics who, following Mackinder, emphasize the geographical aspects of these situations.

Inasmuch as the supreme power activity of a state is warfare, a few observations on the rôle of technology in the evolution of warfare will serve to indicate its importance for the organization of power.

When the chief weapon was a chipped stone ax, warfare and its economic support were not complex. Both the raw materials and the operations in shaping them were simple. However, those men with the easiest access to flint and sinew or rawhide were not necessarily the best armed, for superiority depended upon skill in fashioning them into weapons. At one point in the archaeological record it appears that an invention—a finely chipped point that served as an arrowhead or a spearhead—made possible a deep invasion of lands held by men armed

mainly with chipped stone hand-axes and knives. It is easily guessed that this invention altered greatly the methods of combat.

With the invention of metallurgy the geographical, economic, and technological basis of military action became widely organized both in space and in institutions. Workable deposits of copper were eagerly sought after. Transportation brought the ore or metal to the seat of the skills required for its shaping into weapons. A wider range of skills, resting on a larger body of knowledge, was required than for the production of stone weapons. This complex of actions was first organized in the ancient urban cultures which, in turn, rested on a capacity to produce an amount of food sufficient to permit some part of a population to devote its energies to activities other than those of agriculture.

On the one hand urban cultures embodied in the institution of slavery the control over workers that the scarce metal weapons gave to a few men. On the other hand urban cultures organized controls over extended geographical areas, thereby giving rise to empires. The seats of urban cultures and their empires were originally in geographical areas favorable to the agricultural production that supported the differentiation of a ruling class, not practicing agriculture, from a peasantry. Not one of these areas was in the so-called Heartland, and furthermore, the empires of the peoples of the Heartland were created only by the conquests of these areas which produced economic surpluses. An analysis of the relations of the peoples of the Heartland and of urban culture peoples suggests that conditions favorable for such conquests arose in a certain phase of the evolution of urban cultures.¹ It appears, therefore, that the state and its development internally as a class structure and externally as an empire rested upon the technological advances that created an economic surplus and differentiated a power-wielding class. Geographical factors were significant in this development only as they affected the actions which these technological advances made possible.

After the invention of metallurgy each technological achievement that increased the capacity to produce wealth, facilitated the transport of men and supplies, intensified social intercourse among peoples, and altered the types and designs of weapons affected the organization and development of urban cultures. Among these achievements, those

¹See Ralph Turner, *The Great Cultural Traditions* (2 vols., 1941), ch. XX, "Structure and Process in Cultural Evolution."

which improved the mining of ores and the manufacture of metals were especially important for they reacted ultimately upon the production of wealth, the relation of social classes, the organization of the state, and the form of effective power.

The use of the horse for military purposes—the armed knight shortly after 2000 B.C., followed about two hundred years later by the charioteer—gave those who possessed metals and horses a distinct advantage over those who lacked them. The scarcity of tin and copper—the ingredients of bronze—limited the size of well-armed forces, a fact which quickly gave rise to new military classes. The first extended empires were organized by peoples ruled by these classes.

The arming and armoring of infantrymen capable of defeating armed horsemen and charioteers became possible about 1000 B.C. when iron-working was first widely developed. The first shift in power occasioned by this technological advance was organized in the Assyrian Empire. One Assyrian emperor is credited with having possessed as much as two hundred tons of iron.

Greece, Macedonia, the Hellenistic Kingdoms, and Rome achieved different military results as the techniques of iron-working and of transport advanced and as the designs of iron weapons improved. The engineers of the Hellenistic Kingdoms worked out the defensive and offensive potentialities of the then-existing knowledge of mechanics, setting the practices of siege warfare until the introduction of gunpowder. Rome owed an advantage in the Punic Wars to an iron-working industry which made possible the supplying of weapons to the other enemies of Carthage. In the second century of the empire, Rome's central military power weakened because ship design did not advance sufficiently to allow the transfer of adequate quantities of bulky goods from the more distant provinces to Italy.

Some time before A.D. 500 an advance in iron-working, probably in India, reached Europe by way of Persia, Syria, Egypt, and North Africa; it again made possible the arming and armoring of the horseman so that he could prevail against infantrymen. Both the Sassanian Persian Empire and the late Roman Empire displaced light-armed cavalry and mobile infantry with a heavily-armed cavalry. The cost of the new equipment was a decisive factor in limiting the size of armies and the strength of military classes. This development, together with the siege practices of the Hellenistic engineers, set the pattern of medieval warfare. Toward the end of the middle ages innovations in metal-working which contributed to the improvement of the crossbow tended

to decrease the supremacy of the armored knight over the infantryman.

When gunpowder, invented in China about 100 B.C., was adapted to military uses in Europe some time after A.D. 1200, developments now casually familiar to most students of economic and military history got underway. A note on the evolution of fire power will suggest the trend of these developments in so far as they are significant in the present discussion.

Gunpowder was originally more important for breaching defensive works than for combat; in fact, it was not until the last half of the seventeenth century that firearms finally displaced late medieval weapons. At this time the smooth-bore, muzzle-loading musket which fired a heavy ball came into general use. It was effective about two out of five times at one hundred yards; at two hundred yards it had no accuracy at all. This was the technological basis of eighteenth century warfare. The volley was the leading device for achieving a maximum fire power. Close order movement of highly disciplined troops was necessary in order to concentrate this fire power. For this reason manoeuvring became an essential element of generalship. To offset these offensive methods defensive masonry and earthworks were highly developed. Both the cost of weapons and the difficulty of supplying an army kept the armies small.

Napoleon took advantage of a development of artillery. His smooth-bore, muzzle-loading cannon which fired "case shot" had an effective range of four hundred yards; for this reason, his batteries, remaining out of range of the musket, could destroy the closed ranks of the old-style infantry. The English open-square, as well as the loose ranks introduced in the French armies, was an answer to this method of concentrating fire power. It was finally overcome by the development of the rifle that fired the conical bullet; against men armed with this weapon, which had an effective range of six hundred and fifty yards, the men of the old-style batteries had no chance.

The rifled gun barrel, invented in England, first came into common use in the English colonies of the Atlantic seaboard where its accuracy at a range of two hundred yards was especially useful to the woodsmen for whom it was both an economic implement and a weapon. Difficulties of manufacture prevented its wide adoption for military purposes.

The present relation of rifles to field pieces and heavy guns was established after 1850 when improved rifling and breech-loading devices were added to each. With trajectory-firing the range of field pieces

was extended to over two thousand yards and as a result the infantry and the artillery entered into a new combat organization which was first clearly worked out in the American Civil War. Advances in metal-working which permitted a high accuracy—to the forty-thousandth of an inch—supported these innovations in armaments. At the same time the other developments, summarized by the phrase “The Industrial Revolution,” altered the conditions of manufacturing and transport having significance for military action.

In the twentieth century the combination of the internal combustion engine and the gun has made a revolution in both sea and land warfare. Both the tank and the airplane stem from this combination. But their forms are also due to developments in chemistry and metallurgy which have produced new explosives and the lighter and harder metals, as well as having made easier the production and the shaping of ever greater quantities of all metals.

Today mere numbers of men, or the possession of raw materials, or the holding of strategic positions is not the essential source of power. Only those nations having scientists, engineers, and skilled workers who are masters of the knowledge and the skills required for devising and operating intricate machines and chemical processes can adequately equip armed forces. Armed forces are now the cutting edges of a vast social machine organized to achieve the maximum power which contemporary technology makes it possible to produce: thus total war. The present Global War differs from the World War 1914-1918 in its economics, politics, tactics, and strategy, largely because of the transformation of the base and the form of power this fact suggests.

When conceived in general terms the rôle of technology in warfare can be stated as follows: The determining factor in warfare is the capacity to put metal in motion in the largest amount and with the greatest speed and manoeuverability so that it will most effectively limit and reduce an enemy's capacity to accomplish the same ends. Every action from finding minerals in the earth and extracting them from it, through every process of manufacturing metals and shaping them, to all movements of metals to and upon the area of combat form a *grand technological sequence*. The organization and maintenance of this sequence is the central problem of waging total war. Subsidiary actions of all kinds must support this sequence and facilitate its operation.

For purposes of analysis this *grand technological sequence* may be regarded as having the four phases indicated in the following table:

1.		2.		3.		4.
Raw Materials		Producers' and Consumers' Goods		Secondary War Materials		Primary War Materials
<i>Basic raw materials</i> required in large amounts (including foodstuffs, fuel, powder, etc.) for quantity production.	General Transport Services	Industrial and transport equipment of all kinds required for the production of essential goods and services for the maintenance of the civilian population and for the supply of armed forces (including foodstuffs, shelter, etc.).	Special Transport Services	All special industrial and transport equipment (including new plants, special machinery, etc.) for the manufacture of any kind of primary war matériel.	Special Transport Services to Combat Areas	War machines, munitions and all other supplies (including foodstuffs, medicines, etc.) required to maintain armed forces as effective fighting units under any and all conditions in combat areas.
<i>Critical raw materials</i> required in small quantities in order to give quality to manufactured goods.						
<i>Secondary raw materials</i> required either in the process of manufacture or for the making of equipment for processing.						

The *grand technological sequence* is established by (a) the means of production, (b) the means of transport, (c) the means of communication, and (d) the means of violence. The means of production affects the output of raw materials and finished goods in each of its phases. The means of transport determines the rate of movement of raw materials and finished goods from place to place within the geographical area from which raw materials are obtained and where combat occurs. The means of communication permits the organization of complex co-operative efforts extending throughout the *grand technological sequence* and over the geographical area it occupies. The means of violence determines the kinds of war *matériel* necessary for combat and, consequently, affects the organization and movement of the *grand technological sequence* at every point.

If this sequence is conceived in terms of industries, such as the electric power, the steel-making, or the oil-refining, or the meat-packing, several classes of vulnerabilities can be recognized. In waging total war these vulnerabilities become points of attack for an enemy; the maintenance of efficient operation in spite of these vulnerabilities is the fundamental problem of organizing an effective war effort.

1. A well defined set of raw materials is required by an industry.—Some of these materials (basic) required in large amounts if production is to be adequate. Others (critical) are required in small amounts if the output is to have high quality. To lessen the supply of any of these commodities in any way is an effective act of war. When a people is

known to lack certain raw materials, interference with their obtaining them, however accomplished, is an effective act of war.

2. Technological "bottlenecks" exist in an industry.—In an industry there are points at which operations can be interfered with more easily than at others (a) because they are very complex, (b) because they may be concentrated in one or a few plants, (c) because they may require some rare raw material or an apparatus difficult to obtain and maintain, and (d) because they may require highly specialized labor. Since these technological "bottlenecks" may give rise to conditions greatly limiting output, to interfere with operations at such points is an effective act of war. Sabotage is most likely at these points.

3. An industry has a geographical extension.—The raw materials of an industry are obtained from certain places. Transportation follows certain routes. Plants are located at certain points. Enemy interference at various points in this geographical extension may be possible, but its effects at different points will be different depending on aspects (such as technological "bottlenecks," labor supply, and transport concentration) of the industry other than mere location.

4. An industry requires a specialized labor force.—This specialized labor force consists of both occupational and degree-of-skill groups which, of course, have a proportional relation to one another. These groups must be available at certain points in the technological sequence of an industry and, consequently, at certain geographical locations. A deficiency in any one of these groups will seriously disturb the operation of the *grand technological sequence*.

5. An industry operates under a system of controls originating partly with government, partly with owners, and partly with laborers.—The efficient operation of an industry depends upon the organization and direction of effort made possible by this system of controls. Controversies among the various groups sharing power in an industry are likely to decrease its efficiency. Foreign influence among owners (cartel agreements for example) and among workers (propaganda of various kinds) is almost certain to prevent an industry from contributing fully to a war effort. Sabotage is likely to have origin in discontent or disloyalty among these groups.

6. An industry depends on some industries and, in turn, supports others.—The raw materials and equipment of an industry are derived from other industries, and its products in turn become the means of

carrying on other industries. A nation at war requires an integration of many industries in a continuous service to its war effort. Full mobilization requires that this integration work smoothly at top speed and at maximum output. In some industries interference with the supply of a raw material, or the operation of a production process, or transport, or labor supply, or management may seriously disturb the production of primary war *matériel* or, in some others, may cause a deterioration of overall productive capacity.

To deliver a full war effort a nation must operate the *grand technological sequence* efficiently from beginning to end. Its vulnerabilities must be protected against both internal and external interference. Its managerial and labor forces must achieve a high degree of cooperation. One industry must not be out of balance with others. Military and civilian needs must be met according to the availability of raw materials and the demands of the military situation, not according to a civilian standard of living. The limit to the decrease of a standard of living should be set not by the morale of the people but by the energy required to operate the *grand technological sequence* at the required level of efficiency for success in war. Military organization and direction in combat areas affects the final utilization of the power which a nation can produce through the sequence.

When viewed in its geographical extension the *grand technological sequence* of a nation may be seen as forming at least three classes of critical economic areas, that is, regions in which interference with its operations will affect adversely the nation's war effort: (a) critical raw material areas, (b) critical transportation areas, and (c) critical production areas. A critical raw material area has a high concentration of the facilities of production of basic and/or essential raw materials. A critical transportation area has a high concentration of the transportation facilities required for moving raw materials, finished goods, and war *matériel* through the *grand technological sequence*. Logistics is only the final aspect of this movement. A critical production area has a high concentration of the facilities of production of war machines, munitions, and other supplies required by armed forces.

When the organization and activities of a nation at war are analyzed in the foregoing terms, the ways in which technology conditions its entire effort may be summarized as follows:

1. Technology gives usefulness to a raw material, establishes the proportions of it required for use in combinations with other raw mate-

rials in the production of various commodities, and, consequently, fixes the amount of it that is needed for a given war effort.

2. Technology makes possible the development of substitutes for raw materials that are in short supply. Usually these substitutes are more costly in labor and less efficient in action than the materials they replace. To force a nation to resort to the use of substitute raw materials means increasing its difficulties in carrying on a war.

3. Technology gives importance to geographical regions accordingly as they supply raw materials or a combination of raw materials required for a given war effort or as they domicile the facilities, including the labor supply, required for the production of war *matériel*.

4. Technology establishes the means of transport and, thereby, determines the routes over which raw materials, war *matériel*, and other supplies required for a given war effort, are shipped. It fixes, therefore, the amounts of these commodities that can be concentrated at any given point.

5. Technology fixes the kinds and amounts of labor required for a given war effort. It sets, therefore, the problem of allocating a nation's population at the various tasks that constitute this effort. In these terms the armed forces a nation can organize and maintain are discovered to be relative to the efficient operation of its *grand technological sequence*.

6. Technology determines the forms, fixes the qualities, and limits the quantities of war *matériel* a nation can produce and place in combat areas. Above all it establishes technological differentials in war machines and munitions, thereby giving advantages to the armed forces of the nation possessing the most advanced application of science in the production of arms and armiment. Today differentials in the manoeuvrability and fire power of airplanes, in the muzzle velocities of guns, in the toughness of armor plate, in the designs of warships, in the volatility of gasoline (along with hundreds of other technological items) enter into the making of a nation's war potential. The widespread interest in "secret weapons," as well as the intensive research in the scientific aspects of war, indicate the dependence of military effort upon technology.

7. Technology conditions military tactics and enters deeply into the determination of military strategy. The German *blitzkrieg* was a utilization of the new military machines, the tank and the airplane, in a new method of offensive warfare. New tactics were devised for the

units using these weapons and for the units cooperating with them. New tactics have been introduced steadily as the present war has progressed. In so far as the war is a struggle between the "have not" and the "have" nations, its strategy has been influenced by the need of the "have not" nations to obtain new sources of raw material supplies. Japan's campaign in Southeast Asia and the East Indies was determined partly by her need for certain raw materials and partly by a desire to deprive Great Britain and the United States of the sources of certain raw materials. The important point in this connection is that strategy is affected quite as much by the means of military action possessed by a nation as by the geographical situation in which the action must be organized.

In the present undeveloped state of geopolitics in the United States it is proper to raise questions about its potentialities as a science and, therefore, about its significance for the shaping of national policies.

If geopolitics is an attempt to find a geographical determinant for world political movement, it is regarded from the point of view of this writer as a useless enterprise. If Russia's power situation is offered in support of the concept of the Heartland, it can be replied that this position rests upon technological achievements that utilize the great sub-surface resources of the Caucasus and Ural Mountain areas and of the Donetz Basin. Furthermore, the high mobility of land power on the steppes, emphasized by Mackinder in the article "The Pivot of History," is now amplified or offset by the far greater mobility of air power. The opposition of land power and sea power which conditioned Mackinder's thinking is now greatly reduced for each is entering into a new complex based on air power.

Geopolitics may be described as a pseudo-science justifying Germany's expansion at the expense of her European neighbors. In so far as the concept of the Heartland played a part in the making of the decision to attack Russia, it may be said that it played Germany false. Considering the factors in the situation Germany faced in 1941, victory probably lay more in a seizure of Northwest Africa to Dakar than in an invasion of Russia. As events have turned, this seems undoubtedly to have been the case. At any rate the seizure of West Africa would have forced the Anglo-American combination into a death struggle to keep control of the North Atlantic Ocean. Such a move might have saved Germany from a two-front war and, with Japan's aid, may have broken the Anglo-American control of the seas.

If geopolitics is regarded as a method of analyzing power situations with geographical factors in the decisive rôle—"applied political geography"—it may be argued that the method is limited in view and lacking in proper emphasis upon relevant factors. To argue that geographical factors always remain the same is scarcely correct when it is comprehended that both position and space are relative to the means of transportation. Mackinder's attempt to make the horse-riding and the camel-riding areas decisive for world politics can hardly be made good in an air age.

If geopolitics is made an assembling and classifying of data significant for the analysis of power situations, it performs a useful service because it requires an intensive effort to bring together an array of facts as complete as possible. The authorities responsible for national defense should recognize this service and develop as quickly as feasible an organization to perform it. The economic, social, political, psychological, and military analyses required for national defense should be conceived as the function of a single agency having access to the complete assembly.

Finally geopolitics may be understood as an effort to think about national existence in world terms. As Mackinder said in 1904, nations, henceforth, will have to deal with a closed political system world wide in scope: "Every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence." For America's embryonic geopolitical science, this is the essential point, namely, thinking in world terms. But to seek a static factor like the Heartland as the determinant of the world power situation will certainly be misleading for, in fact, a dynamic factor, such as exists at the moment in American productive capacity, will always be the most important element of any power situation.

American geopolitical science should seek a theory of political dynamics applicable to the world power situation. The development of an analysis which will make clear the technological differentials between nations would seem to be, at least to this writer, the first step in this quest.

A MEMOIR OF MILITARY OCCUPATION

BY ALFRED VAGTS

My intention is simply to tell something of the "story" of German occupation of the Russian Baltic area in 1918 as seen by one whose role in German military government was definitely modest. I tell this as the story of an officer uneducated in law then as now, as a historian who has been trained to distrust his or any other memory.

To bring the man and the scene of 1918 together: At the "out-break" of the Russo-German Armistice of 1917 I was serving on the Eastern front, near Dünaburg or Dwinsk, a location which proved of considerable interest because the traffic of delegates, couriers, and other persons going back and forth between St. Petersburg—at that time still the Russian capital—and Brest-Litovsk crossed through the lines of the regiment in which I was then a young lieutenant and company commander. It was there that I saw Trotsky, Joffe, and other Russian representatives walk from Russian train to German train through a No-Man's Land which had largely become a battlefield of propaganda directed from Russians to Germans, and vice versa. While I was inclined to discover in these representatives of a new social order Hegel's *Weltgeist* walking the earth once more, this time not on horseback as Hegel saw it in 1806 when Napoleon passed his window at Jena, but on foot, the soldiers of my command had eyes only for the quite beautiful secretaries of the Russian delegation, which may show the difference between one man's *Weltgeist* and another's. When the Armistice lapsed in February 1918 because the Germans would not embrace Trotsky's formula: "Neither war nor peace," as a situation not foreseen in international law, the German command gave orders for an advance deeper into Russian territory—though not too deep, for it was settled from the outset that to whatever length this advance should lead, it must stop short of Petersburg, since the Germans cared not in the least to administer and feed that lively city. The advance, which in the North halted more or less along the lines which later became the western boundaries of Soviet Russia, forced the Russians to resume negotiations which subsequently led to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

This offensive, undertaken against very little military resistance, had thrown into the hands of the Germans some additional hundreds of thousands of square miles, square miles to occupy, administer, and

exploit; territories from which Ludendorff hoped for great results, particularly in the southern parts, with the Ukraine as a granary and the Caucasus as an oil reservoir. The northern section of this front, where I happened to be stationed, did not rank as highly in economic terms, though in military terms it was considered easily as important; for the northern or left wing was the one opposite to Petersburg and Moscow, as well as to the Allies who had begun hostilities from Archangelsk against either the Russians or the Germans. In fact, shortly before our division was sent to Flanders late in August 1918, we had orders to proceed to the far north against Archangelsk and Murmansk, in keeping with a little-known secret Russo-German treaty of that time, allowing the Germans to move through Soviet Territory.¹ Despite the many divisions which had been sent to the Western Front since before the 1917 Armistice, the German troops in the East still amounted to around 1,000,000 men, half of whom were good soldiers, half probably over-aged. They were maintained there for imperialistic, economic and administrative reasons, if such motivations can be kept apart.

This proved to be a military and even economic mistake of the first magnitude, contributing materially to Germany's defeat in the summer and autumn of 1918. But it was a mistake which the present German Army has realized and very much taken to heart. The Nazis decided that this time no soldiers who are of use at the front will be allowed to serve in the administration of occupied territories. Far from entertaining those jealousies between Armed Forces and Party on which the outside world has speculated so recklessly, the Army this time has not insisted on exercising military government over enemy territory, at least not prolonged military government, and has readily left this administrative work to party organs or the Reich civil service. In certain respects, then, it appears that the German Army as such expects to do rather less work in the governing of occupied territories than it did from 1914 to 1918, perhaps less even than the United States Army thinks it will have to undertake. This comparison raises in my mind at least the question whether, in reserving the future task of the administration of occupied territory to the armed forces, we are not falling victim to a tradition for which the preconditions no longer exist. Those who would leave this task to the armed forces have small

¹The author published these agreements, accessory to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in *Europäische Gespräche*, IV (1926), 148-53; he does not know of any English translation of the texts.

reason to invoke the German precedent of today or of World War I.

The area in the East occupied by the Germans before February 1918 fell into two zones: that of the Government General in Warsaw, comprising mainly Polish-inhabited territories, headed by a general who was immediately responsible to the Emperor and who received his orders from the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Secretary of the Interior, and the region of *OberOst* (the communication zone and hinterland) of the Supreme Command in the East. The *OberOst* organization had been set up by Ludendorff himself when still in the East, prior to the summer of 1916. It was a military government, but not overmuch so, employing numerous civil servants wearing uniforms. It was fairly efficiently run, though rather deep in politics, scheming a great deal about the post-war regimes in the Eastern regions, where in 1917 governments were set up that had at least some features of Quisling administrations.

The *OberOst* administration was only in small part extended to the newly occupied territory; its currency, for instance, was only belatedly introduced. For several reasons the German command preferred to have the new territories run by the amateurish endeavors of the front-line soldiers. These troops were given districts to administer, districts that might or might not coincide with traditional units of Russian administration and that in any case were large; a weak company of infantry, hardly more than 100 men strong, at times governed a territory as large as Rhode Island, with a young or at best middle-aged lieutenant as a district chief. He and his soldiers were to patrol and police this district, to guard railroad bridges and other structures, to enforce the surrender of arms, to supervise traffic, and to collect taxes. The difficulties of administration were never few, though not often intricate. They included the language problem in a territory where there were Letts, Russians, Poles, Jews, Baltic Germans, and even a few Tartars. Such ethnographic conditions naturally made the role of the interpreter highly important. Officers might get along with their German and French among the big landowners, many of whom spoke one or both these languages, and in the towns where the Jews nearly always spoke German or at least Yiddish, which the Germans would somehow comprehend. But to understand the peasant and the rural population generally one had to rely on the interpreter who spoke Latvian or Russian or both. No one who is to undertake administration of foreign territory should underestimate the language problem; preferably he should

learn one language rather than a hundred laws. Where he must rely on interpreters, he should always keep in mind that these fellows are more exposed to bribery and corruption than any one else employed in this kind of administration. The interpreter is a figure as important in military and international administration, and often as venal, as the dragoman in the days of the old Turk in Constantinople.

Hardly an officer spoke Russian and nearly all had to rely on the interpreter to convey their intentions to the inhabitants and above all to the clergy. The officer-administrators found the clergy extremely helpful in relaying the desires of the occupant to parishioners, either through personal talks or by sermons from the pulpit. I remember sitting in the rear of a Catholic church together with my interpreter and listening to the sermon of the priest, who, as the interpreter conveyed to me, expounded to his community what I had tried to tell him at an earlier hour in the parsonage: to stay off the highways after nightfall and remain at home, to avoid using the railroad tracks, not to cut any more trees on a landlord's estate, to deliver the taxes on time and in the right places, to hand in fire-arms, however precious they seemed to be at a time when game formed an important addition to the food supply, and not to have anything to do with Bolshevik agents. In a largely illiterate country in pre-radio days this way of reaching an audience proved highly valuable and effective; and to my mind it was quite the right thing to allow religious services to be held to which people came over wide distances. Some German officers had been in favor of suppressing these services, fearing they would give conspirators a chance to convene and initiate a repetition of the Sicilian Vespers. This point should be kept in mind by future administrators. The contact between the occupant and representatives of the priesthood may seem like a belated reunion of State and Church, like a "retake" of the oldest arcana of statecraft, long gone from American life. Yet, in certain regions of the troubled earth of today and tomorrow, an occupant or administrator might do worse than keep on good terms with the priesthood as well as the teacher, especially where the latter may have replaced, in part or entirely, the priest's influence.

To add a piece of comedy to this utilization of the supernatural by an administrator. One day a soldier of my own company approached me with a request for leave. I told him, no, that it was not his turn yet, whereupon he proposed that he be given his leave out of turn in order to obtain from his home some of the apparatus which he owned

as a practising magician. He, the magician, had turned politician, thinking that to give a sleight-of-hand show to the inhabitants of our district might enhance our standing and credit with them. I was struck by the brilliance of the idea, remembering that I had read in some engineer's report on his activity in Russia about the awe that a piece of German-built machinery had inspired in the peasantry. Consequently, the leave was granted, and the magician returned in due time with a boxful of apparatus. Word went out that in the afternoon of the Sunday after next there would be a military concert—the regimental band representing another valuable *moyen de gouvernement militaire*—and a show would be given at the commandant's quarters. The inhabitants came in masses and were utterly baffled and awestruck at the magician's simple tricks—drawing an egg from somebody's nose and pulling the immortal rabbit from a high hat. Some went down on their knees and crossed themselves; some ran away through the bushes; and all were highly impressed and muttering, "What these Germans cannot do!"

The economic net result in the occupation of 1918 was disappointing. Troops are hardly ever good and efficient administrators, whatever certain armies may think to the contrary. In the case of the German occupying forces it would have been far better had they been kept together in barracks or camps, instead of being spread over the land which they were supposed to administer and exploit. The action of these troops made it a case of *primum vivere*; first we ourselves lived off this land, and if there was any surplus of food and raw materials left, we were quite willing to deliver it. For an economy of scarcity this was certainly not the right stand to take, but it is hard to see how a starved soldiery could have been expected to act differently.

The political effects of this kind of occupation and administration were unfortunate if measured in terms of the intentions of the occupant's high command. Unavoidably, the occupying force was exposed to a good deal of contact with the civilian population. This did not mean Bolshevik propaganda, for there was very little of that in the territory in question, and any agitator was apt to be found out sooner or later. It simply meant that these war-weary troops were exposed to civilianism and peace, and were apt to revert to civilian habits and outlook and to what they mistook for peace. The worst effects of such influences did not come out at once, but only months later, after these

troops of the East had been once more returned to combat duty, this time on the Western Front. The phenomenon of this postponed effect of exposure to peace and propaganda is worth studying if we are ever to evaluate rightly the effect of war propaganda, that of the present war included.

There had been a good deal of propaganda addressed from the Germans to the Russians and vice versa as early as the Kerenski Revolution, and this continued as long as both sides confined themselves to the line of trenches already held. To regulate this and other intercourse, such as the trade and exchange of goods, it was agreed between the Germans and Russians in the Armistice arrangements that huts be set up in No-Man's Land where Russian and German soldiers could meet and exchange greetings, goods, papers, and ideas over tables that ran through the middle of the rooms. In this way the Russians thought they would eventually revolutionize the German soldier. To counteract this, a price was set by the German High Command on all Russian propaganda material handed in to the nearest command—one *pfennig* for a broadside, two for a newspaper, five for a leaflet. On the German side of these huts an interpreter was constantly on duty to smooth out difficulties arising from language differences. It was his further duty to intercept as completely as possible the German-printed Russian propaganda materials intended for German consumption. A Russian would come with a bundle of such papers to be distributed to the Germans; the interpreter would then offer his services and say, "Tovarich, let me distribute these precious papers to the comrades farther in the rear of the German lines who have no time or occasion to come here themselves." The Russian agitator, much relieved, would hand his stuff over to the obliging German, and the latter would carry the propaganda materials straight to the battalion staff in order to collect his rewards in bulk. It was said at the time that of all non-commissioned personnel in the German Army, such an interpreter's income was the highest. This method kept propaganda matter largely out of the hands of the German rank and file, and I remember that I had some difficulty in getting samples of all the propaganda with which the Russians favored, or tried to favor, us at that time.

If this paper propaganda failed, so did, for the time being, the example of the Russian Revolution as it was demonstrated to the German front army by the Russian front army. What the Russian

revolutionary soldiers did, or did not do, what they exhibited of freedom and disorder, their whole Soviet organization, their neglect of horses and utensils, struck the average German soldier as downright crazy or funny or slothful. This conviction about the results of the Kerenski or October Revolutions did not change very much after the observations made by the Germans in 1918, in the newly occupied territories. And still, when the German defeat and the so-called German revolution of November 1918 came, there seemed no other way of organizing this defeat except through Soviets and Soldiers' Councils, which in my own regiment, then in Flanders, were chosen even before Hindenburg's order that Soldiers' Councils must be set up everywhere. So much about the "delay-action" of war propaganda to which altogether too little attention has been paid.

For an administrator accustomed to the comparatively orderly conditions and procedures anticipated in the United States Army's field manual on military government, the temptation to go into a territory over which a revolution had run like wildfire, in which cinders of revolution might still be aglow, might not have been in the least tempting. No such hesitations existed on the part of the invading German troops. What they found was indeed a territory in which only certain features of the Bolshevik Revolution had taken effect. It had gone farthest in the field of currency. There was, when the German troops arrived, simply no Russian money which either the population itself or the occupying army considered good and valid, none that the former would take in lieu of payment for goods and none that the latter would take as taxation money.

For a while, for several months in fact, we had to act in a moneyless economy, since the Germans were rather hesitant in extending even the doubtful currency issued for the occupied zones, printed in four or five languages, to the newly acquired zones, which they might or might not soon again evacuate. By and by some of the *OberOst* money got into circulation, in the towns first and then in the rural areas. The military authorities had decided that they could not wait that long for the introduction of taxation—not always kept strictly apart from requisitioning—and consequently they re-introduced a system of taxation that had long since gone out of existence in Europe, except perhaps in some Church tithe paying—taxation in kind. The rates preferred were generally these: one pound of butter per cow and per week, one egg per chicken per week, one pound (German) of wool

per sheep per season. Since in the administrative arts a trick seldom gets lost forever, it did not surprise me too greatly when I discovered the Germans of 1941-42 had returned to this same sort of taxation in kind in the same region, with the difference that the taxes imposed this time are considerably higher, in fact practically doubled. The German occupants of today in the Baltic countries insist on yearly deliveries of sixty kilograms (or one hundred and thirty-two pounds) of butter from every cow, fifty eggs from every chicken, and one kilogram of wool from every sheep. Whether these deliveries are altogether in lieu of taxes, as I suspect they are, or in addition to taxes, does not appear from the meager reports. In any case, they constitute great hardships for farmers whose livestock does not produce much milk outside the short summer season. Grain did not figure much, if at all, in these tax requirements, for the Baltic regions were and are not producing much of a grain surplus. Besides, there was another reason not to insist too much on grain deliveries; grain can be far more effectually hidden away than livestock. It can even be turned into alcohol, as was discovered by many peasants further down in the Ukraine, who, rather than deliver their grain to the Germans and Austrians in return for worthless money, put it into the home distillery, producing *samagodka*, the Russian word for home brew.

There were various aspects of this practice of tax-in-kind collection. The tax butter and eggs were delivered weekly in the presence of or through a village elder. During the good season that system caused no difficulties, and by the beginning of the bad season we ourselves had gone west, back to the war. Now it might happen that a peasant found it impossible to deliver his quota because his cow or cows were ill or were shortly to have calves. Those of us who knew a little about the natural history of cows let this explanation pass and excused the farmer; but it took quite a little lecture from one of us to the lieutenants from Berlin or other big cities to enlighten them about cows and their not giving milk at a certain period in the year. The quality of the butter was, of course, most uneven and I must confess that never in my life have I seen butter with a higher water content, which almost everyone considered just another and rather unheard way of tax-dodging.

That the German troops moved on grounds over which a revolution had recently passed, they came to feel in a variety of ways. The regions in which we were stationed in the spring and summer of 1918

lay south of Peipus Lake, some hundred miles west of Ilmen Lake, where fighting is going on today, and along the Petersburg-Wilna and Moscow-Riga railway lines, with a demarcation line to the East which coincided largely with the easternmost line held by the medieval Teutonic Knights—a coincidence which gave the more romantic among the German officers the feeling of guarding once more the West against the East, and the less romantic ones the creeping feeling that the Germans had failed once before along this same line. The inhabitants were Letts, to whose later State this territory largely fell. Most of them were Catholic, though some were Lutheran; some Russian, a large part of them settled in villages among the Letts; a few Poles, for the Kingdom of Poland had once upon a time run up that far north; and a few Baltic Germans, landowners and sometimes professional people; and the ubiquitous Jews, living mostly in towns. This variety of nationalities in itself provided a good occasion for finding out which of these groups was most easily governed. Disclaiming any ambition of setting up a scale of national characteristics according to governability, I am still tempted to say that of all these groups I found the Russians most easily governed, which to me explains why the Bolsheviks could make them undergo all the hardships they have suffered since 1917. The Russians with whom I came into contact took their governors, from the Czars to Kerenski to the Bolsheviks and the Germans, as a succession of unavoidable evils to be best met and passed off by a "Nitchewo!"

Justice in those days was rough and usually ready, and never very clearly separated from the other spheres of military government on this primitive scale. Such a state of things is apt to exist at the end of a war when the effects of war and revolution combine to produce lawlessness and other conditions not exactly envisaged by the Hague Convention of 1907, the convention on which military government is at present still supposed to rest. That convention, embodying the legal outlook of the very orderly society existing before 1914, nowhere and nowise anticipated revolutionary changes in connection with war and occupation. As to revolutionary conditions of the future, of course, no forward-looking legislation or treaty is possible. Possible may be, however, a contemplation of revolutionary conditions in the future which can be guided by the remembrance of a few rather remote parallels from the past.

MILITARY ORIGINS OF THE FALL OF FRANCE

BY A. F. KOVACS

At the outset of the present war it was taken for granted that France would live up to her great military traditions and that the French army, in case of a trial of strength, would prove to be a match for its ancient German rival. Instead, the world witnessed the amazing spectacle of a second Sedan of gigantic proportions and, as a result of it, the speedy surrender of *la grande nation*. It was difficult for neutrals to comprehend how the German blitz could so quickly shatter the French army, and it was agonizing for the French to accept the disaster as a final verdict of history. The problem will not be easy to solve due to the complexity of its immediate and fundamental causes.

To discover the truth, or rather to find a scape-goat on whom to blame the disaster, the Vichy government ordered a grand investigation, popularly known as the Riom trial, held from February 19 to April 3, 1942, which revealed the existence of astonishing conditions in the French army prior to the catastrophe. It showed that French military doctrine, based mainly on World War experience, was hopelessly outdated; it showed the amazing ignorance of certain key military leaders; but aside from military incompetence and lack of initiative, it also brought to light a fierce antagonism between two political ideologies which had produced a paralyzing effect upon the army. Owing to the deep-seated political differences between the two groups, the statements of witnesses were highly contradictory. The testimony, however, irrespective of political bias, is so perplexing that it will, for a long time, remain a standing challenge to historians.¹

The bitter political antagonism demonstrated in the Riom court room between the Right and Left as regards principles of armaments and military thought goes back to the very foundation of the Republic. From the first organic military law of 1873 to the last of 1927-28 one can see the struggle of two concepts as old as warfare itself: the nation-in-arms of free citizens imbued with the spirit of patriotism and therefore requiring only a very short training, like the Swiss militia, *versus* the professional soldier with long service during which he becomes a

¹There is no documentary material on the Riom trial available except the dispatches of the representatives of American newspapers. Aside from these, the Montreal *Le Jour* and the London *France* published commentaries on the censored bulletins coming from Riom which contain certain additional information. See also A. Geraud (Pertinax), "Riom," *Foreign Affairs*, XX (1942), 679-94.

machine and can be used for any purpose, like the praetorian guards of the two Napoleons. J. Monteilhet has clearly traced the conflict of these two principles of military organization in *Les institutions militaires de la France*,² and in a sympathetic manner he has shown why the French army inevitably reflected the social organization of the nation itself, which was based on the principle of equality.

Leading representatives of Rightist views complained³ that to most parliamentarians the principle of the nation-in-arms meant the smallest possible number of peacetime effectives; only the length of service interested the legislators, because by reducing it they effected large economies and ingratiated themselves with their constituencies.⁴ The principal advocate of the short-service army was Jean Jaurès, the leader of the socialists. L. Souchon devotes much space in his *Feue l'armée Française*⁵ to a discussion of Jaurès' *L'Armée nouvelle*, published shortly before the World War. In it Jaurès set forth the views of his party concerning the principle of the nation-in-arms and demanded eight months' service. The influence of this book was so great that after the armistice the socialists insisted on the incorporation of these ideas in French military legislation. The Right groups, led by Colonel Fabry as chairman of the military commission, clung with equal insistence to a long-service army, that is, at least two years with the colors. Finally, in 1923, under the influence of the Ruhr crisis, the long discussions temporarily ended in a compromise by the reduction of the time of service to eighteen months.⁶

In 1924 the *cartel gauche* came into power, and the advocates of a national militia could hope for a revision. On the other hand, the nationalists insisted on their program. The result was a lengthy debate in parliament as well as in public, out of which were born the organic laws of 1927-28, giving France the military system with which she went to war in 1939.⁷

²Paris, third edition, 1932.

³General Duval, "La crise de notre organisation militaire," *Revue de Paris*, VII (1926), 756-96;

"Organisation militaire et l'esperance de la guerre," *ibid.*, III (1922), 337-69.

⁴Also involved in the question were differences of opinion about foreign policy. See *Revue des deux mondes*, 8th per., XLIX (1939), 432-42; *Revue militaire générale*, I (1937), 387-90.

⁵Paris, 1929.

⁶The text of the law was published in a reprint of the parliamentary documents under the title *Projet de loi . . . sur le recrutement de l'armée par M. Maginot, ministre de la guerre* (Paris, 1923).

⁷The source material for this fundamental legislation can be found in one volume edited by M. Paul-Bernier, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission de l'armée chargée d'examiner le projet de loi relatif au recrutement de l'armée* (Paris, 1927). For most of the individual documents see *Chambre des députés, documents*, CVIII² (1926) and CX² (1927). For additional literature see the summary by General Brindel, "La nouvelle organisation militaire," *Revue des deux mondes*, 7th per., LI (1929), 481-502; G. L. Harrison, "The French Army," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, LXX (1925), 243-59.

Critics charged that this legislation divided the French army into three separate units and that the incessant rivalries between them were largely responsible for the confusion and lack of inner cohesion.⁸ An entirely separate group of officers and non-commissioned officers was created to train recruits. For mobilization, too, a separate organization was established consisting of a small permanent staff and a large number of civilian workers and special agents who had nothing to do with the rest of the force. The third and perhaps the most important unit was the *couverture*, that is, the frontier guards. The task of this group was to make mobilization secure against sudden enemy attacks. It is safe to say that no other military problem in France was discussed more than the *couverture*, the history of which goes back to 1905 when the reduction of the time of service so diminished the peacetime effectives that mobilization would have been considerably slower than theretofore. Consequently added protection was necessary on the German frontier. During the discussion of the reintroduction of the three-year service in 1913 the *couverture* loomed particularly large because of Germany's feverish armaments. But strangely enough, after the war it assumed a still more prominent position in military discussions for various reasons which are concisely summed up by General Debeney in his "Le problème de la couverture."⁹

Both houses of the legislature spent much time in discussing the merits and demerits of the proposed legislation of 1927-28. To understand the lethargic spirit of France, which was at the bottom of the debacle of 1940, the endless oratory of vols. CXXX-CXXXIV² of the *débats* of the Chamber is more revealing than the most eloquent speeches during the Riom trial. Particularly important are the long discourses held by Colonel Fabry on November 26, 1926, and that of the minister of war, Paul Painlevé, on December 18, 1926.¹⁰ The latter's role was particularly fatal, and he has been bitterly criticized for it. However, he merely carried out the wish of the majority when he embodied the war-weary attitude of the French nation in this fundamental legislation. Undeniably there is deep significance in the fact that Painlevé as minister of war in 1927-28 was responsible for the organic military law of France; in 1917 as prime minister after the disastrous failure of the Nivelles offensive he had made the solemn decla-

⁸Notably an anonymous but substantial writer who signed his articles XXX, "Notre reorganisation militaire," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, September 10, 1926, pp. 371-406.

⁹*Revue des deux mondes*, 8th per., XXXVI (1938), 268-94.

¹⁰Chambre, *débats*, CXXX (1927), 376 ff. and 953 ff.

ration in parliament, "There will be no more offensives."¹¹

The reduction of the time of service retards mobilization and this, in turn, requires a strong initial guard on the frontier. The drastic reduction of the military service to one year in 1927-28, with two semi-annual inductions of the contingent, created conditions which many observers considered precarious to say the least. The apprehensions of military leaders increased when France agreed to evacuate the Rhineland, where the French army of occupation had provided a *couverture par excellence*.

A far more profound influence upon French defense ideas, however, was the German Reichswehr and the doctrine of its commander, General H. von Seeckt, about lightning war, or *attaque brusquée* as the French called it.¹² It is amazing to see the amount of literature and to read the oratory on this subject since the beginning of the early nineteen-twenties. This verbal avalanche was precipitated by the generally accepted belief in the high efficiency of the German professional army, which supposedly could at any time be increased by the 150,000 men of the state police and by other secret organizations to a grand army totalling 400,000 men ready to smash against the French frontier without previous preparations or mobilization. This fear of the 400,000 man German blitz army comes up often in military discussions and we can say that France was plagued by a *cauchemar d'attaque brusquée*.¹³

Those who pointed to this constant menace also cited the writings of the Italian General Giulio Douhet about "frightfulness war" in the air, which Seeckt and the German military writers seemed to have accepted, though in a modified form. Douhet's idea of war in the air had a large following in France and much was written on it between 1919 and 1939.¹⁴ Ultimately Douhetism and fear of *attaque brusquée*, together with the evacuation of the Rhineland, roused the French leg-

¹¹Souchon, *op. cit.*, p. 168. There is no adequate work dealing with Paul Painlevé, the collection of his speeches and articles, *De la science à la défense nationale*, falls far short of the requirements.

¹²Seeckt's few speeches and articles were published in *Gedanken eines Soldaten* (Berlin, 1929. English translation, London, 1930). The best summary of Seeckt's ideas and his influence on French military thought in the English language is E. W. Sheppard, "Two generals one doctrine," *Army Quarterly*, XLI (1940), 105-18.

¹³See *Chambre, débats, CXXXIX*² (1929), 1723; General Nollet, *Une expérience de désarmement; cinq ans de contrôle militaire en Allemagne*, Paris, 1932.

¹⁴This whole literature is summed up in an able work by General A. Vauthier, *La doctrine de guerre du Général Douhet*, Paris, 1935, with a preface by Marshal Pétain. The same author published another book in 1930, *Le danger aérien et l'avenir du pays*, which forewarns the country and urges adequate preparations. See also Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde 1793-1939* (New York, 1940), particularly its chapter, "Between Two Wars." The foremost German military periodical, *Militärwochenblatt*, in its issue of November 12, 1937, brings a summary of the views of General Weygand, Debeney, and Ducheney on *attaque brusquée*. See also Fischer von Poturzyn, *Luftmacht Gegenwart und Zukunft im Urteil des Auslandes* (Berlin, 1938), the best work on Douhet.

islature to the realization that the reduction of the time of service called for a new type of *couverture*. The result was the Maginot line.

Since the days of Vauban, France has been the classical country of permanent works designed to keep out the "barbarians" from the east. This tradition has been summed up by L. Montigny in his *Les systèmes fortifiées dans la défense de la France depuis 300 ans*.¹⁵ The discussions of the military laws of 1927-28 are full of references to the concept and to various specific examples, particularly to Serre de Rivière's line of fortresses between Verdun and Belfort planned and built after the disasters of 1870 and reinforced again and again before 1914. Some of the forts around Verdun, especially Vaux and Douaumont, proved that concrete especially constructed for purposes of fortification could withstand the heaviest bombardment. The defense of Verdun was the strongest single tradition of the war in France and had an immediate and uniform appeal to every Frenchman, so this example was cited in the endless debates about the technical details of the new *couverture*. As revealed by Painlevé in his speech on March 4, 1927, and by the preliminary *expose des motifs*, there were long discussions in the supreme war council.¹⁶ Financial difficulties intervened—by 1926 the inflation of the franc had assumed catastrophic proportions—so that the appropriations for the "Fortification of the northwest frontier," as the bill was originally called, could not be voted before 1929.

With the reorganization of the French army and the completion of the Maginot Line in 1935 France definitely committed herself so exclusively to a defensive doctrine of war that offensive concepts were rejected *a priori*. By 1936 all attempts of the modern school to reconsider military doctrine were definitely shelved.¹⁷ The origins of the military laws and the Maginot Line mentality were merely manifestations of the passive attitude of the entire nation. This same lethargy is also responsible for the emergence of the strategic and military doctrines so mercilessly trampled under foot in the courtroom of Riom.

The origin of the French military doctrine, its development, and gradual decline into dry rot formed a complex process, over-simplification of which can very easily become the enemy of precision. Such errors were committed by the defendants at the Riom trial when they

¹⁵*Revue militaire française*, LVII-LVIII (September-December, 1935), in four installments.

¹⁶See *Chambre, débats*, CXXXI, 484, and *documents*, CXVI-CXVII (1929), 367. Concerning the genesis of the Maginot Line the best authority is P. Belperron, *Maginot of the Line* (London, 1940). See also S. B. Leeds, *These Rule France* (New York, 1940).

¹⁷For a dispassionate summary of French problems on the eastern frontier, see General Debeney, *Sur la sécurité militaire de la France* (Paris, 1930). See also H. Pol, *Suicide of a Democracy* (New York, 1940).

derisively quoted Pétain's foreword to General Chauvineau's book, *Une invasion, est-elle encore possible?*,¹⁸ in which Chauvineau elaborated the doctrine of the continuous front, that is, the necessity of fortified lines of trenches which would bar passage to the enemy and could be easily defended. He rejected the mass employment of tanks and hardly mentioned airplanes. His faith was in small defensive weapons, and particularly in rapid lines of communication capable of throwing enough reserves to a threatened point. In other words, the doctrine of limited defense which would be cheap, particularly as regards the expenditure of man power, and would become very costly to the enemy.

To this work Pétain wrote a foreword. The passage so incriminating to him was read on March 18 at the Riom trial by Daladier.¹⁹ It says, "direct action of aerial forces in battle is a moot question . . . it is by individual action over the rear that aviation activity is exercised most efficiently." Nobody read Pétain's preface to Vauthier's book on Douhet, however, from which a very different argument could be construed as regards the marshal's opinion. Neither did anyone mention his preface to General Sikorsky's *La Guerre moderne, son caractère, ses problèmes*,²⁰ which fully elaborated De Gaulle's theories. A reviewer mentions somewhat sarcastically that the preface includes everything conceivable from Maginot Line to blitzkrieg via total war, which merely increased the confusion.²¹

Whence came this confusion? From this impact of the new theories of Douhetism and *attaque brusquée* upon the glorious traditions with which the French army emerged from the long struggle on November 11, 1918. Since the German and Italian doctrines were continuously discussed in the press as a terrible menace, and at the same time the achievements of the French army in the World War were continuously held up as the deeds of an invincible nation, of the *grande nation*,

¹⁸Paris, 1929. Pol says that this book was being sedulously read by French officers in the case-mates of the Maginot Line during the winter of 1939-40 (*op. cit.*, p. 188). See also M. Werner, *Battle for the World* (New York, 1941), *passim*.

¹⁹New York Times, March 19, 1942.

²⁰Paris, 1935.

²¹*Army Quarterly*, XXXV (1938), 184. For an objective appraisal of Pétain it is indispensable to read J. M. Bourget, "La légende de Maréchal Pétain," *Revue de Paris*, XII (1931), 57-70. The author traces the origin of the legend and shows what an injustice it did to the Maréchal by creating a symbol of the defense and only of the defense, whereas he favored the attack too, as proved by his actions in the second period of the battle of Verdun and in the Riff campaign. It was, however, his attitude during the first period of Verdun which made such an indelible impression on his countrymen. The second symbolic meaning attached to his character was an inexhaustible moral force as a consequence of the restoration of the French army's fighting spirit after the mutinies of April-May, 1917. For this, see H. Carre, "Le moral élément de la victoire; l'oeuvre de Maréchal Pétain," *Correspondence*, CCLXXVII (1919), 384-404; P. du Colombier, "Le Maréchal Pétain de l'Académie," *Revue critique des idées et des livres*, XXVIII (1920) 130-50.

the man in the street gradually lost his way in this chaos of military opinion. The Frenchman thirsts for glory and so he would rather cling to his cherished illusions about the invincibility of his army and close his eyes to the new heresies coming from abroad. Modern war is science and science does not mix with illusions. There were only a few personalities in France, just as everywhere else among the democracies of the world, who had the scientific perception and enough courage to tear themselves loose from these prejudices and sentimentalisms. Others, who because of their positions had to note scientific doctrines and new theories, lacked either the ability or the energy to find a compromise sufficiently elastic to preserve the constructive elements of the old, yet embody the new. So, like Pétain and Weygand, they haphazardly talked about everything, merely increasing the confusion.

In tracing the conflict of new ideas one must necessarily begin with a study of General Debeney's *La guerre et les hommes; réflexions d'après guerre*.²² In the chapter about doctrine he traces developments in the French and German armies up to 1914. His discussions of French strategic thought and the exact origin of French tactical principles before 1914 are an invaluable source of information. He finds that the high casualties of that year were due to the fact that since 1871 the French had imitated the Germans, finally accepting their doctrine of attack *à outrance*. Consequently they had suffered terrific losses. But the Germans, he said, also paid dearly for their folly, and therefore he concluded that too much faith in a doctrine is dangerous and advised the younger generation of officers not to take the initiative in the next war immediately, but only after experience had revealed the realities of the situation.²³ This lesson, learned in 1914 and throughout the war, was driven home with such impact upon the French military mind that in their fear of new holocausts officers distrusted every doctrine except the safest one, which provided for shelter in permanent heavy fortifications when attacked and offered the protection of enormous creeping barrages when attacking. It is this deep desire to save the precious blood of the nation—bled white in the last war and decimated further by *dénatalité*—which dominates military theory and there is no more characteristic passage in the entire French military literature than the one cited above from Debeney's book.

Another very revealing book is *Défense nationale, notre sécurité*, by E. Bénazet,²⁴ president of the commission of air armaments in the senate. In 1912 the author was French military observer at-

²²Paris, 1937.

²³p. 169-70.

²⁴Paris, 1938.

tached to the Bulgarian armies in the Balkan war, and he came back with an urgent recommendation to include heavy artillery in the equipment of field armies. Like De Gaulle thirty years later, he was ignored. In 1914 lack of heavy artillery almost cost France the victory of the Marne. At best inferior armament caused greater sacrifices in men. For the Germans' superior guns could throw twice the weight in lead that the French could. The difference was made up by filling the gaps with men. This is not solely Bénazet's conclusion; it runs like a red streak through French military literature.

To the shock caused by the appalling loss of life in the French ranks as a result of the tremendous fire power of the German armies in 1914 was added the impression of the battle of Verdun, where the newly created French heavy artillery saved the country. Pétain became a living symbol of this triumph and his mystic words: "Fire kills," became a slogan in the French army. The Verdun legend, the Pétain legend, the Maginot legend, all finally blended into a superstition of fire power—so strong that it crippled progress and initiative. If, under pressure from a clamorous minority, some concessions had to be made to new ideas, they were invariably subordinated to the favorite theories of fire power, as in General L. Maurin's *L'Armée moderne*.²⁵ This book, in its time, was considered a fundamental contribution to French military thought, although it was not as popular as Chauvineau's. It is more methodical and indulges in deep analyses. Maurin's views on tank warfare conform to the general pattern: the fetish of fire protection. Tanks must not run beyond the protective curtain of artillery because modern anti-tank fire is so efficient—"le feu tue!"—that it must be destroyed by heavy artillery before tanks can safely move. This superstition is responsible for the fact that, as the Riom investigation brought out, French tanks never had more than five hours of fuel supply because they were not supposed to operate outside the visible range of artillery.²⁶ As a consequence they were often captured by the Germans because they were out of gas. According to General Maurin's tactical principles, however, planes fared even worse than tanks in the confusion of fire power doctrines; they were almost exclusively mere adjuncts of artillery.²⁷

²⁵Paris, 1938.

²⁶New York Sun, March 20, 1942; New York Times, April 1, 1942.

²⁷One of the by-products of the doctrine of fire power was the exaggerated idea of the importance of *matériel*, prompted by the colossal need for ammunition to feed fire power. Chauvineau, who was greatly impressed by the German *Autobahn* program, noted that attack must break down because the supply will not be able to follow it, but defense will only gain by the tremendous advance of motorized transportation. See also the characteristic article by A. Corquin, "Le matériel commande la tactique," *Revue militaire générale*, July, 1937.

Despite all the imponderabilia of fire power and *matériel*, the French doctrine had one relieving feature: the element of elastic defense closely connected with the employment of tanks. Indeed, the only arm of the service that emerged unscathed from the oratorical free-for-all at Riom was the tank corps. In his two hour testimony on April 1 Colonel J. P. Perré deeply moved the court by describing how well the French tanks fought before succumbing to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy. He boldly declared that the French tank doctrine answered the needs of France, but that deliveries had been slow and therefore the French army went to war with insufficient tank equipment.

Colonel Perré was a veteran of the great tank battles of 1918; he had written many articles in military periodicals; he had given lectures; and in 1937 he had published a book entitled *Les chars de combat*. Though encumbered with the dead weight of fire power theories, his book seeks a way out by looking for a combination happily blending his own theory of mobility and the official view on elastic defense, which thereby could be infused with more vigor. Another progressive tank officer was General Brossé, who wrote two books: *Les fronts de combat* and *Les éléments de notre défense*.²⁸ A single article, however, "L'appui d'infanterie par les chars rapides et l'artillerie,"²⁹ brought him more fame. In it he set forth the ideas of elastic defense and scientific attack so well that the executive officer of the Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, endorsed his views as "the best statement of tactical doctrine."³⁰ The *Revue militaire générale*, the leading French military magazine, published another article on tanks in its September, 1937, issue entitled "Considerations sur l'offensive." The author, Major Krebs, reviewing the new official *Instructions sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités*, pointed to its advocacy of the attack whenever the enemy gave a favorable opportunity.³¹

²⁸Paris, 1932, and Paris, 1937.

²⁹*Revue militaire générale*, June, 1937.

³⁰*Command and General Staff School Quarterly*, XVIII (1938), 93.

³¹In the October 22, 1937, issue, the tank columnist of the *Militärwochenblatt* compared the German and French tank doctrines with very favorable conclusions for the French. The tank men were the most alert group in the French army, continually discussing foreign progress and new problems. The famous work of the German General Eimannsberger was discussed on many occasions and long reviews were published of the new edition of his book in the November 1938 issues of *Revue d'infanterie* and *Revue militaire générale*. But perhaps the most remarkable contribution was made by G. le Guest in the March 1939 issue of *Revue d'infanterie*, when he elaborated on the employment of tanks in winter and on the construction of snow fortresses against them. His views were borne out by their value to the Germans in the terrible winter of 1941-42 in Russia.

The Germans held the French tank men in high esteem and watched their every move on the other side of the Maginot Line. Thus it happened that they immediately discovered the most brilliant among them, Charles De Gaulle, who in his own country passed unnoticed with his epoch making book, *Vers l'armée de métier*,³² in which he completely elaborated the organization and tactics of the armored division. In connection with the tragic fate of De Gaulle, it is interesting to read what two famous American generals said about tactical and strategic innovations:

It is unavailing, if a few men perceive the correct principles of strategy and go about a nation thundering them in vain. It would have been unavailing for Jesus of Nazareth if he had had no twelve disciples, no following, if his teachings had not spread to many peoples and many lands.³³

The two authors add that tactical and strategic ideas, no matter how sound, do not produce results unless they become the directing force and the motive energy not only behind the government but behind the concentrated effort of a united people.

De Gaulle's teachings spread "to many peoples and many lands" but in the meantime Jerusalem was destroyed. That this had to happen is unquestionably the strongest indictment of the French military organization and particularly of its leadership, which the defense at Riom exploited with great effect. They pointed out how the German tank expert, General H. Guderian, incorporated De Gaulle's views in his book *Achtung Panzer!*³⁴ General Guderian himself tells about it in "Armored Forces," published in the *Infantry Journal*,³⁵ where in support of his theories he gives full credit to De Gaulle at a time when De Gaulle's book was already four years old and in his own country he was still an unknown man! The way the Germans discovered De Gaulle and the way the French forced him to remain in obscurity is very dramatically told by Ph. Barrès, *Charles De Gaulle*.³⁶ The leader of the Free French movement, however, erected the greatest monument to his genius in a memorandum written after the outbreak of the war which was submitted by him on January 26, 1940, to Generals Gamelin and Weygand, to Daladier, and to his only supporter among

³²Paris, 1934; American edition, *The Army of the Future* (Philadelphia, 1941).

³³Henry E. Arnold and I. Eaker, *Winged Warfare* (New York, 1941), p. 160.

³⁴Berlin, 1936.

³⁵XLVIII (Washington, 1938), 418-21 and 522-29.

³⁶New York, 1941.

the politicians, P. Reynaud.³⁷ In this memorandum De Gaulle predicted the forcing of the Maginot Line by the Germans, deplored "l'obscur sentiment d'impuissance" which spread in the army as a result of inactivity, and urged the speedy organization of armored divisions.

A few of them were organized, but without air cooperation despite the fact that dive bombers, as was asserted at Riom, acting in *stuka* fashion with motorized divisions, were also an original French conception attributed to General Joseph Doumenc.³⁸ Like De Gaulle, however, Doumenc was a prophet without honor in his own country, and very few people in France advocated the use of the air force in close cooperation with tanks. A brilliant exception was General Mouchard, who wrote, "Le factor aérien dans la guerre modern."³⁹

To produce tank-airplane teamwork, cooperation between aviation and ground forces is the *conditio sine qua non*. At Riom it was disclosed that rivalry between artillery and air force as to which should control observation planes nullified the whole idea.⁴⁰ This is substantiated by General Culman's works, three bulky volumes on strategy, tactics, and particularly artillery, which laid with ponderous arguments the foundations for the fire power doctrine. In the February 11, 1938, issue of *La France militaire* he dismissed the importance of air warfare and relegated it to liaison and reconnaissance work, going in his incredible short-sightedness to the length of pointing to similar theories in Germany.⁴¹ Culman was too great an authority for anyone to assume that these were merely his private views. Pétain's famous preface to Chauvineau's book is evidence enough to bear out Guy La Chambre's statement at Riom, admitted by General Bernard, chief of the army service corps, that the army did get the type of planes they wanted, i.e., mostly reconnaissance. That was the policy of the army, he said, and as air minister he was merely the executor of that policy.⁴²

³⁷Published in the original text and with English translation in *National Revue*, CXV (London, 1940), 393-445.

³⁸*Christian Science Monitor*, April 1, 1942. A similar fate befell General Velpy's brilliant suggestions expressed in his "Tactique d'hier et de demain," (*Revue militaire générale*, III [January 1938]). In his criticism of the French doctrine on employment of large units, Velpy advocates tanks in mass, followed by motorized infantry and strongly supported from the air. It is the perfect German blitzkrieg. No less an authority than General Eimannsberger, the founder of the German tank doctrine, discussed it in the *Militärwochenblatt* in two articles in the August 19 and 26 issues, 1938.

³⁹*Revue des questions de défense nationale*, May, 1939.

⁴⁰*New York Times*, March 27, 1942.

⁴¹One would be tempted to suspect that the German propaganda ministry produced this *Tragikomödie* in the pages of *La France militaire*.

⁴²*New York Times*, March 8 and 19, 1942.

Despite the reality of confusion and ignorance behind the facade, up to 1935 the French air force was considered the best in the world. The fallacy of this assumption was indicated by XXX in two articles. In the first, "Notre sécurité—l'aviation et l'armée,"⁴³ he shows that Douhetism had overthrown the balance of judgment in the French air force and resulted in the theory that the best way to combat the bomber was retaliation. In consequence the army cooperative units deteriorated and line officers forgot how to deal with air force units attached to their troops. These units mostly consisted of reserve machines and pilots. In "La France,—refera-t-elle son aviation,"⁴⁴ he gave a complete review of the appalling conditions in French aviation and offered remedies. His criticism culminated in the statement that the French air doctrine was completely worthless because the air ministry decided to produce planes known as model BCR (bombardment, combat, and reconnaissance).

The French air men, however, just as the tank men, produced very sound theories about the air tactics of the future. A monumental work on air war, *Aviation de bombardement*,⁴⁵ was published by C. Rougeron, head of the technical department of the ministry of air. Very methodically the author sets forth the tremendous possibilities of the plane in warfare. The book was not fully appreciated in France, but the *Royal Air Force Quarterly* published long excerpts from it and considered it one of the greatest contributions in the field.⁴⁶ Another French air man, Captain D. Poulain, whose views were characteristically published in England also, set forth with that clear logic for which Frenchmen are so well known the exact nature of *blitzkrieg* as it was developed by the German and Italian forces in their Spanish Civil War laboratory.⁴⁷ Whereas Rougeron put the emphasis on the bomber, XXX in his "Notre sécurité aérienne: chasse ou bombardement," upheld the dominance of the pursuit plane, the number of which in

⁴³*Revue des deux mondes*, 8th per., XL (1937), 519-38. Much of this is substantiated in Pierre Cot's speech on February 2, 1937, in *Chambre, débats*, CLXI, 281.

⁴⁴*Revue de France*, July 15 and August 1, 1938, pp. 184-203 and 327-55.

⁴⁵Two vols., Paris, 1937.

⁴⁶VIII (1937), 1-14. The review was written by General N. N. Golovine whom Fischer von Poturzyn considers as the official spokesman of the British air ministry as regards air doctrine (*op. cit.*). Golovine's four long articles in the *Royal Air Force Quarterly* (Vol. VII) on "Air Strategy," later published in book form, present a program which was carried out by the RAF almost to the letter. To what extent Rougeron influenced the British remains to be seen; the fact is that his views read as if they had been based on the experiences of the war. In an article in the February 1938 issue of *Revue de l'armée de l'air*, entitled "L'aviation et les chars de combat," he advocates aircraft as the best anti-tank weapon.

⁴⁷"Aircraft and mechanized land warfare—the battle of Guadalajara, 1937," and "The Role of Aircraft in the Spanish Civil War," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, LXXXIII (1938), 362-68 and 581-86.

France he estimated at 350.⁴⁸ He argued that the best defense against bombardment is to attack the bombers where they cannot get away: in the air. Certainly a very sound view in the light of the battle of England.

France, as so often in her history, produced a galaxy of talent but unfortunately for her in this period—the most critical in her history and in the annals of Europe—it was wasted. While Rougeron, Poulain, and XXX deduced the most logical conclusions from the Spanish Civil War, the officials and generals who were responsible for formulating the doctrine of the French armed forces on modern lines, ignored them and decided that the Spanish experience invalidated their modern views.⁴⁹ There was no place in France for original ideas. In consequence the products of French logic and inventiveness were used by others. England, which created the best air force, saved herself with methods clearly set forth by Rougeron, and Germany overran France with ideas elaborated by her most celebrated son, De Gaulle.

Much has been said both inside and outside the Riom courthouse about production in France, or rather, about the lack of it. The prosecution accused Blum's popular front government of gross mismanagement but no substantial evidence could be produced. The fiercest attacks were directed against Pierre Cot, who was Blum's air minister and retained his portfolio until the beginning of 1938. His book, *L'armée de l'air 1936-38*,⁵⁰ suggests that the government laid too much emphasis on the assumption that the combined forces of England, France, Russia, and Czechoslovakia would always out-produce the Axis.

André Maurois' *Tragedy in France*⁵¹ shows the petty rivalries and squabbles among the French politicians and generals entrusted with providing the wherewithal for the French war machine. The thesis of the book, which is one of the best of the flood of literature on the fall of France, is that French national life in its highest spheres was interested only in personal feuds and insignificant but angry political quarrels. If we accept this view at all it can be applied only to the surface symptoms. Deep down in the French national psyche a crisis was brewing, which paralyzed the collective will. This is illustrated by H. W. Ehrman's profound article, "The Blum Experiment and the

⁴⁸*Revue des deux mondes*, 8th per., XXXVIII (1938), 761-74.

⁴⁹Daladier's statement at Riom, *New York Times*, March 19, 1942.

⁵⁰Paris, 1939.

⁵¹London, 1940.

Fall of France,"⁵² which analyzes the economic conditions of France during this crucial period. He comes to the conclusion that the social legislation of the *front populaire*, so much abused by the fascist-inclined generals, caused only a ripple in French economic life which, since the depression, had been undergoing a very grave crisis originating in fundamental organic and psychological troubles. From a memorandum written by Paul Reynaud he quotes the following: "The creative spirit and the taste for risk have all but disappeared. Let's not fear to say it: this is the basic evil. For it adds an abdication, as it were, to our economic depression."⁵³

This word "abdication" must be applied to the military system of the country, too, in which the terrible bloodletting of the World War created a permanent "depression." General Duval declared in 1938, with the exaggeration of despair, that the French military system had not changed much since 1875,⁵⁴ and the same is true of her economic system. The World War crippled her as far as national defenses were concerned, and similarly the tremendous economic efforts in the same struggle weakened her finances to an extent from which she could never recover.

Another fundamental cause of the tragedy of the Third Republic was the great variety of permanent boards and offices entrusted with important tasks in connection with military problems—elaborate planning for armaments and organizing the vast machinery which, in every army, has to work smoothly and efficiently on M Day. There were the council of national defense and the supreme war council, both charged with central direction. Then there were the various ministries with advisory councils of their own. In the jungle of so many offices, red tape and personal rivalries could completely defeat or emasculate any healthy project.

Moreover, when the creeping malady of the French national body pervaded this labyrinth of supreme authorities, even strong personalities would quickly fritter away their energies without accomplishing anything. Therefore the continuous agitation for a united ministry

⁵²*Foreign Affairs*, XX (New York, 1941), 152-65.

⁵³P. 157. This memorandum was submitted by Reynaud to the president in November, 1938. Ehrman does not give any further references. Cf. M. Tardy, "La nationalisation et le contrôle des industries de guerre," *Revue de France*, September 1, 1938, pp. 89-109, a technical article coming to the conclusion that the effect of nationalization was to discourage initiative, which substantiates the Reynaud memorandum. To see the tremendous contrast between the inane and stagnating French economic system and the feverishly active, nay, revolutionary, German armament industry, cf. L. Engel, "The Sources of Germany's Might," *Harper's*, July 1942, pp. 199-268.

⁵⁴"L'armée française de 1938," *Revue de Paris*, August 15, 1938.

of national defense could not produce any practical results unless that ministry were to be invested with dictatorial power. But the fear of centralized military authority was too great in France and when A. Tardieu, prime minister in 1932, forced adoption of such a measure it was quickly repealed again.⁵⁵ In 1936 the Blum government revived it but with diminished powers for the minister. From that day until the catastrophe Daladier held the post.⁵⁶ But, as the evidence of the Riom trial shows, constant friction existed between Daladier and the military authorities. His parliamentary speeches, on the other hand, reflect perfect harmony. At any rate, Daladier's contradictory and confusing attitude proves Maurois' thesis that his weak and vacillating personality was greatly responsible for the negative results of the defense ministry.

In contrast to Daladier we find Paul Reynaud, the principal exponent of the De Gaulle school in parliament and a vigorous leader with deep republican convictions. His views can be studied in his major work, *Le problème militaire française*,⁵⁷ which is a criticism of the French doctrine of defense and of the fundamental laws of 1927-28, and a program for the establishment of a professional army of De Gaulle's model. Despite his relentless agitation, despite the support he gave De Gaulle in his books and in his speeches, despite the able assistance of his followers, he could produce no results. The paralysis of the French military organization with its wide-spread ramifications in the body politic rendered his efforts fruitless, and when—too late—he became prime minister, he went down as a gallant captain of the doomed ship of state.

⁵⁵R. Hughes, "The Republic Arraigned," *The Nineteenth Century and After*, CXIX (1936), 657-88, reviews Tardieu's book *Le souverain captif* (Paris, 1936), and discusses not only Tardieu's official renunciation of the Third Republic, but the whole conservative influence in France. Conservatism, mingled with fascist motives, hides behind the dissatisfaction of the officers over existing conditions and their urgent demands to establish a unified ministry. For this General H. Mordacq's *Faut-il changer le régime?* (Paris, 1936) is an important source of information, in which the third chapter is significantly entitled: "Le sabotage de la défense nationale." In another, more objective work, *La défense nationale en danger* (Paris, 1938), he reviews the story of the struggle for unified direction of national defense and criticizes the interference of politicians in army matters. His thesis is that political influence destroys the morale of the army. There were many other advocates of unified command and the elimination of political influence, that is Left influence, from the army like General Niessel, "Les besoins militaires de la France," *Revue universelle*, LXXI (1937), 554-65.

⁵⁶On March 24, 1938, he gave a detailed history of this office. See *Chambre, débats*, CLXIV (1938), 950.

⁵⁷Paris, 1937. His other work, *Jeunesse—quelle France veux-tu?* (Paris, 1936), contains the same views in the form of a dialogue with a young Frenchman. His speeches since November 12, 1938, are collected in two volumes: *Courage de la France* (Paris, 1939), and *Finances de la guerre* (Paris, 1940). See also J. Veil, *Paul Reynaud* (Paris, 1940).

There is no more revealing information on the tragedy of France than a series of speeches in Vol. CLXI of the debates of the Chamber of Deputies held at the beginning of 1937. On January 26 Reynaud spoke, reviewing the European situation and criticizing the armament policy of the government which, with its adherence to the doctrine of defense, had lost to France her allies. His reference to the declaration made by the king of Belgium on October 14, 1936, terminating the alliance with France is particularly interesting. Daladier put his full faith in the French army and its leaders, especially in Gamelin and Pétain, who had established the doctrine of the efficiency of fire power: "fire kills." In the future, Daladier said, whole nations will fight with all kinds of weapons. France cannot put her fate into the hands of two or three hundred thousand professional soldiers as advocated by the school of the *armée de métier*.⁵⁸

In this oratory one can find the crux of the whole problem. At the end of his speech on March 24, 1938, Daladier gave a definition of the military doctrine of France: a great colonial power, a Mediterranean power, and a continental European power; she must defend her territory, her air, her waters, and her colonies. That statement is like Pétain's foreword to Sikorsky's book: it included everything. As to the establishment of a unified ministry which would deal with all these problems, he thought that it would be too much for one man, and that if there should be a man capable of handling it, that would be too dangerous. He believed in the method of democratic persuasion.⁵⁹

Put in the glaring light of the Riom trial, we may say that this is the real tragedy of France: a deep faith in democracy and her republican institutions which—did not work. Why? To answer this question adequately should be a challenge and inspiration to historians for years to come. Meanwhile an epitaph could be written on the grave of that parliament which went down together with France in 1940 by using Reynaud's statement of February 26, 1938, that since the armistice of 1918 the French legislature had spent 372 billion francs on the armed forces and yet the nation was too weak to pursue a strong policy. Instead it retired meekly behind the Maginot Line.

⁵⁸Bénazet (*op. cit.*, p. 178) declares that the professional force which was proposed in parliament could not be created because of the general ill-will felt in France against professional soldiers. Perhaps the supreme mistake of De Gaulle and his group was that they emphasized so much the element of professionalism and *élite*, though they meant it in the sense of expert handling of the complicated machinery of an armored division.

⁵⁹Chambre, *débates*, CLXVI (1938), 950.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

A meeting of leading historians interested in the establishment of a War History Commission was held at The National Archives, Washington, D. C., on December 29, 1942. The conference was the result of a suggestion made in a letter to the President by Dr. Bernadotte E. Schmitt of the University of Chicago that such a commission be created to coordinate the collection and preservation of source material relating to the war and the prosecution of research in military history. Further consideration of the problem led to the realization that the scope of activity of existing agencies was insufficient to afford substantial coverage of the field; the present conference was therefore called to review the entire matter.

Attending the sessions were Solon J. Buck, Archivist of the United States; Lester J. Cappon, University of Virginia; Shepard B. Clough, State Department; John Cory (representing Henry Pringle), Office of War Information; Harvey A. DeWeerd, United States Army; Luther H. Evans, Library of Congress; Guy Stanton Ford, American Historical Association; John F. Fulton, National Research Council; Pendleton Herring, Committee on Records of War Administration; Emmett J. Leahy, United States Navy; Waldo G. Leland, American Council of Learned Societies; Allan Nevins, Columbia University; Roy F. Nichols, University of Pennsylvania; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Harvard University; Laurence F. Schmeckebier, Brookings Institution; Bernadotte E. Schmitt, University of Chicago; Ralph Turner, State Department; Donald E. Young, Social Science Research Council; and Dan Lacy, secretary.

Reports were presented by Dr. Leland on historical activities in the last war; Dr. Herring, on historical research being undertaken in the Federal government through the Committee on Records of War Administration in the Division of Administrative Management of the Bureau of the Budget; and by Mr. Lacy on plans for the collection and preservation of materials, other than records of the Federal government, relating to the history of the war. The conference passed a resolution approving in principle the plan for the establishment of an

official National History Commission as an individual government agency responsible to the President. It was agreed that the objectives of the Commission were to include "the collection and preservation of source materials; the preparation of 'first narratives,' reports, and other consciously created sources including official accounts; the preparation of guides to sources relating to the war; the publication by print or microfilm of significant bodies of source materials; the preparation of a general history or histories of the war; and private research in the field of war history." A steering committee including Dr. Evans as chairman and Drs. Buck, Ford, Herring, and Leland as members was appointed to develop plans for the commission and to attempt to give effect to the resolutions presented at this conference.


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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Red Army, by Michel Berchin and Eliahu Ben-Horin. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc. 1942. Pp. 277. \$3.00.)

Although a sketchy and not very accurate or objective historical narrative account of the development of the Red Army, this book is sufficiently timely to appeal to the lay reader. Basically, however, the work adds virtually nothing to the literature concerning the Soviet fighting forces.

The statement carried on the book's jacket, probably through no fault of the authors, to the effect that this is the first time an objective analysis of the Red Army has been presented to the American public is fortunately not the case. The prospective reader has only to turn to the work of Max Werner to find a far more competent and exhaustive, though not always entirely accurate, analysis of the Red Army's fighting potential, strength, organization, strategy, tactics, leadership, supply, morale, and operational ability and method. Evidently the authors realized the worth of Werner's books for they have drawn heavily upon them in addition to Captain S. Kournakov and United States, German and British press reports.

The brief chapter dealing with the organization of the Red Army does not adequately treat this very important subject. In developing the matter of the ratio between peasants and workers in the make-up of the Army, figures are cited for no later than 1934. It is apparent that the 1939 census figures, which are readily available, would have yielded more up-to-date information. Again, in discussing percentages of officers according to social groups represented in the army, the figures cited are for 1926.

Conclusions drawn from an analysis of published sources indicate that strength statistics given in this chapter are not too far off the mark. Figures for the tank park (June 1941), however, appear to be excessive and those for the artillery park (medium and heavy), low. Certainly, there should have been more information presented concerning types of artillery, tanks and other *matériel* and weapons; numbers alone are no criterion of strength. It is also obvious that any discus-

sion of organization should have included a consideration of the signal corps, engineers, and services of supply, not to mention intelligence and counterintelligence. Finally, all strength figures in this chapter are for no later than June 1941. Strength figures for June 1942 would have been far more revealing and could have been arrived at by weighing troop losses against reserves trained and placed under arms, and by an analysis of supply and *matériel* losses as compared with new Soviet production and Lend-Lease increments.

While only 22 pages are devoted to the organization of the army, 20 pages are given to the Red Army Air Force. Although accorded disproportionate space, no new material is presented in this chapter, with the possible exception of a description of the now famous but mystery-shrouded Stormovik dive bomber-attack plane. In regard to the Stormovik, anyone who has studied the current literature published by various aircraft trade journals will not take too seriously the statement (p. 91) that this plane mounts four 37 mm. cannon. Other published sources confirm the fact, as pointed out in this chapter, that Soviet aviation development has suffered because of inadequacies in aircraft and allied industries and the removal in 1937 of some top flight designers, including the famous Tupolev.

The necessarily brief resume of the first thirteen months of the war on the Soviet-German Front is fairly accurate. But, because of brevity, this section suffers from over-simplification. Actually, the vast front from Murmansk to Rostov was, and is today, the scene of the most complicated and intricate kind of warfare. There has been nothing in the history of warfare to match the colossal nature of the continuing Soviet-German struggle.

DAVID S. CRIST¹

Major, Infantry, AUS

The Command of the Air, by Giulio Douhet, translated by Dino Ferrari. (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. 1942. Pp. 394. \$4.00.)

Giulio Douhet rates a place among the major prophets. For twenty years this Italian General has remained something of a specter in the background of totalitarian war and rumors of war. His name came to be identified with unrestricted ruthlessness via unlimited use of the air arm against civil populations, whereas in fact, he was simply a military

¹The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the above review are those of the individual officer. They do not necessarily represent official War Department opinion nor that of the Service at large.

seer who refused to blink the military truths of the generation in which he lived. From the evidence of the World War, he reached certain definite conclusions about the nature of modern military power and its evolution in the period immediately ahead, and he proceeded to make these conclusions of record.

This is the book which is now being published in the United States. As the Irishman said when his horse came in last in a field of sixteen: "Pray what detained you?" It is a good question. One by one the books which the great European strategists wrote many years ago about future war (this war) are being put in type in this country. In the wake of the World War, we got a smattering of von Bernhardt and of other creaking generals who were still concerned primarily with things which they ought to have striven to forget. But to the new military school, our national ear listened not at all. We had to wait for another war before heeding De Gaulle or Douhet, or for that matter, before reading *Mein Kampf*. J. F. C. Fuller's great book, *F. S. R. III*, the blueprint for tank warfare, was never printed in this country, nor was it reviewed by the service publications. We had no feeling for military books except such as assured us that the defensive form of war is superior to the offensive by three-to-one.

Now that we are at war, there is a veritable spate of resurrected volumes. They sound no warning, because it is much too late for that. In essence, and for our present purposes, they are not more than curiosities in the literature of war. The idle will collect them as such. The more studious will reflect upon their contents and will find therein the lesson that closed minds are a greater danger to a nation than closed arsenals and gun pits. There is no longer more profit than that in reading De Gaulle, Fuller, Douhet, or for that matter, Mitchell.

As for Douhet, the body of his work will stand the test of today's events, and maybe of tomorrow's. For when he says this: "The fact that Germany leads the world in both fields, chemico-bacteriological and mechanical, must not be lost sight of. Already we see signs that she is thinking along those lines, that she will apply the intensity, the unswerving purpose which has always distinguished her people, to the development of those new weapons of war," he is pointing to an as yet unmet danger that none who know the Nazi mind will summarily rule out. It could happen, and the nations must reckon with it, even as they reckon with the probability of a return to gas warfare.

In the truest sense, this is a brutal book because it makes a cold calculation of the brutality which is in certain of the sectors of humanity,

specifically, the totalitarian sectors where the only question facing the militarist is: "Can we get away with it?" Douhet clearly saw the working of that principle even as he foresaw its effect upon our civilization, for he was a realist among realists. For him, no nice definitions such as that of Lewis Mumford when he explains that "War is the destructive solution of an unbearable tension and conflict between organic impulses." Says Douhet flatly: "War is a conflict between two basically opposed wills. On one side is the party who wants to occupy . . . the earth and on the other stands the party who intends to oppose that occupation."

A great many of the present thinkers have spun millions of words in explanation of the present conflict. None has stated the case more concretely.

S. L. A. MARSHALL¹

Major, Infantry, AUS

All-Out on the Road to Smolensk, by Erskine Caldwell. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1942. Pp. 230. \$2.50.)

Moscow War Diary, by Alexander Werth. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942. Pp. 297. \$3.00.)

Mission to Moscow, by Joseph A. Davies. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1941. Pp. 659. \$3.00.)

The day of the great and informed war correspondent, the man who was allowed to go to the war, see and describe it, and who knew something of the war in the bargain, seems over forever. There is no more Russell of the *Times*, or Col. Lionel James of a later *Times*, or Henry W. Nevinnson. There is not even a Richard Harding Davis left, which is no loss except to sensationalists. The armies have never been fond of the war correspondent, or for that matter of the military correspondent, and the Nazi solution of turning soldier members of "propaganda companies" into war reporters is only the logical outcome of this dislike. The most intelligent writing on war now comes from the military correspondent, among whose fore-runners in this country, strangely enough, were Engels and Marx, who once corresponded for the *New York Tribune*.

The two newspaper men, Caldwell and Werth, endlessly complain that they were not allowed to see the war at the front, but we are not

¹The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the above review are those of the individual officer. They do not necessarily represent official War Department opinion nor that of the Service at large.

convinced that they would have seen its true face or significance if they had been, judging from their reports of a week's stay along a quiet sector where they were taken for a guided tour. For this the already well-bludgeoned censors are in no way to blame, for both the gentlemen of the press wrote their books outside the reach of the censoring scissors, and still their books are not in the least more important than their earlier censored despatches. What they could not see or grope for themselves in the Moscow blackout they collected from soldiers' stories which they did not always understand, or which were a little Munchausean. Caldwell accepts at face value the story of a Red Army officer that ten or twelve large German tanks, "when within range of our trenches" suddenly raced along these trenches, speeding up to 45 miles an hour (!!), and at this speed made infantry with machine guns jump off, with the natural consequence that both men and guns were injured. Caldwell details the story of German "psychological attack," about which we have not read much that makes sense. Instead of spreading their lines thin for an attack, the Germans marched forward in close ranks "attempting to create the illusion of a small detachment." How this could be done without being discovered, except by marching against one man and in the total absence of any lateral observation, we cannot imagine.

None of us will withhold the admiration due to a gallant ally, but how can we possibly share this enthusiasm of Caldwell when he writes, "The carrying capacity of this highway to Smolensk was doubled soon after the war started by shortening the running distance between trucks from four lengths to two lengths. This would have increased the danger of collision if it had not been for the fact that collisions were forbidden in any way. In any other country in the world it would have been difficult to remove the possibility of human error. . . ." (p. 132). Caldwell is clearly more at home along Tobacco Road than on the road to Smolensk.

Werth in his *Moscow Diary*, covering the months from July to November 1941, has an advantage over his newspaper colleague, for he knows the Russian language, people, and recent history better than Caldwell. He frankly admits that an aircraft detection station "was all very impressive, though I don't understand much about it" (p. 97). He realized that the correspondents' pieces would never cover the struggle where it was greatest—"that's the weakest point of the journalism here." But the atmosphere behind the front and the sayings of the people portrayed are recognized as genuine by anyone who has

been in Russia during wartime; for example he has picked up an amazing but real-sounding German woman's letter to her Gottfried at the front, begging him to seize a fur coat for her in Russia. The military information imparted is scant, though there is an occasional common-sense remark such as that the Russian transportation system has stood up far better than had been prophesied by the experts, some of whom had actually described it as already broken down.

Earlier, pre-war correspondents from Moscow had certainly not prepared us for the stand that Russia made, or for a war of coalition. Former Ambassador Davies' book makes up for that, makes clear in fact how the Russian peace economy for several years before 1941 was keyed as in Germany for more cannons and less butter. To have seen the Russian preparations for (and in part against) the war, to have reported this home in time, although almost *ad nauseam*, is the outstanding feature of these reports on his mission.

The great success of Ambassador Davies' book is due to the fact that the American people wanted confirmation, even if belated, of the Russian strength. Before the general public was allowed to share it, Ambassador Davies had expressed his conviction about Russian purposes. This pre-war correspondent had just one thing to report, Russian preparation and strength for war. His views were, as he knew full well, "directly contrary to all of the opinions of the best military experts . . . but based upon what I myself had seen in Russia" (p. 476).

ALFRED VAGTS

Bureau of Economic Warfare

Radio in Wartime, by Sherman H. Dryer. (New York: Greenberg, Inc. 1942. Pp. 384. \$3.00.)

Radio is quite literally a "secret" weapon, for we do not yet know how to use it. The University of Chicago's director of radio productions, devoting himself to problems of the domestic beam rather than the shortwave, probes, points, and recommends. Years of subservience to sales promotion and Crossley ratings have left those responsible for radio almost totally unprepared for its sober wartime job. As specialists, they must abandon notions of pleasing the public. Rather, they must arouse in the public whatever responses are necessary for victory.

Mr. Dryer neither pussyfoots nor muckrakes in posing his dilemmas and controversies. But he occasionally succumbs to the temptation of painting his dilemmas so luridly that they seem more hopeless than they actually are. Thus the official government "Strategy of truth" is

opposed to a realistic "propaganda for the truth"—as if the former meant a completely objective, colorless, and neutral reporting of news. This tendency toward overcontrast is the more conspicuous in view of his explicit warning against "controversy for its own sake" over the radio. Thus a long chapter on "Discussion Programs" includes the latter among other specifications for successful programs of this type—specifications which are offered with pardonable pride as underlying the success of the Chicago Round Table Series.

To each chapter is appended a critique prepared by a well known student of or participant in contemporary radio offerings. Some of the chapters are illumined thereby. Samples of wartime scripts at their presumable best are reproduced in full. Government programs, including "This is War," are reviewed at length, and on the whole most favorably. As a handbook of contemporary issues and attempted solutions the volume probably has no serious competition.

THEODORE NEWCOMB

Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service

Our New Army, by Marshall Andrews. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1942. Pp. 225. \$1.50.)

A pictorial, quick-reading review of the Draft Army in training. The book consists of short, connected stories, anecdotal in nature, and carries a voltage. Impressions are instantaneous, the whole making a compact and keenly felt experience.

There are surprises which make the reading more than casual. The almost explosive expansion of our military forces, especially in known armaments, was anticipated; but such tid-bits as the retention of horse-cavalry for combat purposes, the formation of "grasshopper" units for artillery aerial spotting, the operation of tank-destroyer commands, and the training of paratroops are rare and welcome.

Throughout, the principal concern of the author is with morale. The description of the Army comes at a time when the nation has just passed the critical point in supply, mobilization, and training. The optimistic note, therefore, is justified. As the book is written solely for today's audience, it has military value for the civilian whether war-worker or prospective selectee. Best of all, perhaps, from any point of view, is the emphasis on the capacity of our officers implicit in his general praise.

HYMAN ROUDMAN

The National Archives

Military Ski Manual, by Frank Harper. (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 393. \$2.00.)

Winter sport has given way to winter war—a war which is fought in a fantastic setting of ice, rocks, and snow. The blasting of a mountain peak, building glacial forts which seem like fairy-tales, night maneuvers on the face of a mountain, where one's only guide is a sense of touch, or dropping down a mountain side on skis to dispatch an enemy with dagger, hand grenade or side arm are all in a day's work of a ski trooper. He travels by air, by motor sledge, by snow shoes and skis. He works as an individual or a member of a team enduring almost unbelievable hardships on wild and lonely missions.

The careful training of each trooper is essential to the success of the unit and the *Military Ski Manual* not only presents valuable basic information, but also emphasizes the necessity for an understanding of mountains and mountaineering.

Perhaps no one in the United States could have presented the subject of military skiing with the authority and interest of the author. Mr. Harper is not only a skier and alpinist of international reputation, but also a respected writer on military affairs. His knowledge of the mountains of Europe and unique problems of winter warfare add more than ordinary interest to the volume. It is a sound manual for the ski trooper, and at the same time, of unusual interest for the layman. The chapters dealing with the development of mountain troops in the first World War and use of ski troops in the present conflict are a distinct contribution to the field of military history.

Considerable interest is lent to the volume by including many photographs and a small glossary and selected bibliography.

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NOTES

LAND WARFARE

Books on military organization, strategy, tactics, weapons, and what-not continue to appear to meet the seemingly insatiable appetite of the public for information. The great majority of these publications are ephemera, and make no pretense at being profoundly critical. Penetrating analysis of present operations will have to wait the end of the war, when essential documentary information may become available. For the

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present, though, several recent book length reports by men at the fronts offer spot-information on World War II.

Richard Tregaskis, International News Service war correspondent, in his *Guadalcanal Diary* (New York: Random House. 1943. Pp. 263. \$2.50.) records events leading to the invasion of the island by American Marines and offers a rapid-fire report of action on Guadalcanal without attempting analysis. He writes of the intensity and elemental nature of jungle warfare and details the difficulties of operations on this terrain.

Similar to Tregaskis' study in its staccato-like presentation is A. B. Austin's report on the Deippe raid, *We Landed at Dawn* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1943. Pp. 217. \$2.00.) Austin, correspondent of the London *Daily Herald*, trained for the action with the Commandos and took part in the raid with the Four Commando, led by Lord Lovat.

An action study of tank warfare on the Russian front, *White Mammoths*, by Alexander Poliakov (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1943. Pp. 189. \$2.50.) has just been published. Poliakov, soldier-reporter, who gained prominence for his *Russians Don't Surrender*, was killed in action in October 1942. This posthumous report traces the career of a unit of giant KV tanks from the time they are built in a tank factory in the Urals to their participation in battle.

SEA WARFARE

Robert J. Casey, correspondent of the Chicago *Daily News* and one of America's outstanding reporters, has given us the story of naval action in the Pacific in *Torpedo Junction* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1942. Pp. 423. \$3.50.) Casey was in Hawaii shortly after Pearl Harbor and was present at the major engagements at sea through the Battle of Midway. A keen analyst and splendid narrator, though admittedly no naval expert, Casey has captured the spirit of war at sea and has reported it dramatically and with rare good humor.

W. Adolphe Roberts, biographer of Admiral Semmes and Sir Henry Morgan, has prepared a popular history of American naval action, *The U. S. Navy Fights* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1942. Pp. 275. \$2.75.) Here are to be found the stories of naval engagements from the Ranger-Drake affair during the Revolutionary War to the Battle of Midway of World War II.

In *Firedrake* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1943. Pp. 251. \$2.75.), A. D. Devine has described life on a British destroyer during the present war. *Firedrake* narrates the experiences of the ship in an engagement off Narvik, on convoy and submarine patrol, and in action in the Mediterranean. Well written by a man who possesses real affection for this smaller class of war vessel.

AIR WARFARE

Well worth inclusion in any military library is the first volume in a trilogy, *Winged Mars*, by John R. Cuneo. In this volume, *The German Air Weapon, 1870-1914* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co. 1942. Pp. 338. \$2.50.), Cuneo has presented a cogent and scholarly account of the development of the German air force from its origin in the establishment of a balloon section in the German army in 1883.

Strength statistics, organization charts of the German air arm, a 26-page bibliography, and many illustrations, are included as useful reference guides.

Also outstanding is John Steinbeck's *Bombs Away, The Story of a Bomber Team* (New York: Viking Press. 1942. Pp 185. \$2.50.) Written to specification, entirely devoid of partisanship or embroidery, this study of the making of a bomber team is excellent and instructive reading. Some sixty splendid photographs by John Swope

Allan A. Michie, in *The Air Offensive Against Germany* (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1943. Pp. 152. \$2.00.), indicates his belief that the Allies can bring Germany to the edge of defeat by a series of thousand-plane raids on her key cities. William B. Huie calls for action against the "ancient Gamelins" obstructing the development of the air service and for the recognition of the air weapon as "an independent, strategic, decisive weapon" in *The Fight for Air Power* (New York: L. B. Fischer. 1942. Pp. 310. \$2.50.).

MISCELLANEOUS

Students of arms history and collectors of antique arms will be interested in two books recently published by Herman P. Dean, West Virginia publisher. These two books are a second edition of Franklin W. Mann's encyclopedic *The Bullet's Fly, The Ballistics of Small Arms* (Huntington: Standard Printing and Publishing Co. 1942. Pp. 384. \$6.00.) and Walter M. Cline, *The Muzzle-Loading Rifle, Then and Now* (Huntington: Standard Printing and Publishing Company. 1842. Pp. 162. \$7.00.). Both books contain many illustrations and are first-rate examples of bookmaking.

Also of interest is a new book by Charles T. Haven, who has won renown for his studies of the Colt revolver and automatic arms. Haven has written *A Comprehensive Small Arms Manual* (New York: William Morrow and Co. 1943. Pp. 159. \$1.50.) for the use of state guards and other local defense units. This volume brings together and correlates information on all types of firearms and includes discussions of military and sporting type rifles, shotguns, sub-machine guns, pistols, and revolvers.

Two elementary manuals on map-reading have been released within the past few months. William M. Flexner and Gordon L. Walker, *Military and Naval Maps and Grids* (New York: Dryden Press. 1942. Pp. 96. \$1.00.), is a concise guide for students without extensive mathematical background. Emphasized in the manual are the general principles of the construction and use of maps and the properties of Gnomonic, Mercator, Lambert Conformal Conic, Stereographic, and American Polyconic types of maps.

Richard G. McCloskey's *Map and Aerial Photograph Reading* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co. 1943. Pp. 187. \$1.00.) is based on the field requirements of the Army. Sections of this manual cover conventional signs and symbols, distance and time, elevation, and relief, reading in the field, foreign map reading, and related subjects. The manual is illustrated and contains exercises on the text.

STUART PORTNER

War Relocation Authority

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Thucydides, by John H. Finley, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1942. Pp. 351. \$3.50.)

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Victory—and After, by Earl Browder. (New York: International Publishers. 1942. Pp. 256. \$2.00.)

The Nazi State, by William Ebenstein. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1943. Pp. 366. \$2.75.)

Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries, by Sylvester J. Hemleben. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1943. Pp. 241. \$2.50.)

Siberia, by Emil Lengyel. (New York: Random House. 1943. Pp. 439. \$3.75.)

Vichy: Two Years of Deception, by Léon Marchal. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 257. \$2.50.)

Men and Ideas: An Informal History of Chinese Political Thought, by Lin Moushng. (New York: John Day Company. Pp. 270. \$2.50.)

White Man's Folly, by Vanya Oakes. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 425. \$3.00.)

Make This the Last War: The Future of the United Nations, by Michael Straight. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1943. Pp. 427. \$3.00.)

NATIONAL WARFARE

Pacific Charter: Our Destiny in Asia, by Hallett Abend. (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1943. Pp. 310. \$2.50.)

The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-18, by Thomas A. Bailey. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1942. Pp. 537. \$3.50.)

Nazi Conquest Through German Culture, by Ralph F. Bischoff. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1942. Pp. 209. \$2.00.)

Government by Assassination, by Hugh Byas. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1942. Pp. 386. \$3.00.)

The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920, by Wilfrid H. Callcott. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1942. Pp. 539. \$3.50.)

The World of General Haushofer. Geopolitics in Action, by Andreas Dorpalen. (New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 1942. Pp. 358. \$3.50.)

German Psychological Warfare, by Ladislav Farago, ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1942. Pp. 324. \$3.00.)

News Is a Weapon, by Matthew Gordon. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1942. Pp. 274. \$2.50.)

Covering the Mexican Front, by Betty Kirk. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. 1942. Pp. 386. \$3.00.)

Economics in Uniform: Military Economy and Social Structure, by Albert T. Lauterbach. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. 293. \$3.00.)

Italy from Within, by Richard G. Massock. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 408. \$3.00.)

This Is the Enemy, by Frederick Oechsner and others. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1942. Pp. 364. \$3.00.)

- Balcony Empire: Fascist Italy at War*, by Reynolds and Eleanor Packard. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1942. Pp. 380. \$3.00.)
- The Self-Betrayed: Glory and Doom of the German Generals*, by Curt Riess. (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons. 1942. Pp. 418. \$3.00.)
- America and the Axis War*, by Denys Smith. (New York: Macmillan. 1942. Pp. 430. \$3.00.)
- Flight from Terror*, by Otto Strasser and Michael Stern. (New York: McBride. 1943. Pp. 361. \$3.00.)
- Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics*, by Hans W. Weigert. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1942. Pp. 283. \$3.00.)
- The Russians: the Land, the People, and Why They Fight*, by Albert Rhys Williams. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1943. Pp. 255. \$2.00.)

LAND WARFARE

- Chemistry in Warfare: Its Strategic Importance*, by Frederick A. Hessel and others. (New York: Hastings House. 1943. Pp. 189. \$2.00.)
- Engineers in Battle*, by Lt. Col. Paul A. Thompson. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1942. Pp. 108. \$1.50.)

SEA WARFARE

- Sea Lanes in Wartime*, by Robert G. Albion and Jennie B. Pope. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1942. Pp. 367. \$3.50.)
- There Go the Ships*, by Robert Carse. (New York: William Morrow & Company. 1942. Pp. 156. \$2.00.)
- Serpent of the Seas: The Submarine*, by Commander Harley F. Cope. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1942. Pp. 265. \$2.50.)
- From Perry to Pearl Harbor: The Struggle for Supremacy in the Pacific*, by Edwin A. Falk. (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1943. Pp. 362. \$3.00.)
- Aircraft Carrier*, by Lt. Robert A. Winston. (New York: Harper Brothers. 1942. Pp. 88. \$2.00.)

NATIONAL FORCES

- Fort Brown Historical*, by Joseph C. Sides. (San Antonio: Naylor Company. 1943. Pp. 172. \$2.00.)
- Lexington to Fallen Timbers, 1775-1794: Episodes from the Earliest History of our Military Forces*, by Randolph G. Adams and Howard H. Peckham, compilers. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1942. Pp. 41. \$1.00.)

MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS

- Captain of the Andes: The Life of Don Jose de San Martin, Liberator of Argentina, Chile, and Peru*, by Margaret H. Harrison. (New York: Richard R. Smith. 1943. Pp. 229. \$3.00.)
- Morgan and His Raiders*, by Cecil F. Holland. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 373. \$3.50.)
- Crazy Horse: The Strange Man of the Oglalas*, by Mari Sandoz. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1942. Pp. 438. \$3.50.)

World War II

- The Flying Guns: Cockpit Record of a Naval Pilot from Pearl Harbor Through Mid-*

- way, by Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson and Boyden Sparkes. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1942. Pp. 203. \$2.00.)
- Into the Valley: A Skirmish of the Marines*, by John Hersey. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1943. Pp. 138. \$2.00.)
- The War: Third Year*, by Edgar W. McInnis. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1943. Pp. 364. \$2.00.)
- The Way of a Pilot*, by Barry Sutton. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. 131. \$1.50.)
- War in the West: The Battle of France, May-June 1940*, by Daniel Vilfroy. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1942. Pp. 163. \$2.50.)
- War In Our Time*, by Harry B. Henderson and Herman C. Morris. (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company. 1942. Pp. 416. \$3.75.)
- Free Men Are Fighting: The Story of World War II*, by Oliver Gramling and others. (New York: Farrar & Rinehart. 1942. Pp. 504. \$3.50.)
- Battle for the Solomons*, by Ira Wolfert. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 199. \$2.00.)
- Behind Both Lines*, by Harold Denny. (New York: Viking Press. 1942. Pp. 219. \$2.50.)

CUSTOMS AND ANTIQUITIES

- The Flag of the United States*, by Milo Milton Quaife. (New York: Grossett & Dunlap. 1942. Pp. 224. \$2.00.)
- United States Service Symbols*, by Cleveland H. Smith and Gertrude R. Taylor. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1942. Pp. 116. \$1.50.)

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

- "The Impact of War on American Institutions," by Everett C. Hughes, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, November 1942 (XLVIII, 398-403).
- "Impact of War on Labor and Industry," by Nels Anderson and Nathaniel H. Rogg, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, November 1942 (XLVIII, 361-68).
- "Economic Demobilization in the United States after the First World War," by Albert T. Lauterbach, in *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1942 (LVII, 504-25).
- "War and the British Colonial Farmer: A Reëvaluation in the Light of New Statistical Research," by Wilton E. Bean, in *The Pacific Historical Review*, December 1942 (XI, 439-47). Effects of war on the market for the colonial farmers' products.
- "Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," by Archibald King, in *The American Journal of International Law*, October 1942 (XXXVI, 539-67).
- "Frontiers, Security, and International Organization," by J. W. Brabner, in *Geographical Review*, June 1942 (XXX, 697-704).
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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

ARMY HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

BY VICTOR GONDOS, JR.

Soon after the commencement of the present conflict it was decided to attack the problem of reducing administrative history to manageable proportions, by the production of concurrent narrative studies of the records, "hot off the griddle," as it were, and thus furnish guides to source material for the future historian. On March 4, 1942, President Roosevelt instructed the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to appoint "a committee on records of War administration" for the purpose of preserving "an accurate and objective account of our present experience."

The Army, at least, anticipated the Presidential directive. The reverberations of Pearl Harbor, and the flying declarations of war were still steaming the newspapers and the radio when, on December 11, 1941, General Spaulding's Historical Section recommended to the War Department that its functions be redefined to include work on the war just commencing. The following January the Adjutant General requested the Historical Section to furnish a specific plan for historical work. This was promptly submitted and approved on March 5, 1942.

Meanwhile, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, European Theater of Operations, recommended to the War Department the establishment of facilities at the headquarters of the European Theater, and other theatres as well, for classifying documents relating to the activities in each theater of operations. However, operations in the field have not yet matured to the point of record files. To mature to that point an operation must be a concluded integral unit. Only one Army operation can answer to that description at this time, namely, the campaign of Bataan, and unfortunately probably the bulk of the records of that operation are temporarily reposing in Tokio. Moreover, to write narrative studies of field operations now would be premature, because

document collections will be very incomplete, military secrecy will prevent the use of many of those available, and enemy documents will not be on hand.

In conformity with such ideas, and particularly that of the President's expressed wish, on July 15, 1942, Major General J. A. Ullo, The Adjutant General, sent a directive, by order of the Secretary of War, to the commanding generals of the three War Department Commands, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply, instructing them to appoint historical officers for the purpose of recording "the administrative activities of their respective headquarters during the present war." Provisions were likewise to be made for the full coverage of subordinate organizations. To coordinate the work in the three main headquarters the Historical Section of the Army War College was designated as "the advisory and coordinating office for all the above historical activities."

The Services of Supply, popularly known as the SOS, was the first of the three Commands to organize its historical agencies. The SOS has an enormous and complex mission to perform; it procures, stores, transports, distributes, and salvages military supplies and equipment; transports and shelters the Army; operates its own training centers, as well as camps, posts, and stations; and provides various administrative services.

The Historical Officer of the staff of the Commanding General of the SOS is Major John D. Millett, formerly of the Columbia University faculty and the Social Science Research Council; he was appointed on July 5, 1942. In the organizational plan his office is in the Control Division, directly under the Chief of Staff of the SOS.

A narrative history, embracing an overall view of all the staff divisions, is the main objective of Major Millett's office. The story will be told in two grand divisions; the first will deal with "The Services of Supply" as a whole; the second will treat each administrative service separately. This narrative history will not be a catalogue of all the innumerable changes in the component organizations of the SOS, but rather a description of the general pattern of organizational development. Of course, Major Millett's office does keep a card index record of all changes in nomenclature and functions of sub-organizations. The Control Division itself is an office of record, and the Historical Officer relies on this in the creation of a file of historical source material on the SOS. A daily "Reading File" of all correspondence at headquarters assists in apprehending and segregating items of prob-

able value to the historian. The criteria for such selections? Routine correspondence is automatically eliminated. Important correspondence, memoranda, reports, particularly those bearing on any aspects of policy, will be placed in the historical file. The subjectivity of the selective process is defended only on the grounds of expediency. The Control Division is also engaged in making continuous studies of parts of the SOS, one hundred have been made so far, and these as well as SOS training films are earmarked for the historical file.

Because of its size and the lack of homogeneity in its conglomerate of agencies, the historical work of the SOS, in contrast to that of the Army Ground Forces and that of the Army Air Forces, is definitely decentralized. The Historical Officer at the headquarters of the Commanding General is concerned mainly with administration as it is seen from the peak vantage point of Somervell and his staff. Some of the bureaus in the SOS, like the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, the Office of the Quartermaster General, and the Office of the Surgeon General, have large, effective, and semi-autonomous historical sections of their own, and formulate and execute their plans more or less independently.

The historical program of the Quartermaster General's Office began on May 30, 1942, when Lieutenant A. M. Thornton was assigned to organize a Historical Section in the General Administrative Services of the Office of the Quartermaster General. Dr. Vernon Setser, formerly of The National Archives, soon joined the staff. These two professional archivists created an organization of historians who are now engaged in combing every subdivision of the QMG in Washington, on the prowl for documents and interviews. Word-of-mouth information they consider important, even to shed light on routine administrative problems. The coverage of the field installations of the Quartermaster Corps has been a far tougher task, its normal complexity increased by the far-flung nature of the Quartermaster units in an oceanic and inter-continental war.

By order of Major General Levin H. Campbell, Jr., Chief of Ordnance, the Historical Section, Executive Branch, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, was established on September 21, 1942. Although Lieutenant Colonel L. A. Codd, the Ordnance Public Relations Officer was also designated the Historical Officer, the imposing plan for Ordnance history was formulated by Lieutenant Colonel Calvin H. Goddard, who became Chief of the Section, under Colonel Codd. This plan goes well beyond the directive of July 15, 1942, subordinating administrative history to a history of weapons produced by or under

the Ordnance Department. In this conception of his mission, Colonel Goddard believes that organizations are merely the media helping in the development of the ordnance *matériel*—the means, not the end—so there will be volumes entitled *Small Arms*, *Field Artillery*, *Anti-aircraft Artillery*, *Machine Tools*, and so on. After a survey of the field it was decided that at least twenty-four volumes would be produced, each of about 200,000 words. The volumes will be grouped in four periods, one from the evolution of ordnance to April 6, 1917, and three from then to the termination of the present war. Strong emphasis is to be placed on the visual presentation of the material by means of charts, tables, and photographs.

The collection of the source material is the work of the officers designated as historians at the several ordnance facilities. From October 1, 1942, onwards quarterly reports by all Ordnance agencies are to be transmitted to Colonel Goddard's Historical Section. It is contemplated that the day-to-day records of the junior historians and assistants of the smaller sub-divisions will flow in to the official historical officer who will incorporate them into the quarterly reports. Strong emphasis will be placed on full and complete documentation, particularly with reference to major changes of policy or practice.

Rather curiously, the Medical Department of the United States Army has published histories of only two of our wars, the Civil War and the First World War. In fact, official military medical histories date only from the Crimean War, when Andrew Smith, head of the British Army Medical Department decided to issue one. This was followed by an elaborate German study for the war of 1870-71, and a Japanese account, in the English language, of their medical service in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Britain and America prepared comprehensive medical and surgical histories of the First World War, and instituted a new departure by going beyond a merely technical account and detailing also medical administration.

With such a background of medical military history already established, Surgeon General James C. Magee directed, on August 22, 1941, the organization of a Historical Section in the Administrative Division of his office. In addition, the subcommittee on historical records of the National Research Council's Division of Medical Sciences formulated plans for an overall history of the medical activities of the Army, Navy, Public Health, Veterans' Administration, and civilian agencies. This committee, headed by Dr. John F. Fulton of the Yale University Medical School, tentatively approved a ten vol-

ume history largely devoted to professional medical and surgical subjects.

Colonel Albert G. Love of the Office of the Surgeon General was appointed head of the project for the medical administrative history, and he proposed a seven volume plan which was approved. This is to deal with the actual supply operations, and the problems of procurement, storage, issuance, and transportation. The Historical Section, besides correlating the activities of its many reporting assistants, also receives the periodic official reports of medical installations and facilities and prepares an index of correspondence of the Surgeon General's Office and an index of current medical literature of military interest.

The remaining historical units in the Services of Supply are, as a rule, not on as large a scale as the foregoing. The historical officers appointed to head the units are, (1) Major Charles H. Franklin, The Adjutant General's Office, (2) Chaplain A. N. Corpening, office of the Chief of Chaplains, (3) Major George O. Gillingham, Chemical Warfare Service, (4) Major R. P. Rosengren, Office of the Chief of Engineers, (5) Captain E. E. Edwards, Office of the Chief of Finance, (6) Major William F. Fratcher, Office of the Judge Advocate General, (7) Captain B. M. Rich, Office of the Provost Marshal General, (8) Lieutenant Colonel Charles McIntyre, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, (9) Mr. C. C. Wardlow, Transportation Service. In addition there is a historical officer in each Service Command. The Army Exchange Service, the National Guard Bureau, and the Executive for Reserve and R.O.T.C. Affairs, have thus far provided no historical officers.

In closing this survey of the historical work in the Services of Supply it must be stated that the projects here attempted are presently of a far larger amplitude and complexity than those of the Army Air Forces and the Army Ground Forces. It would appear that the resilience of the personnel attempting to execute that program will be stretched to the breaking point, unless more reinforcements are provided.

In September 1942, Colonel C. B. Lober became the Historical Officer of the Army Air Forces, but the Historical Section, it should be noted, is a part of the larger organization of Colonel Edgar P. Sorenson, who is the A-2, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. Colonel Lober is an Army man; during the First World War he transferred from the Coast Artillery to the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, and he became an Air Corps officer of the Regular Army in 1920. In

addition to the degrees of Bachelor and Master of Science from M.I.T., he successively graduated from the Airship Pilot School, the Air Service Engineering School; the Air Corps Tactical School, and the Army Industrial College.

The Historical Section offices at Gravelly Point, Virginia, are rather ambitiously organized. The Chief has a personal staff consisting of a Technical Executive, an Administrative Executive, and an Information Specialist. Then comes the Service Staff which has an archivist, the Office Stenographic Services, and an Illustration Service consisting of three artists and a draughtsman, which makes it possible to emphasize illustrative material. Finally comes what may be termed the Operational Staff, consisting of five sections, a Current Narrative Section, engaged in producing stories with an Air Force background; an Administrative History Section, which is divided into three parts, personnel, legislation and organization, and *matériel*; a Special Projects Section, intended to do research work on particular problems; a Current Operational History Section, to write narratives on combat activities; and a Biographical Section.

It is obvious that here as elsewhere, the intention is to go well beyond the directive, from the Adjutant General's Office, of July 15, 1942, producing not only administrative history but also combat stories, biographical studies, and popular narratives for public relations purposes. At present, however, plans are more ambitious than performance, partly due to lack of sufficient competent personnel, partly because of insufficient cooperation of higher commands and combat groups. There are no official historians functioning overseas for the Air Forces, although there have been efforts made to induce certain officers to act unofficially in that capacity.

Information and source material will be obtained from a large variety of data. Systematic collection of organization charts of components of the AAF, as well as Tables of Organization, yields significant items on the expansion and increasing specialization of air warfare. Official files of correspondence, memoranda, and reports are sifted, and the "why" of organizational changes obtained from interviews. Professional and popular publications are combed. Air Force regulations and orders form the framework and benchmarks for all the accumulated data. Aside from the compilation of the historical material and its orderly preservation, the Historical Section will prepare those pamphlets concerning administrative policy which are of particular interest and immediacy to the Army Air Forces.

Major Kent Roberts Greenfield was appointed Historical Officer of the Army Ground Forces on October 15, 1942. An officer in the First World War and Professor of History in the Johns Hopkins University now on military leave, Major Greenfield was eminently qualified for the post. His office is located in the main building of the Army War College, and is attached to the G-2 Section of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces under the command of Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair.

Since the Army Ground Forces feel the full effects of the revolution in military tactics and technology ushered in by the fall of Poland and France, the consequent volcanic changes in training, organization, equipment, and leadership affords a man-size job to the military historian desirous of keeping abreast of developments. The main task of the AGF is that of simulated battlefield training, and integration of combat organizations into flawlessly working teams. Besides the field armies, the AGF includes such commands as the Armored Force, the Airborne Command, the Amphibious Training Center, the Anti-aircraft Command, the Tank Destroyer Center, the Mountain Training Center, the Desert Training Center. Necessarily the plans of the Historical Section are focused on these training programs.

Source material will flow from two main sources, the Headquarters of the Army Ground Forces and the units in the field in the Zone of the Interior, that is, in the continental United States. A system of assigned historical officers in the field has been resorted to, an officer being assigned to each of the twenty-three training centers, commands, armies, and corps, under the jurisdiction of Gen. McNair.

The date of the commencement of the history of the Army Ground Forces will be July 26, 1940, the day on which GHQ was activated. This preliminary section of the work will be a study of the relation of GHQ to the War Department General Staff, the functioning of GHQ, and the evolution of the AGF, which was activated March 9, 1942. The relation of GHQ to the overseas defense commands and to the organization of the task forces will be analyzed.

There will be no attempt to prepare an official or definitive history of the AGF. A sort of running inventory of currently accumulating documents will be kept. Flash narratives of training, battle, and other activities, caught on the spot from eyewitness observers, will furnish the future student with that intimate *rapporti* with the subject which no amount of formal documentation can replace. So the major function of wartime historical work will be that of a series of guides or "tick-

lers" for the research historian, as well as for those who will eventually have the painstaking work of putting the records in final archival order. Insofar as strictly administrative history is concerned the present plans envisage studies of army and corps headquarters, and those of special detachments like the Amphibious Corps. Lower echelons of command will not be treated at this time.

The mission of the current group of Army historical officers is to segregate and organize the historically significant material accumulating in the War Department and the various branches of the Army. They are to furnish definite guide posts to historians and military students of the future. The material to be collected indicates that the meaning of the word "historical" is given a broad interpretation, embracing documents of both routine and special types, administrative, statistical, personal, as well as photographs, sound recordings, and artifacts.

Is the mission attainable? We do not know. But since the cost, in relationship to the total war effort, is so small it is certainly worth attempting. Nothing is lost, something may be gained. Indeed if we are ever to grow out of our military swaddling clothes, it must not only be attempted but prosecuted with reasonably satisfactory results. It must be far more than a war project, it must be a continuing national policy, properly supported, ably led, adequately staffed. The strategist must be able to dissect the execution of plans; the tactician must know what combination of arms succeeded and which failed, and why; the ordnance expert and manufacturer can best improve their processes by reference to experience; and, of course, both the civil and military administrators in Government can chart the future only by sighting on the past.

Whether the mission will succeed or fail can be partly foretold. Three tests can be applied, (1) is there a complete organizational coverage? (2) is there a complete chronological coverage? (3) is there a complete geographical coverage?

The answer is—no. As presently constituted the organization for Army historiography is far from complete. While the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply are covered, vital policy-making bodies like the War Department General Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff are not; and even within the three War Department Command groups there are a number of branches which do not have historical technicians nor adequate staffs. In the theaters of operations there has

been to date only the scantiest sort of historical coverage.

The lack of sufficient personnel is matched by a lack of clear-cut command authority over lesser offices, a lack of training and orientation in the lower echelons, and a lack of uniform policies.

Upon inspection it is obvious, too, that a dissonance exists between actual practice, as to what is the primary emphasis, and the directive of July 15, 1942. The Historical Section at the Army War College works solely on operational history while the directive specifies that it should work on administrative history. The three War Department Commands likewise tend to break out of the confining limits of the directive. Since the directive is thus being modified in practice, it may be advisable to amend it to conform with the realities.

But both operational and administrative histories are vitally necessary. The difficulty is that often the twilight zone between them is wide and indivisible. So perhaps the dissonance is more apparent than real and is forced, *pari passu*, by the nature of the case. Of course it must be recognized that while a war is in progress, administrative material is much more readily available, while operational material is either difficult to get or is locked in the secret files of headquarters staffs.

The ideal in any agency should be one function, one organization, one head. Army historiography, viewed as a subject rather than a service, is patently wide of the mark. The historical officers of the three War Department Commands are operating separately as service functions of the respective command groups. The Historical Section of the Army War College may advise but cannot command. It may be confidently anticipated then that there will be no unity or standardization in data collection, record processing or administration, and, probably, even documentation. The only unity will be that occasioned by the academic training in historiography of the officers heading the various historical sections.

While in foreign countries military history is considered a very important tool—the historical fraternity still seems to be somewhat apologetic about it. It will be noted that all the historical sections hide, so to speak, “behind the skirts” of some other organically vital operating office, usually that of a control division or an intelligence section, with just a suggestion of timorousness about their own existence. This direct dependence of the historical sections on the offices which they serve may have a questionable effect on the professional ideal of the maximum of objectivity. But, as an offset, it may be the best way to obtain the necessary cooperation for the collection of the material.

PREPARATION OF GERMAN ATTACK AVIATION FOR THE OFFENSIVE OF MARCH 1918

BY JOHN R. CUNEO

In 1917 the Allies had lost an excessive number of men without achieving any major victories; their high commands and strategic efforts lacked coordination and unity; and Russia had dropped out of the war, releasing German troops and supplies for use on the Western Front. However, the rapidly increasing flood of men and material from the United States combined with deteriorating economic conditions in Germany made it clear that time was on the side of the Allies. Moreover, the failure of war at sea—the submarine campaign—made a promise of military success highly advisable. This estimate of the situation persuaded the German Supreme Command to take the offensive on the Western Front in 1918. It was to be no attempt to seize limited military objectives but rather to break through the restraining entanglements of the trenches into open or mobile warfare.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wetzell, head of the Operations Section of the Supreme Command, suggested an offensive in the form of a skillful combination of interconnected, mutually supporting, successive attacks. The first blow was to fall in the St. Quentin sector. Here seemed to be the enemy's weakest point; the terrain appeared to be more favorable; and it marked the junction of the British and French forces, thus offering an opportunity of separating these armies. A second attack was planned for the Lys sector, a third in the Ypres, and a fourth in the Champagne district. Although adopted in outline, Wetzell's plans were changed by First Quartermaster-General Ludendorff to the extent that almost everything was staked on the first blow.

In the detailed and careful preparations for this offensive the real military genius of Ludendorff can be seen—his receptiveness to the suggestions of able assistants. That characteristic was especially manifest at this time because Ludendorff had decided to concentrate on tactics rather than strategy. "Tactics had to be considered before purely strategical objects which it is futile to pursue before tactical success is possible." With the aid of experts such as Captain Geyer (on infantry) and Colonel Bruchmüller (on artillery) the plans were drawn up. They were not novel but rather a new combination of known means which had seldom been employed under similar circumstances. The general pattern of the ground attack emphasized concealed preparations of the offensive, a brief but intensive artillery bom-

bardment, and von Hutier's system of infantry infiltration. These tactics have received a great deal of attention but the preparations for aerial cooperation have attracted little notice.

The plans for the tactical employment of the air arm in general, and of attack aviation in particular, were laid against the background of a great expansion program. The chief emphasis of this so-called "Amerika" Program (designed to meet the increase in Allied aviation which would probably result through the aid of the United States) was upon doubling the fighter flights, providing for their groupment into squadrons, increasing the artillery flights, and expanding home airplane production as well as training. With the unstinting cooperation of the German Supreme Command the program was gradually accomplished in spite of the lack of raw materials and man power and of other impediments.

The plans for the employment of aircraft were prepared at the headquarters of the German air service under the direction of General von Hoeppner, the Commanding General of the Air Forces. Not only were they drawn up by able staff officers, but experienced flying personnel were recalled from time to time during the winter of 1917-18 to work out problems in the form of war games. Every possibility that could be foreseen was provided for.

As a hypothetical basis for the study conducted at air headquarters it was assumed that the offensive would be launched at a section of the front previously held by six divisions. The attacking force inserted at this sector was assumed to be an army composed of six corps. Each of the latter was made up of four fresh divisions and one of the divisions originally at that front. These divisions were divided according to their employment in the attack—two as the first wave and two as the second; the division which had held the line prior to the offensive was to serve as a reserve.

The allocation of air units to such a force was determined. Directly under army headquarters were to be placed units of all the various types of flights in use, reconnaissance, bombers, photographic planes, fighters, and others necessary to give a balanced aviation arm. To each of four corps headquarters was assigned a reconnaissance flight. To each of the remaining two corps headquarters was allotted a fighter group made up of six flights as well as a reconnaissance flight. To each division in the first wave was given one reinforced reconnaissance flight¹

¹The usual number of airplanes in a reconnaissance flight was six. It was believed that this was

and an attack flight. Each division of the second wave received a reconnaissance flight. The reserve divisions had no aviation units, surrendering their reconnaissance flights to the attacking units when the latter took over the sector.

The guiding principle of all the studies made in preparation of the 1918 offensive was that "all means must be applied to achieving the first essential of success, namely, surprise." A great deal of attention was therefore devoted to screening the concentration of air units.

It was pointed out that during quiet periods beforehand airdromes with permanent sheds should be constructed along the entire front. In this way not only would the erection of a number of new hangars be eliminated but also tents formerly used as hangars would be freed. The latter then could be stored at the sector of attack, ready for any emergency. By using airplanes from supply bases or neighboring flights, the airdromes of the units withdrawn to the scene of the coming offensive were to appear still occupied. The radio calls of the withdrawn units were to be continued. It was recognized that the withdrawal of units from the non-active sectors would place the remaining aircraft at a tremendous numerical disadvantage. This would continue until the enemy became suspicious and began to concentrate its forces in the apparently threatened sectors. In the interest of concentrating the maximum force at the decisive time and place, losses had to be expected.

Of course, it was provided that there should be no increase in flying activity at the sector of the attack until the morning of the offensive. But it was important that the airmen brought up as reinforcements become familiar with the countryside. This would be accomplished without noticeable increase of aerial activity by an adroit procedure. While the reinforcing flights themselves remained in the rear or were attached to neighboring armies, the aviators were to be taken to their future airdromes. Here, inconspicuously flying with units already on the sector of attack, they would learn the terrain. After this was accomplished—in ten to fourteen days depending on the weather—these airmen were to give way to men from other flights. In this manner all flyers of reconnaissance and attack flights could receive proper instruction. The ones who had completed it were to return to their flights and to participate behind the front in the practice attacks of the divisions with which they were later to cooperate during the offensive.

too small for efficient employment in a large scale offensive. Accordingly it was planned that at least the divisions which made the first attack should have flights made up of nine airplanes each.

If all the aviators from the reconnaissance and battle flights suddenly came to one section it would be hard for the small number of flights already at the sector of attack to instruct them without a noticeable increase of air activity. Accordingly a part of the crews of the attack units were to be attached to the units of neighboring armies which were not going to participate in the attack. From their fields these flyers could cross into the sector of the offensive and reconnoitre the territory. Bombing crews could be similarly instructed.

Secrecy demanded that the airplanes, personnel and supplies reach their assigned airdromes at the last moment. But this was clearly out of the question since the strain on transport—particularly railroads—might be too heavy during the last few days before the attack. Therefore a part of the personnel would be sent on beforehand. The selection of these men had to be made with the thought that should the remainder of the unit fail to arrive, those already there would be able to service the flights. Therefore these advance groups must include a sufficient number of mechanics and technicians.

The Commanding General of the Air Force planned a careful but chronologically flexible schedule for transporting units to their stations. The dates were to vary in accordance with the availability of transportation facilities. Every unit was to arrive at its station at full strength. Each of the new reconnaissance and attack units was to have an extra crew from the supply base and each fighter flight was to have two pilots in reserve. The remainder of the reserve personnel was to be kept at the base. Airplanes, machine guns, radio and photography apparatus, instruments and tents (hangars) were to be assembled at the supply base behind the front. Certain advance depots with replacement parts and propellers could be set up. Oil and gas were to be stored in large quantities at the airdromes, at the advance depots, and at the supply base.

For the air forces to function effectively, it was emphasized, the command must be conscious of its potentialities as well as clear as to its employment. Moreover only a systematic use of this arm could counterbalance the numerical inferiority of the German units. Owing to the tactical importance assigned to the air arm, an error in its employment would be just as disastrous to the infantry or artillery as to it. Therefore in the preparations for the March offensive the Commanding General of the Air Force sought to instruct not only the airmen but also the army, corps, and division commands in the maximum coordination of all arms. The general plans of operation which were

to govern all reconnaissance activity, all planes cooperating with the infantry and the artillery, and the fighter planes to protect them, were worked out in detail.

To the bombers and attack aircraft was assigned the mission of attacking the enemy ground troops. The secret of bombing success was declared to lie in massing large numbers of planes and concentrating their fire on single or concentrated targets. As the effort of the bombers was directed to the enemy's rear areas, they were as a rule placed under the army command. The corps staff, however, could suggest targets, as it was often in a position to see momentarily vulnerable targets, such as transport of enemy troops. The principal duty of the bombers was to attack railroad lines and stations so as to prevent just such activities on the part of the enemy. If something prevented this, targets nearer the lines could be bombed. Important highways, billets (especially if occupied by high commands), and camps were to be machine-gunned during the flights. Attacks with small caliber bombs were also to be made on enemy airdromes.

As a rule bombing attacks were to be made at night. There was less chance for aerial combat and less danger from anti-aircraft batteries. Therefore the bombers would not be required to fly so high and could carry heavier loads. Moreover, enemy troop and supply movements often took place at night, so this time offered especially inviting targets. Frequently such raids were to be made by bombers flying as units rather than in formation.

The opportune use of the bomber squadrons could only be made with the full cooperation of the weather service and by an integrated night flying service. The staff officer for aviation of the army was to appoint a special officer for each bomber squadron. It was to be the latter's duty to set up a smoothly working organization of all means of orientation at night (direction shots, Very lights, blinker signals). He was to be informed in advance of prospective raids so that he could inform the army searchlight posts. The bomber crews were to be fully instructed as to all arrangements for the cooperation of the anti-aircraft and searchlight units in guiding the bombers. Emergency landing fields behind the lines were to be described. These might be the fields of the division or corps reconnaissance flights. Simulated airdromes near these were to be laid out to deceive the enemy and to attract his fire.

The performance of the German bombers had so improved that some day bombing was also considered. These attacks were to be

directed against mobile targets—especially enemy reserves and tanks. During the assault emphasis was to be placed on raiding enemy airdromes. Even if such attacks did not destroy the enemy's aircraft or halt its employment, they would certainly hinder it. Such attacks were especially effective immediately after the assault was begun. At such times raids against camps and munition or material depots were of considerably less value.

Attack aviation in 1918 was still a new development in the German army but the battles of 1917 had proven its value beyond question.² It had originated in the two-seater airplanes grouped into "protection flights" which were to guard the artillery spotting planes. At the battle of Arras they had been ordered to attack troops in the trenches when not occupied with their protective duties. The results had been so favorable that the airplanes were developed into battle units, dropping their protective assignments. They then became known as attack flights (literally "battle flights").

Emphasis was placed on the effectiveness of attack aviation on the morale both of the German troops and those of the enemy. However, this effectiveness would depend on their employment in concentration—the flights were to be collected together as a group under one command and employed in the assault side by side or in waves. The demoralizing effect produced by the appearance of low-flying airplanes attacking ground units was found to mount in direct proportion to the number of machines employed in the action.

Studies conducted at German air headquarters led to the decision to place the attack flights under the jurisdiction of the army command, which was then to assign them to those of the corps commands whose units were engaged at tactically critical points. In no case were attack flights to be assigned to lower echelons. The corps command with its broader point of view was held to be far better able to judge the critical points than the divisions. This command assignment was for the assault. During the later stages the divisions were to be given control of their attack flights.

A manual issued February 20, 1918, and signed by the Chief of the German Staff, however, flatly contradicted this arrangement and con-

²The three principal reasons for the success of the German counterattack at Cambrai were the mist, the lack of a preliminary artillery bombardment and the fact that "the infantry assault was preceded by intensive and widespread attacks by low-flying German aircraft which not only bewildered the defending troops, but also forced them to keep their heads down so that many of them did not see the approach of the German infantry. . . ." (H. A. Jones, *The War in the Air*, VI [Oxford, 1934], 251.) There was also evidence that the success of British low-flying machines impressed the German command.

templated the divisions having command for the assault. Such an assignment clearly violated the principle of concentration which the study at aviation headquarters had sought to attain. The manual left some attack flights with the corps for use, during the later stages of the battle, in breaking up fresh resistance or warding off counter-attacks. The army command was also to have a certain number of flights for harassing traffic in the enemy's rear. It is interesting to note that these specific regulations in the manual directly contradicted a general rule, which it presented on another page, in complete agreement with the study by the aviation section:

In the attack flights, the higher command possesses a powerful weapon which should be employed at the *decisive* point of attack. They are not to be distributed singly over the whole front of attack, but should be concentrated at decisive points. Less important sectors must dispense with the support of attack flights.

The weapons of the attack airplanes were the machine gun, small-caliber bombs, and small grenades. Their objective was—in addition to actual destruction—to shatter the enemy's nerve by repeated attacks in close formation and thus to obtain a decisive influence on the course of the fighting. In the attack they were to fly ahead of and to carry the infantry along with them, while hampering the fire of hostile infantry and batteries. They were further to cause confusion to a considerable distance behind the enemy's front lines, to dislocate traffic, and to inflict losses on reinforcements hastening up to the battle field. They were only to be employed in decisive engagements.

Great importance was laid on the correct timing of the attack flights in the assault. It was pointed out that if they were engaged too soon, they would only serve to indicate the point of attack to the enemy; if too late, they would endanger their own advancing troops. They were to appear over the front at the exact moment of assault, attacking from a low height.

The employment of the units at the correct time was to depend on the care with which the orders were drawn and on the promptness of their appearance. The commander of the units was to receive orders informing him of the exact position of the enemy and the German front lines, the sector and objective of the attack, the nature of the preparatory phase, the method of attack, the zero hour, and the targets specially allotted to the attack flights.

Whenever possible the time for crossing the lines at the moment of the assault was to be given by the watch. Accordingly watches were to be synchronized. The location of the airdromes was to be deter-

mined with a view toward permitting the flights to start far enough in the rear not to be seen but near enough to arrive at the critical moment. It was also recommended that a single airplane might be sent over the line prior to the assault in order to test the wind velocity, which might vary the previous arrangements. If the zero hour was not set by watch, the timely engagement of the attack flights was to be arranged by use of signals. One machine was to fly over the post of the command of the attacking troops and fire a Very light as a recognition signal. Then ground signals would indicate the time of attack which the communication machine would radio back to its flight.

The hour at which the attack flights were to attack was to be made known to the troops in the assault orders. Furthermore the infantry was to be instructed to fire light signals from time to time in order that the observation or infantry airplanes could ascertain the position of the lines.

The flights were to advance to the attack on an oblique rather than a direct line in order to lessen the chances of the enemy ascertaining their objective. Flying formation could be either in column or wing to wing. When flying in line, one airplane was to follow the other at a distance of 350 to 500 feet, with the individual airplanes in step formation. From the line of their captive balloons to the front, the formation was to dive diagonally toward the front. After crossing the battle area the foremost machine was to turn back whereupon the planes were to return in an irregular course to a rendezvous behind the balloon line where they would reform. The attack was to be carried out while approaching and leaving the enemy territory.

When flying wing to wing, the machines were to be separated at distances from 500 to 750 feet and flying in a slight "V" formation. The flight was likewise a diagonal dive towards the front. Over the targets all machines were to turn either to the left or right and fall into a straight line. The target was to be first attacked by the pilot's fixed machine gun, then when directly beneath by the observer's gun, bombs, and grenades. The return was either to be in line or by an irregular course during which the targets were again to be attacked.

The attack in column was the most simple form but, on the other hand, it affected only a narrow section of the enemy's front, thereby lessening the moral effect of the attack. A well-trained flight was expected to be able to undertake the more difficult but more effective wing-to-wing formation. This permitted a wide area of fire. It required a great deal of practice. When several flights were concentrated

on a single sector of attack they were to be employed in waves one after the other.

Some officers held the opinion that the attack flights should not engage the enemy front lines. This belief was based on the fact that when they appeared the troops would be already or on the verge of being interlocked in combat. Therefore it was proposed that the enemy reserves and barrage batteries should be their targets. In answer, the plans contemplated the attack flights leading the troops into battle. However, as a compromise, the Commanding General of the Air Forces decided that the first objective of each wave of attack airplanes was to attack the enemy's artillery in the assigned sector, and the second objective was to aid the infantry. Each objective was assigned to a flight, the wave consisting of two flights.

After the assault, the attack flights were to be ready to ward off any counter-attacks by the enemy. In the further course of the battle their chief employment was to be attacking the enemy artillery, then his reserves, bridges and similar crossings, and strong points which might hold up the ground attack. It was emphasized that the systematic employment of the attack flights at the decisive moment would be of exceptional aid to the rapid advance of the infantry attack.

If the enemy was discovered retreating, immediately attack flights and bomber squadrons were to be employed first to hamper the enemy artillery's preparations for retreat, and then to attack the important roads, especially in the narrow spots. If night came heavy bombs were to be dropped on bridges, narrow road passages, stations, moving trains, camps, and airdromes. Such action would be of immense value because the psychological moment when the bombs would have their greatest effect on morale was when the enemy began to retreat. In order to assure the prompt and efficient use of the attack flights, their leaders were to be kept informed about the course of the battle and the situation in the air by the officer for aviation at the corps headquarters and by the staff officer for aviation at the army command.

If the enemy did not know the time of the zero hour, it was probable that there would be few enemy fighters at a low altitude over the sector of attack at the crucial moment. However, if the foe scented the time and had placed strong fighter units in the air, the assault of the attack groups was to be escorted by strong fighter units. Attaining the coordination of the fighter and attack units was to be left to the commands. Great attention was also to be given to working with the aid of the air observation officer.

In order to increase the moral effect, the attack flights were to fly at levels of about 200 feet. Steep direct dives were not recommended because the time of effectiveness was too short. A weaving course while diving down was advised as it apparently brought more of the enemy under the threat of the attacking airplanes.

The above represents only a small part of the study conducted at German air headquarters. Not only was it far more detailed, but it included rules for the preparation and employment of every conceivable type of airplane, captive balloons, anti-aircraft defense and weather service, all of which were under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General of the Air Force. The study as a whole marked a tremendous advance in the military conception of the employment of the air weapon.

Not only the preparation but the actual employment of aviation in the offensive of March 1918 had a lesson for the future. The rules for the secrecy of preparations were quite successful for while the Allies knew that an offensive was in the offing, they were not certain of its exact location. A heavy fog denied the German aviation a chance to participate in the initial assault. However, its work during the following days on the whole was not as successful as had been hoped. Many reasons can be assigned for particular failures: heavy air casualties in the first few days cut down on equipment and the supply had been exhausted; aerial cooperation with ground forces broke down and liaison between air units ceased to be effective; and the commands failed to apply the general principles of warfare to the employment of aircraft particularly that of concentration with regard to the employment of the attack groups. The latter's effectiveness was generally nullified by a dispersion of the units into groups as small as one or two airplanes to satisfy the universal appeals from the infantry for aerial support.³ However, no failure was due to the fact that it was unforeseen. The regulations for the offensive contained the warnings of and the solutions to all the problems that arose.

Air power as it is today did not emerge full grown from the minds of any military staffs or "prophets" of any nation. Although compressed in a short space of time, there was nevertheless a definite development. The above account illustrates only one of the stages in the history of the air weapon from which lessons may be taken for application in the coordinated warfare of today.

³Critics of the employment of German aviation during the offensive have pointed out that in an attempt to satisfy pleas for air support the commands flouted the principle of concentration and destroyed the effectiveness of the weapon.

GEOGRAPHY IN WAR AND GEOPOLITICS

BY ALFRED VAGTS

Three recently published books on the subject¹ serve to remind the student of military history that the reception accorded to Geopolitics in the United States during these war years has formed a curious episode, political rather than scientific in character, in the history and sociology of science and politics. There were at one end of the spectrum of receptivity articles maintaining that practically all German politics of today had their starting point, not in the Brown House or the Wilhelmstrasse or the Führer's GHQ, but in the Geopolitical Institute headed by Professor-General Haushofer, the original indoctrinator of Adolf Hitler and the provider of the ideas on foreign policy in *Mein Kampf*; in fact, he was portrayed as a kind of "Führer of the Führer." A foreign news commentator wrote in *The Lion*, Chicago monthly, that

About 1895 the German government, through Prince Bismarck [who was then out of the government and out of power] founded the Geo-Political Institute. . . . The German people, through successive governments, have continued to support the Geo-Political Institute uninterrupted since its foundation. . . . The Institute set out to study ways and means of softening up, first the immediate neighbors and latterly the whole world, ready for eventual military conquest. The method adopted consisted of undermining every one of each country's institutions—economic, industrial, religious, educational, social and political. The Institute prepared the plans, then sent agents abroad, to carry them out, slowly and stealthily, like termites undermining your house. Ultimately, it was hoped, these countries would become so rotten that their whole structure would collapse of their own weight.²

Another, more distinguished commentator, Miss Dorothy Thompson, greeted the reprint of Mackinder's little geopolitical book of 1919 by saying that it predicted the whole strategy of this present war to a T. (Which T in strategy would that be, the first or the second?)

On the other end of this spectrum of reception stands the organization in the United States, as of June 8, 1942, of the "Geopolitical Section, MIS, by the Chief of the MIS in compliance with oral instructions from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to study physical, eco-

¹Johannes Mattern, *Geopolitik. Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire* (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, series LX, No. 2. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1942. Pp. 139. \$1.50.)

Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality. A study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1942. Pp. 219. \$2.50.)

Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer. Geopolitics in Action* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 1942. Pp. 358. \$3.50.)

²Reprinted in *The Digest about People and Events*, June, 1942.

nomie, political and ethnological geography in order to advise on measures of national security and assurance of continued peace in the post-war world, as well as to conduct such studies as may be demanded for the immediate prosecution of the war." This section's work, to judge by the announcement, would seem to be concerned with tasks more political than technical in character, and perhaps with the higher geography of strategy rather than the simpler one of tactics, with continental or world maps rather than those on the 1:100,000 scale, with maps "bringing out" this or that feature of significance. It is headed by Lieutenant Colonel William Smith Culbertson, former member of the Tariff Commission, minister and ambassador to several of the minor courts and capitals, author of writings on economic problems like tariffs and reciprocity. Prior to this date, the head of the Section of Economics, Government and History of the United States Military Academy, Colonel-Professor Beukema, had greeted Geopolitik with a good deal of discernment and some criticism, though not without conceding it a large sphere of validity, a stand which he repeats in the introduction to Dorpalen's book.

The more uncritical welcome accorded to geopolitics in America was in part a post-Pearl Harbor reaction evident in some persons and institutions that had earlier declined to prepare for war by military thinking. As Mackinder formulated the common Anglo-Saxon experience of 1914 and after, still applicable to that of 1939-41 and after: "The thought of the organizer is essentially strategical, whereas that of the democrat is ethical," to which might be added that when the democrat begins to think strategically he is apt to take a good deal of chaff for or with the grain. Many things and much power were conceded to Geopolitik at once. For some it was like a new all-around explanation of a phenomenon for which they were not otherwise prepared, a pan-determinism compared with which historical materialism became almost a spiritual sensification of history and politics. "The facts of geography condition the destiny of our world," it was stated, whereas even the most school-bound German geopolitician would have insisted: that these facts co-condition it, and probably more so in war than in peace. Numerous articles were written on Geopolitik and books dealing with it were published, whose number was clearly not rationed in accordance with the true importance of the subject and the sustained national interest in it. In fact, the saturation point for geopolitics would seem to have been reached by now, which may allow the contemplation of its theories more at leisure.

Mr. Mattern has provided a book which is useful as an interim balance sheet on geopolitics as of the summer of 1942. He has listed the publications up to that point and has at the same time evaluated geopolitics and traced its ancestry, on the whole reliably enough, though to place Alexander von Humboldt in the ancestral hall of the geopolitical gentry seems to concede them a forerunner they hardly had a right to—and if Humboldt, then why not also Herder, the most anti-imperialistic geopolitician? Granted that geopolitics is a recent form of political materialism, what allows him to call Geopolitik a “National Socialist version of Marxian dialectical materialism?” What is even dialectical about it? Or has “dialectical” become a *Schimpfwort*? As a bibliographer would do, he finds geopolitics old rather than new, “a new name hiding an old device,” and thus easily as much non-German as German. Such a search for paternities may, however, too easily lead to the *Listenwissenschaft*, the listing science, of the bibliographer, and past the more important problem of where and to whom, to which groups in society, or states of mind, geopolitics “belongs” and who or what was and is its conceiver and propagator?

Many of the great war-makers have insisted that the forces of the earth, personified by the Greeks in *Gaia* or *Gē*, are playing a very great, if not the decisive rôle in human affairs, including politics. “The politics [policies?] of all the powers are governed by their geography,” declared Napoleon, to whom Stendhal paid the very misleading compliment: “Il ne disait jamais des choses vagues,” which he so often did under the guise of conciseness. The Napoleonic statement serves to remind us that most peoples of the Western world use the term geography in a double sense, geography as written up and “drawn up” in maps that are often not so very objective, and geography as the things somehow or other described, the pre-graphic subject, with *Gaia* as she actually and objectively is. In point of terminology the situation is worse than with respect to history, which is also two things: on the one hand the sum of past events and on the other the way of writing it, though at least the careful historian has the word historiography to use.

Greek mythology, as embodying common human experience, is not as utterly *passé* as is commonly believed. We, as a war-making nation, are again confronted by what the Greeks called *chaos*, a yawning empty space, according to Hesiod, waiting for our ordering thought, the chaos arising before any power which could then produce out of itself darkness and night. In an Old High German description of this pre-creative condition, chaos is the state “when there was nothing of ends and

limits" (Wessobrunn Prayer, beginning of the 9th century), which is to say that in the beginning ends and limits and perhaps frontiers had to be set. With the later Greeks of antiquity, chaos came to mean "world space," *Weltraum*, something like the first approach to order, from which next in order arose *Gē* or *Gaia*, the Earth. Again many Germans of today are playing on the vague concept *Raum*, space, something which in their own language would be *das endlich Unendliche*, *das begrenzt Grenzenlose*, the finite Infinite, the limited limitless, a vague enough concept which for political purposes, however, possesses both the charms of the moderate and the finite, appealing to those who do not want to go too far in conquests, and the infinite, addressed to those who "own Germany today and tomorrow perhaps already the whole world" and who are fully prepared to fight on in some Valhallaic beyond if they happen to be killed in the battle for living space in this world. *Raum*, limitless space, is Spengler's "deepest symbol of the Faustian soul, as a derivation of which we have to understand the particular, in their form purely Western European, phenomena of will, strength, action."³ *Raum* in German etymology is the locality in which to expand, the place for moving around in, and also a definite expanse in time, a *Zeitraum*, a space of time; from the 17th century on, it came to mean as well a place closed in by definite limits, rather like the modern English "room," which had come to mean an apartment within a building, a partition within a house, since the 15th century. A *Räumlichkeit* is with Goethe a definite, not overly large space. Like many a term useful in politics, like balance for instance, *Raum* is therefore possessed of a double meaning.

As conquerors of space, military men have been strongly tempted to give their statements about space and the desirable order to govern space a final, law-like or science-like form. "La nature a fait votre Etat fédératif," the First Consul told a deputation of Swiss in 1802, a declaration which raises at once the question whether the technology of communications has not worked since that time in the direction of the unitary State and whether the political will of the people favoring federalism has not preserved this federal form of State despite geopolitical and technological forces. Pointing in a different direction, some great generals like Moltke and Roon have been good and sound geographers, the former publishing geographical works and the latter writing textbooks on geography for military and other schools, both to

³ *Untergang des Abendlandes* (Munich, 1917), I, 464.

eke out the meagre officer's salary that the Prussian Army paid its lower officers at the time. Roon's *Principles of Physical Geography* of 1832 was, with 40,000 copies sold within a few years, a best seller of its period. A great geographer like Carl Ritter was a teacher of military men young and old. Technically considered, geography has been a more useful handmaid of military leaders than even history. The old Chinese military classic, *Sun Tzu*, reminded them that the art of war is governed by these five constant factors: 1. Moral law, 2. Heaven, 3. Earth, 4. The commander, 5. Method and discipline, with the factor Earth comprising distances great and small, danger and security, open ground and narrow passes and even, in an age of necromancy, the chances of life and death.

It is through geography that military men have very often approached politics and foreign affairs, with which in the division of labor otherwise called government they are in many places presumed not to concern themselves. The settlement of boundary questions, the discussion of actual or ideal, of "the most defensible" boundaries have provided them with occasions to state their geopolitics, from the day when Alexander harangued his Macedonians who refused to follow him any further into Asia on the pursuit of the final frontier:

From the Pillars of Hercules all the interior of Lybia becomes ours, and so the whole of Asia will belong to us, and the limits of our empire, in that direction, will be those which God has made also the limits of the earth. But, if we now return, many warlike nations are left unconquered. . . . If we go back, there is reason to fear that the races which are now held in subjection, not being firm in their allegiance, may be excited to revolt by those who are not yet subdued. Then our many labors will prove to have been in vain.⁴

The appeal did not work with the homesick Macedonians and the problem of the ideal frontier, to be reached after the one end of the earth had already been won in the West, remained once more unrealized. From Alexander through the Romans, among whom Lucretius—quoted by Haushofer (Dorpalen, p. 63)—came to realize that for Roman imperialism "no boundary can exist anywhere and that room for the weapon's flight will always prolong its flying," and down to Haushofer, military men have been much concerned with the "hunt for the frontier," die *Jagd nach der Grenze*, as a pursuit of another Fortuna. Thus Count Yorck von Wartenburg, a writer on Napoleon and author of a world history from the standpoint of the Berlin Great

⁴Arrian's *Anabasis of Alexander*, V, Chapter 26. Haushofer's commentary: "It was the idea of space too foreign for his army which forced Alexander to retreat at the Pundjab." *Weltpolitik*, p. 36.

General Staff, who was killed during the Boxer campaign of 1900, spoke of Russian policy in an understanding and sympathetic way as a drive for a final frontier in Asia (*Das Vordringen der russischen Macht in Asien*, 1900). In the nature of things this chase ends in world dominion or in the neck-breaking death reserved for those who hunt after Fortuna instead of foxes.

While Haushofer stands at the end of this trend of universal history, he is also the heir to a specifically German tradition of boundary-seeking, that for a better frontier for Prussia-Germany, which we may begin with a letter of Frederick the Great, written in February, 1731, when he was still crown prince, and which was taken up again by the General Staff when it demanded the fortress zone of Metz in 1871 from Bismarck, who did not greatly want it, in order to make the new Western frontier of the Reich easier to defend. It is in this tradition that Haushofer wrote his book on boundaries—*Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung* (1927). And incidentally, Haushofer as a born Bavarian should help to dispel the common notion that Bavarians are less imperialistic than Prussians: he and General von Epp and Hierl, Leader of the Reich Arbeitsdienst, as well as Hitler himself, born on the Austro-Bavarian boundary, are all Bavarian imperialists.

A large part of Geopolitik is plainly geography gone imperialistic, geography being made to provide arguments and reasons, perhaps even a "law-like" character, for one's own expansion, whereas formerly imperialist argument was apt to be economic or linguistic or historical or racial or even Christian,⁵ when prophets of American expansion insisted that "the finger of God never points in a direction contrary to the extension of the glory of the Republic."⁶ But geography has not always been imperialistic. Carl Ritter (1779-1859), father of modern geography, was definitely not imperialistic when he greeted the founding of Liberia in 1853 as "the dawn of a rising, brighter day-star which would bring not only the blessing of the emancipation from slavery, but also of true freedom through the Gospel, the blessing of family welfare through Christian education, property and work" which in its

⁵To Gaspard de Saulx, maréchal de France, 1509-73, it seemed "that God has laid down frontiers which He does not want to see lightly transgressed: to France, the sea, the Pyrenees, the Rhine." *Mémoires*, in Petitot's Collection, t. XXIII, 266, 380.

⁶On occasions where the geographical argument itself did not seem to suffice, Haushofer calls in the medical metaphor to mix with the geographical. Writing on Mitteleuropa early in 1937 (*Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, no. 1) he called Czechoslovakia "an appendix in a dangerous state of inflammation that is, against the will of more than half of its inhabitants, allied with the Sarmatians and the race-foreigners of the East and at least one of the Western democracies."

wake would leave a beneficial reaction on many of the fearful tendencies and prejudices of the white race.⁷ While a pupil of Ritter and a great geographer, Elisée Reclus (1830-1905), became a communard and an exile from his native France, a number of German geographers like Richthofen (1833-1905) and Ratzel (1844-1904) turned imperialistic (for the Germans) and so did the Swede Kjellen (1864-1922), who was imperialistic not for Sweden but for the Germans who translated and read him widely. Finally came Haushofer, who completed the transformation of geography into political argumentation, and, a little earlier in the line, Mackinder.

As a piece of idea-ancestry, Mackinder deserved the reprinting and the introduction he has found. Like Kjellen a Conservative parliamentarian—accident or more?—there was some enlightened Toryism in Mackinder which made him warn against “geographical temptation” to make war again; at the same time, he made use of the old balance of power recipe: “You must have a balance as between German and Slav, and true independence of each. You cannot afford to leave such a condition of affairs in East Europe and the Heartland, as would offer hope for ambition in the future” (150). What is applicable in this recipe after the present war ends? When we have already forsworn buffer states against Russia?

Mackinder’s basic concept of “heartland” is fundamentally a revival of the 18th-century concept of military thought, that of the key position. When he says

“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World,”

that is essentially the same as saying that who holds the key position on the battlefield, holds victory in his hand and who holds certain geographical points controls large areas around him, if not the world. The concept might be called much older than the 18th century: Ammianus Marcellinus, himself an officer of Julian the Apostate, in the fourth century A.D., describes a location on the Balkan Peninsula which was situated “as if Nature had provided for bringing the surrounding nations under the dominion of the Romans.”

The world (and word) of General Haushofer is not easily transferred into foreign lands and phrases and it was a sound decision not

⁷*Zeitschrift für allgemeine Erdkunde*, I. 5ff.

to translate any one of his works in toto but to present his own and his collaborator's writings in excerpt and digest as Mr. Dorpalen has done. For this we are duly grateful to him. For he achieves a faithful presentation of geopolitical sense, non-sense and half-sense, though not avoiding all pitfalls in the Englishing of Haushoferisms. To translate *Wachstumsspitzen* with "marginal growths" (79) leaves out the intended notion of pointedness, asparagus-like, of expansion; *Zerrungszone* (145) is not a region of friction but of stress; to translate the basic definition of Geopolitik, "die Lehre von der Erdgebundenheit politischer Vorgänge," by saying: "The doctrine of the earth relations of political developments" (23) misses the "earth-bound" character of political events which brings Haushofer's doctrine several nuances closer to manifest destiny as earth-dictated fate.

Did the earth, however, dictate Haushofer's doctrine to him, or was it Germany's socio-economic condition? The basic concept of his geopolitics is *Raum*, nature-given, earth-given, history and destiny-given space; and since the later 1920's we have heard German politico-neurotics, almost unavoidably ending up in the Nazi Party and only rarely in exile, pronounce the word *Raum* as though they were building a Gothic cathedral above their heads and claiming a wide space defined by their convictions about Germany's needs; they claimed a space for the German people, the *Volk ohne Raum* as a popular novel phrased it, and for themselves to roam in, far away from the unsatisfactory post-Versailles Germany and, a little more specifically speaking, its unsatisfactory academic job situation. This was Haushofer's socio-economic world, in which he remained a figure largely unrecognized by the academic and reading public before 1933. In this era, insisting upon a truer scientific standard than geopolitics conformed to,⁸ Haushofer was an ex-major general allowed to hold a minor professorship and to edit a magazine whose publisher was constantly tempted to abandon it, since it never had more than seven or eight hundred subscribers before 1933. Like others in the academic world, Haushofer was a shadow plant, eager for a "place in the sun" of Nazism which arose over the gabled roofs of the German universities in 1933. He was also a former officer, unreconciled with Versailles, though almost

⁸To illustrate Haushofer's science concept by just one example: "It is the great sin of omission on the part of the German natural sciences so marvellously developed in the Second Reich, that they started out too little from the rule that a people must first gain the secure basis for its own survival among the other peoples and can only afterwards dedicate itself to the love of truth." *Weltpolitik von heute* (Berlin, n.d. [1934 or '35] p. 25.) Here is the open admission that Geopolitik is pre-scientific or sub-scientific.

willing for a time to accept Locarno; in the last war he had been an artilleryman of the kind, so Bavarian friends related, more interested in horses than in guns; and after the war, finding no promising military career open to a man of his background, rank and age, he became filled with an envy for the British as successful imperialists, an emotion shared by many of the German upper middle class. If he did not exhibit an outstanding military talent, he did show an uncommon gift for oratory, far from usual among German or other generals, which enabled him to address personally almost his whole division at one time, no mean feat in the days before the loudspeaker. This turn for oratory made the step to a university chair easier for Haushofer than for some other General-professors. On the whole, his writings betray some of the histrionics of a neglected and slighted man who would certainly enjoy learning about the hullabaloo raised by his doctrine in this country. His place in the collegiate world was rather that called by the Germans a *Gnadenstall*, a stable granted to a deserving war-horse in his old age. And without Hitler, he would have ended his days in that stable, writing long querulous letters such as he once penned to me, after I had publicly raised doubt whether Geopolit'k could convincingly decide the real function of Korea—did its sheer geographical location determine that it was to be a grapnel for China thrown out in the direction of Japan, to be conquered by the Chinese, or a gangway hanging down into the sea for Japan to board the Asiatic continent?

Hitler made Haushofer a full professor and head of the German Academy, more a propagandistic institution than a true academy in the continental European sense, and he played a minor rôle in the military-scientific discussions preceding 1939. But still he remained under the shadow of the race into which he had married. And in the last analysis the "large space" order of Haushofer and his advocacy of the German-Japanese alliance is fundamentally anti-Nazi if race is the Nazi idea for the new order in Europe, to be "carried out" by the peoples with Aryan blood. Nazi Europe and the Nazi world in general are blood-determined, whereas to Haushofer they are geo-determined.

* * * *

It is part of the revaluation process which war forces us to undergo—"for the duration" at least—when at present our outlook on geographical factors is changing. In this rests the legitimate cause, even if only dimly discerned, of the present preoccupation with geopolitics. For in

war we find it definitely harder to master those earthly forces like climate, distance, mountains, rivers and other obstacles which put themselves in the way of plans, actual operations and transport, slow them up or make them altogether impossible. This is largely so because during the war the time and the technological means to overcome them are not readily available or the time required for overcoming them cannot be afforded—or the enemy is in league with them. To state things differently: In war, the forces of the earth are stronger than in peace, the power of nature over man is re-asserted. Hence, the soldier first and the civilian citizen next, in order to understand the physical “frictions” arising in war, must know more geography, more of the “geographic conditions of war”⁹ for a full understanding of its processes. That in subsequent peace as well the forces of the earth are considered equally strong and all important in the minds of officers is perhaps unavoidable. Might not indeed geopolitics be defined as the hangover in the minds of political generals of wartime considerations? But must the makers of the future peace think as highly of geopolitics as generals? They must also remember that the geographic features of the earth surface have lost and are still losing in comparative and absolute strength in their influence on politics—a comparison between the earth influences on men in the days of Bodin and Leibniz¹⁰ and our own time would bring that out in a most striking way, and insofar geopolitics in those days would have been truer and more relevant than it is today or will be tomorrow. In our own age, earth-given “spaces” are, at least in peace time, technically overcome or overcomable almost as soon as they are geopolitically stated and posited as pretendedly unalterable geopolitical “facts.”

⁹Capitaine Villate, *Les conditions géographiques de la guerre*, (Paris, 1925.)

¹⁰ Leibniz expressed the conviction that out of geography the true interests of every people and every government could be deduced. (Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus*, Munich and Berlin, 1936. 41.)

THE ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR OF 1919

BY ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPE

The land route from Europe to India and the Indian Ocean is guarded by a natural land fortress, Afghanistan. On this land route converged the perspectives of German strategy in two World Wars. It is, therefore, not surprising that Afghanistan looms large in German geographic and strategic thought.

German schemes for the conquest of Central Asia date back to the first World War. An expeditionary force would probably have proceeded towards Afghanistan, had the German High Command been able, after the collapse of Russian resistance in 1917, to exploit its Eastern gains without stinting other fronts.

A German mission had, in 1916, actually made its way to Kabul in Afghanistan. Its leader was Wilhelm von Hentig, who later became chief of the oriental section of the Nazi Foreign Office. The purpose of this mission was to incite the predominantly Moslem Afghans to join in a Holy War and create a diversion in Britain's back yard, i.e., the North West Frontier Province of India. Yet the advance in 1917 of German troops to the Don River and the Crimea appeared to justify vastly more ambitious schemes: German military experts and geographers declared themselves in favor of an offensive across the Transcaspian or Transcaucasia—or through both regions—to Afghanistan and thus to the gates of India. It is easy, in retrospect, to point out how far German plans had then strayed from the realities of Germany's rapidly deteriorating military situation. However, this plan for a campaign in Central Asia, like so many audacious projects hatched by German military leadership in World War I, was shelved but never scrapped. It reappeared in German writings immediately after Hitler's invasion of Russia in June 1941 and probably influenced Hitler's choice of geographical objectives in the planning of his 1942 offensive in Russia. Hitler himself—after the German reverses at Moscow and Stalingrad—avowed other objectives. Yet his avowals were made for the purpose of explaining away the checks imposed on his schedule by Soviet resistance. They did not signify the abandonment of his grandiose designs on Central Asia. Here—as in all other important respects—Hitler sought to carry on where German strategy left off in 1918 and to re-fight the first World War in a more scientific, grander and—more successful—manner.

Afghanistan is the gateway to India and holds the key position along the only highways of war afforded by the geography of Southwestern Asia. The Hindukush, consisting of many ranges, rises to 20,000 feet. Its relatively low passes provide, by land, the easiest access to India locked in by the deserts of Baluchistan, the solid wall of the Himalayas and the jungles of Burma.

To the Northwest the gap between the Murghab and Tejend rivers offers the easiest passage between Persia and Turkmenistan, the Transoxiana of ancient times. Due south of the headwaters of the Murghab lies the Afghan city of Herat. Here the trough formed by the valleys of the Atrek, Kashaf Rud, and Hari Rud provides the most practical pathway from the northern plateau of Iran to Kabul and Kandahar and thence to India.

Because of its central position astride the crossroads of Central Asia, Afghanistan has played an important role in the long military history of Asia. Alexander the Great, starting from the West, forced the gap between the Tejend and the Murghab, crossed the Shibar Pass, 9,800 feet high, followed the Ghorband Valley and, in 327 B. C. passed into India. Fifteen hundred years later Jenghiz Khan, advancing from the East, ordered one of his commanders to fall upon Herat and secure—as a preliminary to the invasion of Persia—control of the Murghab-Tejend gap. Jenghiz Khan in person led a corps of his famous light cavalry across the Hindukush to the Kabul River and, along the valley of the Tochi, into the Punjab.

Alexander and Jenghiz Khan were only two—if also the greatest—of the many commanders who pitted their skill against the barren plateaus, towering ranges and the warlike tribes of Afghanistan. Yet it is significant that the latter, perhaps the greatest military leader of all times, sustained in this operation against numerically inferior opposition heavier losses than in any of his campaigns against the then greatest military powers of Asia and Europe.

Afghanistan—though the essential passageland of Central Asia—is the communication officer's nightmare. Barren wastelands alternate with snowcapped mountain ranges, intense summer heat with severe winter cold. Topography conspires with climate to impede human communications in peace and war.

The historic approaches were from the Northwest and North. From the Northwest (Persia) the road runs, with an easy gradient, along the valley of the Hari Rud to Herat. But the would-be invader advancing from Herat to Kabul must either scale a series of jagged

ridges, the Koh I Baba Range, or travel the long, round-about route via Kandahar. The classical route of invasion from the North (Russia) follows the valley of the Oxus, skirts the Hindukush, ascends, via a 38 mile narrow gorge, the Shibar Pass and drops down steeply to the Kabul Valley. It takes 360 miles of marching and climbing to reach Kabul which, by air, is only 180 miles distant from the Russian border. However, this road is seldom snowbound for a long time and the Shibar is, by Afghan standards, an easy pass. Jenghiz Khan chose this route.

At Kabul, a focal point of several valleys, the routes from North and West converge. From Kabul radiate several alternate routes to India. One of these, now the most famous, leads via Jelalabad and Landi Kotal to the Khyber Pass and thence to Jamrud in India.

The improvement in World communications and the shift of the centers of political power in the course of the last two centuries robbed Afghanistan and its ancient roads of conquest of much of their strategic glamour. Britain conquered India from the sea and held it by virtue of her naval supremacy. Thus Afghanistan played in British military policies the role of a barrier rather than passage land—a barrier between British and Russian interests in Central Asia.

From the 1840's onward Britain, and later Czarist Russia, engaged in military operations against the unruly Afghans. These wars were waged in the style of border warfare. Neither Britain nor Russia were able, in spite of considerable local successes, to occupy and hold large parts of Afghan territory. British troops repeatedly stormed Kabul and Kandahar; the Afghan armies were, in open battle, no match for European troops. But the tribesmen proved themselves masters in mountain guerilla warfare and inflicted heavy losses on the European invaders. Measured by the exploits of a Jenghiz Khan the state of the military arts of the 19th Century spelled retrogression rather than advance. Warfare in the Afghan mountains posed problems in mobility and supply for which European armies had not yet found adequate solutions. The excessive costs of these campaigns as well as political considerations deflected Britain and Russia from attempting the real conquest of Afghanistan, and the Afghans thus managed to retain a large measure of political independence.

The most recent lesson in the intricacies of Afghan warfare is contained in the history of the war between Britain and Afghanistan in 1919. In this full-fledged trial of strength both sides employed comparatively large forces. Approximately 340,000 British troops were

ranged against 200,000 Afghan regulars and guerillas. The British troops were equipped with most of the technical devices developed during World War I, as for example, high explosives, armored vehicles, wireless, and planes. The campaign is, therefore, of some contemporary interest—last but not least because of the attention it seems to have received in German military quarters.

Afghanistan's attack against India—for it was the Afghans who precipitated hostilities—appears to have been the long delayed consummation of the intrigues started by the German missions who had turned up in Kabul during the World War. The pro-British Amir Habibullah was mysteriously murdered in February 1919. He was succeeded, after a brief revolt, by the Amir Amanullah who owed his throne to the anti-British leaders of the Afghan Army. Counting on Britain's preoccupation with widespread unrest in India and, probably, on Soviet assistance, Amanullah set his troops in motion on April 25th. Simultaneously a stream of anti-British propaganda commenced to flow from Kabul and an Afghan-led Fifth Column went into action behind the British lines in the North West Frontier Province. Amanullah's agents in Peshawar—with a Goebbels touch—distributed from speeding Ford trucks leaflets announcing that the Germans had resumed the war and that India and Egypt had risen against Britain.

Owing to the peculiar timing of the Afghan attack, paradoxically launched on the heels of Britain's victory in Europe and during an unusually intense heat wave, the British authorities were taken by surprise. Conversely, the Anglo-Indian forces were mobilized more rapidly than the Afghans had expected, offsetting some of the latter's initial advantage.

The conduct of British operations was determined by these considerations:

The Afghan Army was distributed as follows: On the northern line, including Kabul, were stationed 16,500 infantry, 2,800 cavalry and 110 guns. On the central line, including Ghazni, were 1,100 cavalry, 9,000 infantry and 60 guns. On the south, facing Chaman in Baluchistan, stood 500 cavalry, 10,000 infantry and 60 guns. Including the garrisons at Herat and at the Russian border, the Amir's army consisted of 7,000 cavalry, 42,000 infantry and 260 guns. Half of the guns were obsolete, none of the modern ones were of large caliber. For transportation the army relied on horse and mule, for Afghanistan boasted neither of railroads nor modern highways. The Amir's real strength lay not in his army but in the potential fighting value of the

border tribes. Expert in mountain warfare, 120,000 strong and armed with modern rifles, these tribes had been exhorted by Amanullah's agents to join the Afghan regulars in a Holy War—a Jihad—against Britain. It was on their cooperation that the Afghan plan of campaign was based. This plan contemplated operations on three fronts: From Jelalabad on the Khyber sector; from Ghazni on the Tochi and Kurram river sector (Jenghiz Khan's line of approach); and from Kandahar on the Chaman border. This plan put to good use the Afghan's natural advantage of interior lines. The British troops were forced to fight along a front of about 1,000 miles—and to guard even against such Afghan threats as a diversion which was indeed attempted from Herat against Persia.

The distribution of the enemy forces and the length of the frontiers to be guarded dictated the British plan of campaign: To stay on the defensive in the Tochi and Chaman sectors, and to advance the Main Striking Force against Jelalabad, the object being to divide the border tribes from the Afghan Army, secure the Khyber and open the way to Kabul. Subsequent events were to impose considerable modifications on this plan.

The advance through the Khyber, under General Sir A. A. Barret, met with little resistance and the bombing attacks of the R.A.F. forced the Afghans to evacuate their forward base at Dakka. Determined resistance was met at Fort Robot. Infantry attacks, supported by air bombings—then a novelty in warfare—and field artillery, failed to dislodge the enemy from his hill positions. The arrival of mountain howitzers, firing 3.7 inch high explosive shells, finally forced the enemy to retreat. Here the offensive came to a halt, and here the Main Striking Force remained until the cessation of hostilities. The R.A.F. subjected Jelalabad, the Afghan principal base, to three bombings, and a few bombs were deposited at Kabul. Neither place was relinquished by the Afghans.

The preparations for an advance from Dakka were considerably hampered by raids on the British lines of communications, a shortage of traction animals and, most importantly, by the multiplicity of enemy threats to other parts of the front. British withdrawals at the upper Tochi and Kurram river were the signal for the rising of the tribes and defection of native militia units. Only by the end of July and upon the dispatch of re-enforcements were the British forces able to retake the ground lost at the beginning of the campaign. Similarly, Lieutenant

General Wapshare's Baluchistan force in the Chaman sector was forced to draw upon reserves originally destined for the Kabul sector. Here, also, the initial successes of the Afghans persuaded the hill tribes to turn against the British garrisons, and many border posts had to be abandoned. General Wapshare's one major offensive operation, conducted against Fort Baldak, was largely in the nature of a riposte, and the capture of this strong point was followed by no further advances into Afghan territory. Snags in the organization of supply, the reluctance of the British commander to advance far beyond the railheads of the Indian railway system and the insufficiency of rolling stock, limited the scope of offensive operations.

After protracted negotiations, continued throughout most of the hostilities, a peace agreement was signed on August 8th at Rawalpindi. Unofficially, the border strife continued unabated until deep into the winter. The failure of Afghan troops to penetrate into India and British promptness in dealing with Indian unrest had cooled Amanullah's ardor. Moreover, Soviet support had not been forthcoming and domestic intrigue had begun to sap the fighting strength of the Afghan Army. Yet neither had the results of the campaign been conclusive from the British point of view. The peace treaty gave Britain only negligible territorial advantages whereas Amanullah was given a letter recognizing the freedom of Afghan foreign relations from British control. While this control had not been very effective during the reign of Amanullah's predecessors, public opinion in Britain was left with the uncomfortable feeling that the Afghan campaign had not been a boon to British prestige in Asia.

The war with Afghanistan left Britain a rich legacy of trouble. It left as its heritage a disturbed border which to this day has not settled down to pre-war conditions. It also gave rise to acrimonious debates in Parliament and in the British press as to alleged breakdowns in the medical and transportation system. While some of the criticism leveled against the military and civil authorities is undoubtedly of the armchair kind, deficiencies actually did exist. Some of these may still today command the interest of the student of warfare in Asia.

The sharpest criticism was leveled against the Medical and Transportation Services and in these branches some shortcomings undoubtedly existed. The outstanding features of the campaign, from the medical point of view, were the outbreak of cholera of great severity, and the unusual climatic conditions, i.e., temperatures ranging during

the height of the campaign from 114° to 119°. Cholera made its appearance in the forward areas both in the Khyber and the Tochi sectors. The Medical Service appears to have been, by modern standards, inadequately equipped. Moreover, the organization of rations appears to have been none too satisfactory from the dietetic point of view. The incidence of sickness was high: The total admissions during the period from May 5th to August 9th were 10,800 British and 45,000 Indian troops, and a daily admission ratio per thousand of 5 British and 3 Indian is given by official publications, which compares unfavorably with World War statistics.

Recreational facilities left much to be desired. Their inadequacy was keenly felt by the troops of the Striking Force at Dakka during the long period of inaction between the initial advance in early May and the conclusion of hostilities in August. For the bleakness of the Afghan highlands imposed severe psychological strains upon the British troops. These expected, after the termination of the early operations, their long-delayed leave or demobilization. Some of these troops had been hurriedly transferred—on the eve of their embarkation for Britain—from Mesopotamia where they had fought under totally different climatic conditions. The sudden climatic change impaired their health. Worse, they chafed under the deadweight of inaction. Little was done to dispel their boredom. The complaint that no steps were taken to relieve the dreariness of camp life amidst one of world's least hospitable sceneries was one of the grievances most unanimously aired by the participants of this campaign.

Likewise, the transport facilities at the disposal of the Anglo-Indian forces proved inadequate. Ford trucks were used to supplement the animal transport, impaired by epidemic diseases. Heavy trucks were nearly totally lacking and the dependence of medium artillery on animal traction grievously slowed down operations. Official reports dwelt frequently on the insufficiency of railway rolling stock. Most painfully, however, was felt the dearth of skilled mechanics and engineers. These shortcomings probably explain best the fact that this halting campaign taxed Britain so heavily and yielded her so little.

Since 1919 the military geography of Afghanistan has been modified by extensive road construction. A motor road linking Kabul with Mazar I Sharif near the Russian border, was built by Nadir Shah, Amanullah's successor and Afghan field commander in the war of 1919. The road is longer than the old routes but can be kept open throughout most of the winter. Another modern road now links

Kandahar with Herat. Airlines, established by the German Lufthansa and now controlled by the Afghan Government, link Kabul with Herat and Kandahar.

The motorcar and plane have become factors to be reckoned with in the military geography of Afghanistan. However, the motorcar is confined to a few hundred miles of tolerably surfaced roads, and air-dromes are few and far between. To this day Afghanistan has no railroad and the beast of burden remains the backbone of the Afghan transportation system. Thus the ranges of the Hindukush and Koh I Baba are hardly less of an obstacle to a modern army than they were to the horsemen of Jenghiz Khan. The fortunes of war may yet restore their ancient pathways to the importance they once held in the strategic geography of Asia. For history passes and geography remains.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

The annual meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Institute was held in Washington on April 7, 1943. The terms of five members of the Board had expired on December 31, 1942, and to fill these vacancies the Board elected Dr. Edward Mead Earle, Dr. Luther Evans, Major Jesse S. Douglas, Captain Harvey A. DeWeerd, and Elihu Root, Jr. At the same time Dr. Robert H. Bahmer, who had been Acting Treasurer of the Institute since the resignation of Colonel Ralph C. Bishop in January, was elected Treasurer for a three year term. The committee consisting of Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, Major Douglas, and Major Fred P. Todd which had been appointed in October to revise the by-laws of the Institute, was requested to continue its labors, and there was unanimous approval of a motion to abolish the distinction between subscriptions to MILITARY AFFAIRS and membership in the Institute in the case of individuals.

Marie Charlotte Stark, Librarian of the Institute, reports that the library now has in its custody the manuscript and book collection of the Order of Indian Wars of the United States. This collection, consisting of printed pamphlets as well as manuscript memoirs of various Indian fighters, has been deposited on indefinite loan and is open to use by Institute members as well as to members of the Order.

Readers of our Spring issue will recall that we gave a comprehensive account of the historical work in process in the Army. The following paragraphs contain the latest news on the Army historical sections.

Reference service work in General Spaulding's Historical Section, Army War College, is experiencing a regular, old-fashioned, Wall Street Bull Market. Requests for information have increased 1100%. A comparison of the first ten months of 1942 and 1943 shows that in 1942 there were 713 requests for information from the War Department, and 233 from the public; in 1943 the War Department requests jumped phenomenally to 10,520, and that of the public doubled to 413. The personnel was increased by but a few additional officers and

civilians. Today there are about a score of officers and a dozen civilians in the Historical Section.

The historical work in The Adjutant General's Office is headed by Major Charles H. Franklin, who was appointed to that post in August, 1942; he has spent fourteen years in the Historical Section, Army War College, and produced the revised report of the First Army, A.E.F., which received the commendations of both General Pershing and General G. C. Marshal. His unit, the Policy and Historical Branch, is under the Control Division. The Branch is divided into three sections, Precedent and Policy Section, Historical Section, and Legislative Section. Of the three planned projects in this office, which include maintaining the current chronological history of the functional organization and activities of The Adjutant General's Office, as well as the rearrangement, consolidation, inventorying, and indexing of the AGO files and library, only one item has been completed. On December 1, 1942, a report was furnished to the Historical Officer of the then Services of Supply, which gave the "History of the Organization and Activities of The Adjutant General's Office" during the war period to that date.

Major E. E. Edwards, formerly Assistant to the President of the University of Indiana, was appointed Historian of the Office of the Chief of Finance, in September 1942. Overwhelmed as he is with other duties, the Major has little time to spare for purely historical functions; nevertheless he has managed to produce one item which, at the moment, is not available for public perusal. Major Edwards submitted a report to Major John D. Millett, Historical Officer of the SOS (now the Army Service Forces), which covers the period June 1940 to December 1942. In this report he examined the status of the Office of the Chief of Finance, with particular reference to the policy-making functions of the Fiscal Division.

Major William F. Fratcher, historian of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, is in much the same position as Major Edwards, that is, "doubling in brass." He anticipates, therefore, that the items of a historical nature produced by his office will be restricted to the annual reports. For those who would like to have a comprehensive view of the literature of this department of the Army, it may be stated that Major L. W. Morse of the Judge Advocate General's Library has compiled a list of all publications of the Judge Advocate General from 1862 to the present time and this list was published in a recent number of the *Law Library Journal*.

Robert R. Palmer of Princeton joined Major Kent R. Greenfield's staff, on Washington's birthday of 1943. In line with a recent War Department reorganization plan, the Army Ground Forces historical office has been re-designated the Historical Division, G-2, AGF. Major Greenfield and Palmer are now engaged in drafting substantial and definite plans and programs for the further operations of the office. Several studies have been produced including such items as "General Principles and Policies on Training," "The Amphibious Training Center," "Air and Ground Cooperation," and "Authority and Functions of GHQ."

On March 15, 1943, Major Norman E. Himes and Captain John L. Lentz reported for duty with Colonel Albert G. Love, historical officer of the Office of the Surgeon General. Major Himes is the well-known sociologist, formerly professor at Colgate, who besides his many scientific papers wrote a national "best-seller" on the problems of marriage. Captain Lentz was formerly engaged in preparing the popular public health literature of the Metropolitan Insurance Company.

Colonel Love states that the following reports have already been prepared by his office: (1) Report of the activities of the Medical Department during the fiscal year 1942; (2) The Medical Department Procurement Planning, 1920-1942; (3) activities during the period of military preparedness, June 1940 to December 7, 1941. In addition, many carbon copies of communications considered of historical value have been received by the office, and an index of all such communications as well as of current medical literature is prepared. The historical officer also maintains a subject index, and a brief digest of annual reports. Future plans, said Colonel Love, envisage the preparation, by Major Himes, of studies of certain administrative activities, such as (1) hospital construction and administration, (2) personnel procurement and administration, (3) organization of the Surgeon General's Office, and of the medical branches of service commands; and preparation by Captain Lentz of an account of the supply and fiscal activities of the Medical Department, including an adequate account of medical depots and procurement offices, and of the expansion of civilian industries to meet the needs for medical supplies.

The Historical Section of the Office of the Quartermaster General is proceeding on its established program. Captain A. M. Thornton states that the section is now operated in two divisions known respectively as (1) the OQMG headquarters project, and (2) the OQMG

field historical projects. The latter consists of the thirteen Quartermaster Depots, each with a field historian. Quartermasters operating with armies or other field commands are not included in the scope of this historical section.

Major John R. Stockton, formerly of the University of Texas, joined the staff of Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Goddard, head of the Historical Section of the Office of Chief of Ordnance. This Section is now operated in two parts. The Administrative Staff, in the Pentagon Building, consists of Colonel Goddard; an Administrative Assistant; the Statistical Officer, Major Stockton; the Secretary and one editor. The Sub-Office in Baltimore, located there because of its proximity to the Ordnance Records located at Curtis Bay, consists of a Deputy Chief; an editorial staff of two editors; a technical staff of officers for small arms, artillery, tanks, motor transport, technical research and development, military training and organization, and administration. These staffs have both professional civilian and military personnel. In addition, historical officers are functioning at the various ordnance installations throughout the country. On May 20 there was the first meeting of a new advisory committee to act as consultants on Ordnance Department history, which included in its membership Douglas Southall Freeman, James Truslow Adams, Brigadier General Benedict Crowell, Dumas Malone, and R. V. Coleman. The committee's initial task is to overhaul the existing historical program of the Ordnance Department and check progress from time to time.

As is to be expected the various historical sections have made considerable progress in getting established. They have acquired additional personnel. Most of them have reached the limit of their planned growth. The one outstanding exception is the Army Air Forces, which is in the throes of large expansion of its overseas historical personnel. On the whole the general tendency is towards the production of topical, monographic material.

Progress continues in the development of programs of historical research in civilian agencies as well. Plans for the establishment of a War History Commission, discussed in our last issue, are still under consideration. The steering committee of Dr. Luther H. Evans, chairman, and Drs. Solon J. Buck, Guy Stanton Ford, Pendleton Herring, and Waldo G. Leland, members, appointed at the general meeting of historians on December 29, 1942, has under advisement proposals for the sponsorship of the Commission.

Meanwhile the Committee on Records of War Administration,

Bureau of the Budget, directed by Dr. Herring, has attempted to bring historians in the war agencies into closer association through a series of informal meetings. A recent report of progress indicated the following persons among those engaged in historical research at various agencies in Washington: Agriculture Department: Dr. Gladys Baker and Mrs. Jane Porter; Board of Economic Warfare: William Taylor; Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs: Benjamin Margolin; National Housing Agency: Miss Helen Monchow; Office of Civilian Defense: Harold Elsten; Office of Defense Health and Welfare: Mrs. Katherine R. Clement; Office of Defense Transportation: Dr. Paul Zeis; Office of Lend-Lease Administrator: Miss Letitia Lewis; Petroleum Administrator for War: Dr. Carl L. Lokke; State Department: George Fennemore; War Relocation Authority: Dr. Stuart Portner.

War records officers at various agencies in Washington met on April 9, 1943, to discuss means of exchanging information and utilizing the personnel, facilities, and experience of the National Archives. Plans were laid at this session for a series of similar meetings in which problems of records administration would be analyzed. Presiding at this meeting was Dr. Solon J. Buck, Archivist of the United States. In attendance were Lieutenant Commander Emmett J. Leahy and Lieutenant Joseph Brennan, United States Navy; Captain Wayne C. Grover and Lieutenant Hugh M. Flick, Army of the United States; Drs. Theodore Schellenburg, Robert H. Bahmer, and Philip C. Brooks, the National Archives; Miss Helen Chatfield, Treasury Department; and Dr. Stuart Portner, War Relocation Authority.

Of considerable interest to members and friends of the Institute was the recent announcement by The Infantry Journal that *Studies on War: A Military Affairs Reader* would soon be published in its series of Fighting Forces Books. The volume will contain fourteen articles originally published in Volumes I through VI of MILITARY AFFAIRS, which have been organized into thirteen chapters. The chapters have been grouped under three headings, European Military Thought and Practice; Economics and Warfare; and The United States Army, Past and Present. An initial printing of 25,000 copies will be distributed commercially as well as to members of the armed forces.

Contributors to This Issue

John R. Cuneo is the author of *The German Air Weapon, 1870-1914*, the first volume of a projected trilogy *Winged Mars*; his article

on German attack aviation has been adapted from part of one chapter of the second volume, which is to cover the World War I period.

Dr. Alfred Vagts, a trustee of the Institute, was a contributor to the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* two decades ago.

Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, a new contributor to MILITARY AFFAIRS, is author of *Geopolitics: the Struggle for Space and Power* as well as other writings on world power politics.

Dr. Henry Pleasants, Jr., lieutenant-colonel in the Inactive Reserve, has written a biography of Thomas Mason and includes historical research first on his list of hobbies.

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

The Self-Betrayed: The Glory and Doom of the German Generals,
by Curt Riess. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1942. Pp. 380.
\$3.00.)

There is probably no area in which a bad book can do more harm at present than in the military field. Because of their unfamiliarity with military matters, American readers are easy victims for pseudo military experts. In the European field we are particularly gullible. The average reader or reviewer cannot tell a good book in this field from a bad one. If the bad book is fairly well written, carries an air of authority, and presents a surface familiarity with the details of European armies, the deceit is likely to be complete. Such are the thoughts provoked by reading Curt Riess's *The Self-Betrayed: the Glory and Doom of the German Generals*.

There are four fields in which I think his general picture of German military affairs is untrustworthy. They are (a) his treatment of Seeckt and the *Reichswehr*, (b) his characterization of the *Ostelbien* officer class, (c) his account of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften*, (d) his description of the new German Navy and its history.

Overlooking such things as mere errors in chronology and geography, one has the feeling that Mr. Riess lacks the background required to write a book on German military affairs. The number of errors and inaccuracies are astonishing. He betrays an ignorance of the institutions and habits of the old German army (pp. 45, 76, 81, 158, 169). He confuses (pp. 52, 53, 57, 70) branches of the staff of field armies with the Great General Staff. This confusion extends to technicalities of German general staff work (pp. 83, 228).

His accuracy as a reporter of historical events may be gauged from his interpretation of the battle of Mollwitz (p. 178), from his confusion of the Roman consuls at the battle of Cannae (p. 175), from his preposterous assertion (p. 75) that the French and Russian Revolutions built their military machines from the ground up, and from his utterly unexplainable reference (p. 296) to August 13, 1918, as an

"American victory under American leadership." Possibly he was thinking of the British offensive of August 8, 1918. Or was it the American offensive at St. Mihiel, September 11-15, 1918?

There seems to be no relation between the works cited in his carelessly-prepared bibliography and what he has written. Much to his embarrassment, the reviewer found his own book cited in the bibliography, but was relieved to find that Mr. Riess had made one mistake in spelling his name and another in the title of the book.

He garbles facts known even to casual students of German political and military history. Hindenburg did not refuse (p. 56) to send any of his generals to participate in the signing of the armistice in 1918; he sent General von Winterfeldt. His reference (p. 57) to General Mackensen as the "general who never lost a battle" shows that he is content to repeat old journalistic phrases. Perhaps he never knew what happened to Mackensen's XVII corps at the battle of Gumbinnen on August 20, 1914!

Some errors must be charged to plain carelessness. He tells us (p. 137) that Rundstedt was commander of the III military district in 1932, and yet insists (p. 190) that until 1935 there were only two military districts. Far from being content with having "the Gestapo" beat out a few of Papen's teeth on June 30, 1934, he has them beat them all out (p. 151) including the back molars! He is equally careless in dealing with things familiar to Americans. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was never Fort Leaven (p. 391) nor was the Army Industrial College ever the "Industrial War College" (p. 296). One could extend the list *ad nauseum*.

The cream of the jest, the very crown of this comedy of errors, however, is an utterly incredible reversal of Schlieffen's advice to "keep the *right* wing strong" in the coming battle with France. This warning was repeated in many of Schlieffen's papers and went into German folk literature through the death-bed message of Schlieffen to General von Hahnke. It is as familiar to Germans as Washington's farewell address to Americans. As the reader of this review might assume, Curt Riess, with masterly maladroitness, (p. 176) has Schlieffen say "Make the *left* wing strong." It is as if an American writer should put in the mouth of George Washington the impossible words: "Seek foreign alliances!" This simply could not be a typographical error, but represents a confusion in the mind of the author which extends down to such simple things as north and south, right and left.

Mr. Riess wrote a letter to the *New York Times Book Review*

(January 17, 1943) complaining that reviewers demanded to know the "sources" of his information. He wanted Americans to accept his main message that the German officer corps could not revolt against Hitler. In view of the errors and absurdities pointed out above, is there any good reason why readers and reviewers of this book should *not* be doubtful about Mr. Riess's conclusions as well as his "sources"?

H. A. DEWEERD¹

*Captain, General Staff
Corps, AUS*

The First Century of Flight in America, by Jeremiah Milbank, Jr.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. 248. \$2.75.)

A foundation for an intelligent interest in a subject of national importance is a knowledge of its past. Until recently very little reliable information has been available to the general reader interested in the history of aeronautics in the United States. This volume is the latest attempt to remedy the situation.

Mr. Milbank traces the story from Franklin's interest in the first French ascensions to the Chicago air conference of 1893. There was a slow beginning: the first ascension in the United States seems to have been by a thirteen-year-old boy in a captive balloon on June 24th, 1784, followed by Blanchard's famed flight at Philadelphia almost ten years later. Interest lagged until other French balloonists appeared in 1819. Eleven years later came the first native aeronaut, Charles F. Durant—known like most of his successors by the awe-inspiring title of "Professor." John Wise is brought out of the obscurity caused, perhaps, by the publicity given to the Civil War exploits of T. S. C. Lowe. Brief but well-written passages describe not only the aeronauts and inventors of the period but also the contemporary literature, both light and serious. The turn of American interest to heavier-than-air problems at the close of the nineteenth century is noted. As Europe was then turning to dirigibles, it perhaps explains why the first air-plane flight should occur on these shores.

No attempt is made to treat military ballooning at length. The Civil War events are only briefly described—just as are most of the topics in a book which admittedly only scratches the surface.

Although the author has gone to the source for his material, his

¹The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the above review are those of the individual officer. They do not necessarily represent official War Department opinions nor that of the service at large.

outline history probably contains little that is new to the student of aeronautics. However the concise presentation of material recommends it to the latter as well as to the general reader unfamiliar with the events. The book is a good example of fine commercial printing. It is a pleasure to find an air historian daring to treat his subject in a scholarly manner, citing his sources—a practice unfortunately far too rare in aeronautical literature.

JOHN R. CUNEO

East Norwalk, Connecticut

The Story of Weapons and Tactics from Troy to Stalingrad, by Tom Wintringham. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 230. \$2.25.)

Tom Wintringham brings to this work his experiences in the World War, the Spanish Civil War, and the English home guard. He also offers a definite philosophy, one developed and concretized during the epochal struggle of the last four years. Wintringham knows that no one can appreciate the meaning of modern warfare unless he has an understanding of the force of change on the art of war. "No one," he declares, "can clearly grasp a science or an art unless he gets a clear idea of its history." And with such an idea in mind, he proceeds to give the background of modern warfare, tracing its origins to Troy.

Wintringham divides the history of warfare into armoured and unarmoured periods:

- I. The first unarmoured period—prehistory to 479 B.C.
- II. The first armoured period—479 B.C. to 378 A.D.
- III. The second unarmoured period—378 to 774.
- IV. The second armoured period—774 to 1346.
- V. The third unarmoured period—1346 to 1917.
- VI. The third armoured period—1917 to ?.

The major tendencies illustrated show the swing of the pendulum between armour and projectile, shock and projectile, a general increase in mobility, and the dominance of projectile weapons. In each case the accurateness of Wintringham's survey in its broad outline is seen in terms of more detailed accounts.

His new pattern of warfare is the People's War, "which treats as principal the active linking of an armed population with an offensive striking force." The American Revolution, the Napoleonic War against the Spanish guerillas, and the present successful developments in Russia are the bases for this argument.

The layman will find in this study a clear presentation of the most important developments in warfare. The expert also will receive tremendous stimulus from the incisive summation of tendencies even if he does not agree with the author's conclusions.

It is the most readable summary of the history of land warfare yet written.

GEORGE STANSFIELD

The National Archives

We Can Win This War, by Colonel W. F. Kernan, U.S.A. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. 176. \$1.50.)

This book starts out as an educational treatise on a winning strategy but ends up as a contribution to military theology. Indeed, in a measure it is disturbing. The author devotes 130 of his 176 pages to a "strategic reconnaissance" or an exploration of the enemy's position. The resulting estimate of enemy strength will come as a shock to radio fans and headline addicts, and awaken some dreaming citizens to a realization of the dangerous character of this war. Colonel Kernan shows no royal road to victory.

Taking advantage of the mature hind-sight of the historian, and with a marked capacity for picturesque phrasing, the author uses much space in caustic criticism of the mistaken policies and strategies of the Democracies, during the twenty years' armistice. He claims that the military system of the Democracies was weakened by economics, by the concepts of the financial leaders of 1920-40, who thought of limiting war without paying the high price of peace insurance. He attacks the various schools of "liberal" thought, such as "limited liability," the "Manchester School," the "influence of seapower on history," and castigates such strategic assumptions as "The Maginot Line is impregnable," "The mountains of the Balkans impassable." But his particular *bete noir* is peripheral strategy, that is hitting the enemy at the rim of the wheel instead of at the hub. The presently popularized "global strategy" is scorned as merely an alias for the peripheral school, and Guadalcanal and Dieppe are cited as illustrations of meaningless tactical efforts that do not affect the main issue in the slightest degree; indeed, the former is dolefully termed the "Gascon's Graveyard of the Pacific."

The Colonel believes that United Nations strategy has also been hampered and frustrated by over-administration, by a desire to have everything perfected to the last detail before launching the only offen-

sive that matters—the thunderbolt blow directly at the enemy's heart. But in trying to give his version of how to get there the author's coherence shades into vague generalities. He advocates a "masculine" strategy as opposed to the "hermaphroditic" type thus far practiced by the United Nations. He would "turn the enemy before battle," so that the following application of tactical power would so shake the enemy's "equilibrium" that victory would be inevitable. Yet the Colonel nowhere specifies how these devoutly wished-for dexterities are to be accomplished. Thus we pass into a word fog on strategy and tactics which is somewhat reminiscent of Gertrude Stein of happier days.

Nonetheless, though we may take exception to the foregoing points, the volume ends on an exalted plane—a striking peroration on the necessity of revitalizing our Democratic faith in order to steel ourselves to the harsh realities of the coming sacrifices required. As the author himself says, "though starting out as a book on strategy, 'popular' strategy, it has now become a book on theology . . . For . . . this is a people's war and if the people are going to win it they are going to have to understand strategy. And they are going to have to understand theology too, for it is a religious war in which the children of Faith are engaged with the powers of darkness."

So the author ends on a note of faith. But when faiths are similarly perfervid, the result once again depends on the force equation. Our leaders know that. They are acting accordingly.

VICTOR GONDOS, JR.

Captain, Coast Artillery Reserve

Silent Enemies, by Justina Hill. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1942. Pp. 266. \$2.50.)

Civilian Health in Wartime, Francis R. Dieuaide, M.D. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1942. Pp. 328. \$2.50.)

Flying Health, by M. Martyn Kafka, M.D. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 248. \$2.00.)

Studies of the effect of warfare on national health continue to appear in profusion. Two recent books, *Silent Enemies* by Justina Hill and *Civilian Health in Wartime* by Dr. Dieuaide, are intended for consumption by the general public, whereas *Flying Health* by Dr. Kafka is a manual of interest to the aviator and his crew.

Justina Hill presents in *Silent Enemies* a simple, yet comprehensive, well-documented study of the diseases whose aetiology is a living

agent. Here are noted the advances made in research and treatment of diseases of bacterial, rickettsial, protozoan, and virus nature. Not only are pneumonia, meningitis, and influenza discussed, but diseases not common to the average American like dengue and phlebotomus fevers, *kala-azar*, and *tabardilo* also are treated. Military men not versed in the science of bacteriology will find this a fine introduction to the study of diseases with which American troops are coming into contact in their present activities throughout the world.

Dr. Dieuaide, in *Civilian Health in Wartime*, reviews the medical problems of America at war. The author utilizes statistical data collected over the period dating from the outbreak of the first World War and compares our present conditions to those of 1914-18. The social aspects of our current situation are discussed and guidance is offered in the solution of some of our outstanding medical-social problems.

Dr. Kafka, former flight surgeon, has produced an elementary guide for the flier. Special chapters are devoted to the discussion of particular matters of interest to the aviator. Problems of fatigue are treated, and sections are devoted to a review of the subjects of exercise, relaxation, food, diseases, and similar topics. The chapter on tropical aviation is especially pertinent in pointing out the health hazards in tropical areas. Also valuable are the sections on the prophylaxis of such conditions as sunstroke, heat exhaustion, and diseases caused by physical agents.

M. M. LIPSCHITZ

Ann Arbor, Michigan

The Enigma of Admiral Darlan, by Alec de Montmorency. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1943. Pp. 194. \$2.50.)

In spite of the publisher's claims that "this penetrating analysis and inside story brings to light a sensational array of hitherto unknown facts concerning French intrigue and the man whose strategy baffled the Allies and Nazis alike," this book never finds the depth or meaning it pretends to seek; it has no more reality than the miniature models used in motion picture productions in its commando climax. The author pictures Admiral Darlan as a patriot; yet also, according to him, he was an anti-republican, a royalist, a "white," who in the early nineteen thirties plotted as a member of the triumvirate of Pétain-Weygand-Darlan a coup to overthrow the Republic and establish a military dictatorship.

The rest of the treatment is, in reality, a weird agglomeration of insinuations, dull gossip, twisted half-truths, flagrant misinterpretations, and misleading statements.

This can be judged from such assumptions as that "de Gaulle who spoke of Pétain, Weygand and Darlan as '*gouvernants de rencontre*'" should have realized that "he himself might be a '*Führer de rencontre*' or a '*Quisling de rencontre*' in the hands of the British Government, to be used as a tool against his own country" (p. 111), or that "one may be sure that his cruel death was not altogether unwelcome to his tormented mind" (pp. 147-148). We read that Darlan was glad to greet Eisenhower. But he wanted to keep control of the situation. This fellow de Gaulle was not to be trusted with Darlan's navy. He simply could not see it under any other man's control. When the navy could not get away from Toulon, it was scuttled. A sad incident, but one that vindicates the Darlan who resolved in June of 1940 never to let the *Boche* use a single one of his ships.

The author's technique of impugning motives might be interesting for those who like to read the "inside stories" of international relations. But in this case the interpretations are too contradictory, too glib to the point that they nearly always overshoot the mark. The whole treatment is, in fact, marred by the extravagance of its claims and the impropriety of its judgments. And even if any of such claims have any factual base, they need to be documented. Alec de Montmorency obviously is not a good historian. Themes such as this might be—and have been—the stuff of tragedy. Here at best we have only melodrama. The book is pathetic when it is not preposterous.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
Hofstra College

Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942, by David J. Dallin, translated by Leon Dennen. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1943. Pp. 451. \$3.75.)

As the title indicates, Dr. Dallin's work is concerned with Soviet foreign relations in the period extending from the spring of 1939 to the beginning of the German siege of Stalingrad which marked the end of the first fifteen months of the Soviet-German War. And in spite of the difficulties involved in accurately analyzing events of such immediate occurrence and the unavailability of much pertinent source material, the author has produced a competent study; a study of value to

anyone desiring to know the factors involved in contemporary Soviet policy and to the cautious historians who will attack the subject in the future only after all the evidence is in. It is precisely because Dr. Dallin had the initiative to undertake an analysis of an immediately contemporary subject that he deserves much credit, for through his efforts those who wish to understand the near past, in order that they may better comprehend the future, are at least given an opportunity to examine the results of research accomplished by a long time student of international affairs.

The principal theme of the book is that the primary and constant objective of Soviet foreign policy was to hold the Soviet apart as a "third power" in the diplomatic "arena" of Europe; that is, Russia willfully sought isolation from both the Anglo-French and German coalitions because she distrusted all governments, or combinations of governments, and was at the same time fixed with a world mission complex. Because of this policy, according to the author, it was impossible for any European power to count on Russia for steadfast support since she was not on either side; consequently, the uncertainty of the Soviet position allowed the Germans to swing the balance in their favor in 1939. In the first five chapters particularly, a mass of evidence is offered to support this theme. According to the materials available it seems probable that Soviet policy was much as Dr. Dallin describes it; however, even the casual student of Russian foreign policy should bear in mind while weighing the author's theses, that the Soviet distrust of the great European powers, especially in the years 1939, 1940 and early 1941, was founded on fact. In other words, the Soviet could not forget its exclusion at Munich any more than it could forget the whole chain of events since 1933 which had allowed the German-Axis Coalition to expand unchecked by the Anglo-French Combination which was completely saturated with its own distrust of the Soviet Union.

Chapter XIV, on the Russo-German War, treats of such matters as the Anglo-Soviet Alliance, Soviet-Polish, Soviet-Finnish, Soviet-United States and Soviet-Japanese relations; United States and United Kingdom Lend-Lease arrangements with the Soviet are handled adequately and offer pertinent facts for the uninitiated. In view of the current Soviet-Polish difficulties, the information in this chapter (pp. 395-399) on the wartime course of relations of the two governments is of value to the layman.

This reviewer agrees with the author in his statement that following the battle for Stalingrad the strategic position for the first time

had turned in favor of the Allies. And that, in Dr. Dallin's words (p. 418), "New possibilities were opening up for striking powerful blows at the German bloc. For this, however, one primary condition was required: the rejection of all concepts of a separate war and the elimination of internal friction within the anti-Axis bloc."

DAVID SCOTT CRIST¹

Major, Infantry, AUS

NOTES

The last quarter witnessed no decrease in the volume of publications on military affairs. A review of the books published during the last 3 months produced a list of more than 500 titles, ranging in subject from sure-fire guides to success on your Army I.Q. tests to the most profound type of research in highly specialized scientific fields. "Super-duper" studies of strategy and tactics, frequently based on nothing more substantial than astrological analysis, continued to roll off the presses—the paper shortage obviously having no effect on production. Captains DeWeerd and Gondos and Dr. Roucek have underlined the need for critical study of military affairs; it is sincerely hoped that objective reporting will balance the vaporous utterances of some of our armchair grand strategists.

Among recent books George Weller's *Singapore is Silent* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1943. Pp. 312. \$3.00.) is a splendid first narrative of the Malayan campaign. Weller, Chicago *Daily News* war correspondent and recent Pulitzer Prize winner, is a trained observer of human affairs and his character analyses of leading personalities in this area of combat are as significant as his contributions on Japanese jungle warfare. Weller does not pretend to be a military expert, but military men will find a good description of Japanese infiltration tactics included in this volume.

William L. White, whose *They Were Expendable* won him wide acclaim, has produced another stirring account of American participation in the present conflict in *Queens Die Proudly* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1943. Pp. 273. \$2.50.). The "Queens" in this book are Flying Fortresses, and White merely acts as recorder for the crew of a Flying Fortress who narrate their experiences in the Pacific combat area. *Queens Die Proudly* packs a terrific punch; in the recital of their experiences by Lieutenant Colonel Frank Kurtz, Captain Harry Schrieber and the others is to be found a reminder of the epic struggle in the Philippines, Java, and the South Pacific.

In *Vichy, Two Years of Deception* (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 251. \$2.50.), Leon Marchal, former Counselor of the French Embassy in Washington, reviews the domestic and foreign policies of the Vichy administration in the period following the fall of France. The assumption of power by Laval is held to be merely a natural culmination of a process started by Petain's full capitulation to the Nazis.

Military Service Publishing Company has released two books on the German breakthrough on the Western front in May-June 1940. Daniel Vilfroy, in *War in the West* (Harrisburg. 1942. Pp. 163. \$2.50.), gives an interpretative study of the fall

¹The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the above review are those of the individual officer. They do not necessarily represent official War Department opinions nor that of the service at large.

of France. A lengthy chapter on the "Battle of France" reviews French and German operations from the action on the Meuse on May 13 to the retreat to Dunkirk. Students of the art of war will find the discussion of French military doctrine and Vilfroy's conclusions of real interest.

The second of these studies is a diary by the Marquis de la Falaise, *Through Hell to Dunkirk* (Harrisburg. 1943. Pp. 165. \$2.50.) With the Twelfth Lancers throughout this period de la Falaise begins his diary on May 10 and carries it forward daily as he narrates his experiences with the troops attempting to stop the German onslaught. There are no heroics, no profound sentiments, but merely one man's recital of his reaction to events of the moment.

Omnipresent Quentin Reynolds adds his version of the Dieppe raid in *Dress Rehearsal* (New York: Random House. 1943. Pp. 278. \$2.00.). In his introduction Reynolds declares that "for the real comprehensive story of Dieppe as a military operation, we shall have to wait for the historians." From such a beginning he proceeds to give a feature-human interest story of the combined operations against Dieppe.

More delicate than Reynolds, but as concerned with human interest is Vanya Oakes in her account of her 10 years in China, *White Man's Folly* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Company. 1943. Pp. 415. \$3.00.). Miss Oakes insists that "the sooner we comprehend that the Far East has forever ceased to be the happy-hunting ground for predatory foreign interests that once it was, the sooner we shall be on the way to rethinking the Far East in terms of our responsibilities."

Liveright released a truly weird recital of Japanese brutality in Alexandre Pernikoff's *Bushido, the Anatomy of Terror* (New York. 1943. Pp. 284. \$2.75.). This book purports to be a narration of events during the first days of Japanese control of Manchuria in 1931-32. Pernikoff calls his book "a case history of the Japanese technique" and relates in gruesome detail evidence of the reign of terror in Harbin and other cities as Japan took her first step toward control over Greater East Asia.

Blake Clark, former professor of English at the University of Hawaii, speaks in praise of the efforts of Japanese-American residents of Hawaii for their assistance on December 7, 1941 in *Remember Pearl Harbor* (New York: Harper & Brothers. Pp. 307. 2nd ed. 1943. \$2.50.). This is a second edition of the on-the-spot record of the Japanese attack on Hawaii. Material has been added on the damage done to the fleet and amplification has been made in other sections of the book following continued search by Clark. *Remember Pearl Harbor* is intelligent reporting.

In *We Thought We Heard the Angels Sing* (New York: F. P. Dutton & Company. 1942. Pp. 139. \$1.50.), Lieutenant James Whitaker, co-pilot of the plane on which Captain Eddie Rickenbacker and seven others were forced down in the Pacific, relates the adventures of the group at sea. Whitaker renders an inspirational account of the ordeal through which these men went during their 21 days at sea.

Ben Ames Williams, the novelist, has compiled a fine anthology of Americans at war since 1721 in *Amateurs at War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 498. \$3.00.). Included are selections from Francis Parkman, Ethan Allen, Major Robert Rogers, John Paul Jones, George Rogers Clark, Lew Wallace, Stephen Crane, Sergeant Alvin York, and Hervey Allen. Among reporters of the present conflict, selections are from the works of Cecil Brown, W. L. White, Wes Gallagher, Robert Carse, John Hersey, and Ira Wolfert.

The story of rubber has been treated by Charles Morrow Wilson in *Trees and Test*

Tubes (New York: Henry Holt & Company. 1943. Pp. 352. \$3.50.), a well-written, popularized history of the development of rubber production. Wilson describes manufacturing processes, discusses the merits of Amazon, Malayan and East Indian rubber, and reviews most recent attempts to meet the acute rubber shortage. Included as appendices are a digest and the complete text of the Baruch Committee Report and a bibliography.

Another volume in the Norton series of introductions to the arms of the service, *What You Should Know about the Signal Corps*, by Harry M. Davis and F. G. Fassett, Jr. (New York. 1943. Pp. 214. \$2.50.), appeared in the last few weeks. Following the pattern of other volumes in this series, Davis and Fassett treat of the origins of the service in the assignment of a Signal Officer in 1860 and develop the history of the Signal Corps.

Identification (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 301. \$2.00.) is a guide to the world's military, naval and air uniforms, insignia and flags. Though not a definitive treatment, for material on certain countries is entirely lacking, this volume is a handy reference tool.

STUART PORTNER

War Relocation Authority

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

CONTRABAND FROM LORIENT

BY HENRY PLEASANTS, JR.

British and American bombers are roaring over the little seacoast town of Lorient, in Brittany, France, and are dropping tons of bombs. Their objective is the great Nazi submarine base that has sprung into being since the Panzer divisions swept through from the east in 1940. So long as Lorient remains a spawning ground and hospital for the gangsters of the Atlantic, our transports loaded to the gunwales with troops and equipment will be in danger.

Few tourists have ever visited Lorient. It straggles along the Scorff River, about half way between the larger ports of Brest and St. Nazaire; and it is well off the beaten track of sight-seers. Karl Baedeker, whose guide books were always Bibles to summer visitors in foreign lands, gave little encouragement to any one who considered making the tedious journey thither from Paris. In fact, he spoke so disparagingly regarding the possible points of interest in this insignificant town that tourist trade probably languished as a result. No doubt, this was by no means resented by the French authorities, however, for Lorient was an important naval base as far back as 1827; and it was increasing steadily in its activity year by year prior to the First World War. From an official standpoint, the fewer strangers nosing around the quays, with cameras slung over their shoulders, the better.

Baedeker commented somewhat caustically upon the reticence and lack of hospitality on the part of the inhabitants. In 1909, he stated that the population of Lorient was 46,403. He added, "The town is well built, but uninteresting." He did, however, call attention to the bronze statue of Bisson, a young naval lieutenant, who blew up his ship to prevent its falling into the hands of Greek pirates.

There is more to the romantic background of Lorient than Karl Baedeker knew. In the earliest days of the American Revolution, l'Orient, as it was then called, was the scene of one of the earliest and

certainly one of the cleverest and most daring smuggling exploits that history has recorded. The success or failure of the cause of the insurgent American Colonies depended almost entirely upon the importation of a supply of arms and ammunition for Washington's ragged troops holding the British at bay in Boston. The mission was entrusted to Captain Thomas Mason, of Philadelphia.

A word about Mason: He was born in Poole, Dorsetshire, England, about 1730. His father was a successful merchant of that town, highly respected, and a staunch adherent to the tenets of the Church of England, who steadfastly refused to take any part in the illicit trade that had made Poole notorious. Smuggling was to Poole as moonshine distilling is to the Tennessee mountain districts. Thomas Mason listened to the rare tales told by the grizzled sea-dogs on the quays, and caught the fever of adventure. When his stern parent thrashed him soundly for idling with the "riff-raff o' th' port on th' Lord's Day," he ran away to sea, shipping as a cabin-boy on a brig bound for Philadelphia.

He was then but thirteen years old. He never returned to Poole. Instead, he set himself steadfastly to the serious business of becoming a mariner the hard way. From able seaman, he rose steadily and rapidly to captain of the brig *Prince of Wales* and the *Charlestown Packet*, both of which vessels carried freight and passengers between Philadelphia and Charleston, South Carolina. Later, he became associated in the mercantile marine trade with Thomas Shirley, a wealthy Englishman, who was sojourning for his health in the South, and expanded his activities in trade to the West Indies, Bermuda, France, Portugal and Spain. His shrewd business ability brought wealth and many friends in the highest social and financial positions in the Colonies. He bought a comfortable home at 13 Vine Street, Philadelphia, and married his childhood sweetheart, a charming Quaker lass, Priscilla Sisom, in Christ Church, October 12, 1766. Even the members of the strict Society of Friends seem to have borne no resentment against Priscilla for marrying "out of Meeting."

With such a reputation in the mercantile marine trade as Thomas Mason had made by the year 1775, it is not surprising that General Horatio Gates, Adjutant-General of the American Army, should have approached him with the view to obtaining help for Washington. The actual story of the first interview with the Commander-in-Chief is best told by the young mariner himself in the pages of his personal record of his expedition:

1775 the 10th of July—being a Stagnation of all kind of Business my Curiosity lead me to proceed with General Gates to Cambridge, and on my arrival there I was politely introduced by that Gentleman to General Washington, who in a Few Hours Became Acquainted with my Abilities as a Seaman, a man of property & capable of Executing any plan of a Voyage, that may be proposed Either in the Services of the States or Otherwise. General Washington acquainted me with the State of the Army in Respect to Ammunition, and Requested on my Return to Philadelphia that I would use my interest with other Gentlemen & proceed on a voyage to Europe for a Cargoe, to which I gave him my promise after coming from the Camp of Cambridge and finding their Distress was so greate for want of Ammunition . . . I concluded, in Case a Number of Gentlemen would join me—so as to make up a Capital of £4000 Sterling, that I would take the Hazardous Task on myself to Accomplish it—& Leaving a Sufficient Reale Estate Behind me as a Security. . . .

The details of the scheme are interesting from every angle: Mason evidently had much more difficulty in securing the necessary financial assistance than he had anticipated. Only an extremely wealthy man would be willing to stake his reputation and fortune on a plan to provide munitions for the insurgents; for, if the expedition failed, the loss would be total. Even if successful insofar as the importation of arms was concerned, the possible discovery by the British of the connection of any merchant with such a venture would be met with disciplinary measures of the severest type. Withdrawal of trading license would be the least that could be expected. Imprisonment and fine would be likely; and even capital punishment, such as hanging for treason was possible. No one but the most intrepid adventurer could possibly be expected to take such a chance.

Mason met with many rebuffs. Even some of his best friends declined to help him. Finally, he appealed to Robert Morris. The great financier was impressed. He agreed to become a partner in the scheme. This was highly satisfactory, as Morris commanded unlimited credit not only in the ports of Spain, France, and Portugal, but also in England, even at this period of colonial insurrection. Mason himself had some financial resources in England through his friend, Thomas Shirley. Morris insisted that his associate, Jacob Winey of Reading, Pennsylvania, be included as a third partner; but he stipulated that no other additions to the partnership be made. The final agreement between the three men was that each would advance 800 pounds Sterling; Mason would supply the vessel and command her, and Morris and Winey would load her with flour to be sold upon arrival at some foreign port, the proceeds of the sale to be added to the capital to be used later for the purchase of munitions. Mason set sail in the schooner *Charming Polly* on August 12th, 1775.

The voyage across the frigate-patrolled, pirate-infested Atlantic is described by the hard-bitten colonial mariner in just thirty-six words:

—The Next Day following Being the 12th I sett Saile & after a Passage of 34 day—with the Usual Occurences of a Voyage I had the Agreeable Satisfaction to Arrive in Ferole [Spain] the 14th of September. . . .

Difficulties began to be encountered immediately. Mason had no trouble in disposing of his flour, and was able to get an advance of 500 pounds against its sale, the balance to be credited to Morris' account when the transaction was completed by the agent, but the purchase of arms and ammunition seemed out of the question. As Mason put it:

While the Vessel was Discharging—no steps was Left undone to make myself acquainted with their Laws & Customs of Trade & in particular, for the Cargoe I came for, which Sufficiently appears in my Querry's, from some of the most Iminent Merchants in that place, with their answers amongst my papers, and I could not Discover the Least Shaddow of hopes in Obtaining arms or Ammunition.

Disappointed, but not discouraged, Thomas Mason decided to try his luck elsewhere. On the 27th of September, he dropped anchor in Port Lorient, after a passage of five days. Here, he says, "I made every Necessary Inquiry Respecting my outward bound cargoe & Nearly found myself in Like Situation, as in Spain. . . ." The real obstructive element was, of course, the fact that all of the European nations were unwilling to enter into any trade negotiations for arms with representatives of the insurgent colonies for fear of incurring the wrath of England.

The young mariner found some light on the subject among his friends in Lorient: It would be possible to ship saltpeter, used in the manufacture of gunpowder, to Holland "in any Bottom, But American." It would also be possible to ship arms from the port of Nantes to the coast of Guinea. From there, it would be easy to transfer the shipment to America. Mason hesitated, however, stating in his report, "But in this case it is not complying with the Tenor of my orders—and in Case of Accident perhaps it may Involve me in a Law Suit." Sailing orders to captains were very strict in those days; and even though he was actually a partner in the venture, he was, nevertheless, an agent under orders of Morris and Winey.

His discomfiture was suddenly increased when, "—after 2 days thus Reflecting, I concluded on the 29th of September to purchase the Salt-peter, but to my surprise no person would take my Bills, a report prevailing that all American Credit was at an End in England."

Uppermost in the mind of Thomas Mason was the securing of arms and ammunition for the colonies. He had been given specific instructions verbally by Robert Morris to extend his credit beyond the notes and bills of exchange in his possession, if he thought wise. In those days, international credit was comparatively informal. Large amounts of gold or silver were seldom shipped to foreign ports unless it was to establish the credit of a new and comparatively unknown concern. Mason was actually in possession of 3900 pounds Sterling, ready for immediate investment. This was a persuasive form of argument with French merchants; and he used it immediately to the best advantage. He says:

In this situation I put my Bills of Exchange into the Hands of Berard Brothers to Forward them to London for Acceptance, which in Common takes 22 Days Before you have advice of Their Fate—But I prevailed on them Gentlemen to Load the Schooner & in case all my Bills came Back protested, the Vessel should be Dispatched with her cargoe & myself Stay as Hostage untill payment came from America, or security obtained for the amount from my Connections in England.

This was an adroit piece of business. In other words, in the very face of reports of failure of American credit in England, he persuaded an established mercantile firm of France to load his vessel with war supplies, and stand ready to ship it to America, holding him personally as hostage for ultimate reimbursement.

A new phase of the situation now appeared: the Continental Congress had at last been galvanized into action by the appeals of Washington, and had sent Captain Charles Biddle to France with cash for the purchase of war munitions. He arrived in Port Lorient in the brig *Chance* while Mason's negotiations were still pending, and the schooner *Charming Polly* was being cleaned preparatory to taking on her cargo. Everything, consequently, where the French were concerned, took on a new aspect. Thomas Mason had come as an individual; Captain Biddle as representative of the new government. Mason offered payment through somewhat questionable credit under the circumstances; Biddle was ready to offer hard cash and substantial security. Moreover, it was now apparent that the American Colonies intended to push their defiance of the Crown to great lengths. If successful, a valuable market for munitions would be opened. Mason instantly anticipated the reaction:

As he was a Stranger I introduced him to Messrs Berard Brothers, with a request to give them Gentlemen every satisfactory acct. of myself & those I were Concerned

with—that in Case the Bills should come Back protested, they will still be safe in any amount I may contract with them. This being don and the Gentlemen perfectly satisfied the 15th of October I began to Load & by the 20th everything Completed & nothing to prevent my sailing but the Fate of the Bills—as I then was at Leisure Capain Biddle & myself had several consultations with Messrs Berard Brothers, Respecting the Loading of a French ship, & eventually agreed in Case I would proceed in her myself, they would advance me £1200 Sterling on acct of Thomas Mason & Co by the Thirds—.

Here we can see the development of a new plan to charter a French vessel in addition to the *Chance* and the *Polly*. It was evident that Mason intended to squeeze out of France every pound of ammunition he could while Berard Brothers were in a favorable mood. All seemed to be going smoothly.

A sudden crisis rose without warning. Word came from London that all the bills of Morris and Winey were accepted. The financial stability of Mason's expedition was unquestionable; on the other hand, by the same post that had brought news of the acceptance, an order arrived from the Prime Minister of France to the Commandant of the Port to seize Captain Mason's vessel and discharge her cargo. The French government would not chance the displeasure of England by allowing munitions to be shipped from France to America.

Action was necessary at once. By good fortune, the post had arrived in the evening. The schooner could not be seized until the following morning. There were still a few hours in which to act; and upon that depended the success or failure of the expedition. Mason's report gives a confidential and graphic account of his feelings at this moment: he might run the vessel out of the harbor, and down the narrow channel past the walls of the fort at Port Louis, taking a grave chance of being fired on and sunk. In such an event, his partners would justly hold him or his executors responsible for the loss of their capital in so flagrantly having defied the French laws. Even if he should be successful in evading the authorities, he must sacrifice a joint capital of 1150 pounds Sterling, the balance in the hands of Berard Brothers. It was possible that his partners would hold him responsible for this entire amount, a large sum in those days.

Then, too, he could give the command of his schooner to someone and remain behind to guard his capital. This was decidedly dangerous, in view of the fact that if his substitute in command of the *Charming Polly* were careless or unlucky enough to be sunk in running out of the harbor, he would be blamed for trusting his ship to an unauthorized

person. Morris and Winey could then hold him for the full value of all that was lost.

He could, of course, sit quietly and surrender the vessel. If he did, all of his efforts in behalf of General Washington would come to nothing. He would sacrifice the only hope held before his countrymen. Mason was not of that breed.

He thought over the possible solutions of his problem rapidly. He then conferred with Captain Biddle. He offered the suggestion that if Biddle would sail the *Charming Polly* back to America, he himself would remain in Port l'Orient and execute the commission entrusted to Biddle by the Continental Congress free of charge. This would consist in loading the brig *Chance* with munitions without the knowledge of the French authorities, and sailing her back to America at a later date. Furthermore, as he was more familiar with the channel of the harbor, he would himself take the *Charming Polly* out to sea, and return in a small boat as soon as the danger zone had been passed. Captain Biddle listened to this audacious plan, and, with some hesitation agreed.

There was no time to be lost. Mason made a few hurried preparations, and wrote some letters to his partners regarding the sudden change of plans. These he handed to Biddle, and, in return, received a personal letter from him to be read later. Together they went down to the wharf, and found the wind and tide favorable. It was utterly dark, but Mason was confident of finding his way down the narrow passage. The *Charming Polly* was quietly cast off, and drifted slowly with the tide into midstream. Sail was made rapidly and silently, with every block well greased, and the sailors pattering around in bare feet. Down the long tortuous channel stole the *Charming Polly*, with Mason at the helm, his eyes glued to the ramparts of the fort for the first flash of a cannoner's fuse that might be the beginning of a storm of shot from the batteries. They cleared the harbor shortly before dawn; then, when three miles out, Mason bade Biddle farewell, and climbed overside into the long boat of the brig *Chance*, which had been trailing astern with men at the oars ready for any emergency. The *Polly* bent every inch of canvas for her race to America, while her master returned to Port Lorient to await developments.

Charles Biddle was evidently worried over this sudden turn of events. His letter to Thomas Mason is eloquent of his anxiety; yet shows clearly how great was the emergency in America:

Port L'Orient, Oct. 28, 1775.

Dear Sir

I cannot express to you the uneasiness I feel at not being able to comply with the desires of the people by whom I am Employ'd. However the scheme we have agreed upon I believe will fully Answer the purpose. I put the utmost Confidence in you, and as Our Country and Everything dear is at Stake I make no doubt but you will do everything that is possible for the Service of it. You'll dispatch the Brig and Schooner as soon as possible, and please to Inclose to me an Acct of the Charges &c that I may be able to Settle with the Gentlemen I am Employ'd by. pray dont neglect Getting all the powder you possible can in the Brig & Schooner.

I am Sir

Your most Obt Servt

C. Biddle.

The French Government was not easily pacified. Mason had committed something of a serious crime by clearing the port without official papers. Moreover, his vessel had eluded seizure, albeit no warrant had actually been served. The Commandant was not foolish enough to believe that the *Charming Polly* would deliver her cargo to Holland, as he had been led to suspect while she was being loaded. He knew now that she was on her way to America. If, by chance, she should be intercepted by a British sloop of war, serious trouble with England might result. He had been tricked by a wily American, and he was furious. Mason describes the action that followed:

—on my return To Lorient, the Commandant ordered the Guard to take my Body—and had it not Been for the Interposition of a Few Gentlemen, who became Security for my appearance Before him and his Council, I undoubtedly should have been kept in Confinement—when the examination was over & no proff appearing that I Either aided or asisted—I was Released from that Parole.

Mason's mission was, however, only half completed. He had been successful in starting the first shipment of arms on its way to America; but to offset this, he had pledged his word to Captain Biddle to bring back the brig *Chance* equally well loaded. He had incurred the enmity of the Commandant, and the suspicion of all of the authorities of the French government in the port. Whatever move he made now would be watched closely. It would not be unlikely that he would be arrested on some trumped-up charge just to keep him under surveillance. His slightest slip might spell ruin; and might also bring serious charges against Captain Biddle for relinquishing his command of the brig *Chance*.

The strategy employed now by the young adventurer was truly Machiavellian. He retired to his rooms in Lorient, and led the life of the most peace-loving and righteous visitor imaginable. If he ap-

peared upon the streets, he did so openly; if he attended any large gathering, he was careful to avoid being seen in conversation with anyone who had been even remotely connected with the escape of the *Charming Polly*. It was helpful, rather than a hindrance to his plans, that he had incurred the intense hatred of Captain John Craig, now commanding the brig *Chance*, which was idling at anchor empty in the harbor. Biddle had turned over his vessel to Craig; but had stipulated that the orders of Captain Mason were to be followed explicitly in every detail. Craig raved because there were no orders; his men were becoming restless and quarrelsome. If Mason had any plans, Craig was not being told of them. No clearance papers for the *Chance* could be issued without Mason's permission. This suspense was kept up for two long months.

The young mariner was not so idle as it seemed. In his record he says:

—as Berard Brothers was Suspected in asisting to Run the Schooner out of Port—it put a Stop to all our proposed Schemes in their ship—and Necessity Obligated me to Change my Connections to Mr. Goulade—.

It seems that there was a Dutch vessel in port discharging her cargo. It will be remembered that there was no embargo against the shipment of arms and ammunition to Holland "in any Bottom But American." Mason, knowing this, through the connivance of his new accessory, Mr. Goulade, quietly chartered this vessel, and loaded her with 109 casks of cannon powder and 36 stands of muskets, ostensibly purchased by the owners of the vessel for shipment to Amsterdam. As soon as the Dutch vessel's clearance papers were made out to her skipper, the shrewd Yankee presented himself at the office of the outraged old Commandant, and told him that since there seemed to be no possibility of the purchase of arms in Lorient, he had been instructed by Captain Biddle to obtain clearance papers for the empty brig *Chance*, and return with her to America. It is even reported that he begged the Commandant to send a detail for the inspection of the brig to see that she was actually empty. He is said to have added, casually, that refusal to grant the clearance papers without due cause being shown would constitute a violation of international law, since the *Chance* was on a special mission of the American Congress. Whatever misgivings the official may have had that something was in the wind, he had no legal grounds for holding the vessel. He grudgingly made out the papers December 28, 1775.

The Dutch vessel, strangely enough, had delayed her departure on a pretext of some sort until Mason's negotiations with the Commandant had been brought to a successful conclusion. She then sailed quietly out to sea. Mason now instructed Captain Craig to be ready to weigh anchor the following morning. What Craig said is not recorded; but it was probably anything but agreeable for him to look forward to a voyage across the Atlantic in an empty brig. However, orders were orders; and, with all his faults, Craig was an able and conscientious man. He did as he was told.

Thomas Mason tells the story of what followed in terse phraseology. Of his overwhelming anxiety for fear something might go wrong at the crucial moment; a sudden storm; an untrustworthy skipper of the Dutch vessel; a misunderstanding of orders; a deliberate act of piracy, perhaps, he says nothing. He relates the facts:

—we dropt our anchors the same day between Bell Isle & the Isle of Groy [Isle de la Croix]—were I received the Cargo, Principally on acct of Congress—the 29th Following being all compleated, we made saile & is the Reason why my receipt from Capt Craig on Acct of Thomas Mason & Co was dated at Sea—and the 2nd of February 1776 we arrived safe at the Delaware and when I came to Philad. I received the general thanks of Congress for the Integrity of my Transactions & Mr. Morris was the person in a Committee that delivered it.

ARMY HISTORIOGRAPHY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

BY CAPTAIN VICTOR GONDOS, JR.

As the historical sections of the Army begin their second year of operation it is evident that they are on the eve of centralized control and direction.¹ On 3 August 1943, Major General J. A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, issued, by order of the Secretary of War, a directive in the form of a memorandum entitled the *Military History of the Second World War*. To all appearances the ultimate result of this memorandum will have a "block-buster" effect on the hitherto autonomous existence, orientation, and organization of the historical sections.

Since this is a completely new departure in the field of American military history, it is worth pausing a moment, casting a retrospective glance, and broadly tracing the thread of development to the present day.

On January 2, 1914, Robert Matteson Johnston, Professor of Military History at Harvard University, delivered a lecture at the Army War College in Washington in which he discussed the function of military history. This lecture so aroused Major General Leonard Wood, then Chief of Staff, that he immediately caused the initiation of studies with a view to the incorporation of a historical section in the General Staff. Although there were a number of officers available who were competent in modern methods of historical research, such as William D. Connor, Stuart Heintzelman, Arthur L. Conger, and Oliver L. Spaulding, nothing much came of this flurry except a flock of reports from our military attachés abroad, detailing the historical work in foreign armies.²

Exactly four years later to the day, on January 2, 1918, Major General Tasker H. Bliss, Chief of Staff, recommended to the Secretary of War the prompt organization of a historical section. A fortnight later, January 18, the Chief of the War College Division submitted a plan which divided the historical section into two parts, (1) a military history branch, comprising two committees dealing respectively with the history of former wars and with current military history; (2) an

¹Readers of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* will recall that this development was foreshadowed in the first report on this subject. "Army Historiography in the Second World War," *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, VII (Spring 1943), 60-68.

²Joseph Mills Hanson, "The Historical Section, Army War College," *The Journal of the American Military History Foundation*, I (summer 1937), 70-74.

archives branch in charge of manuscripts and library. Although this plan was not placed in operation it is highly significant to us today because it is a tentative recognition of the core of our problem—archival methods.

With the reorganization of the General Staff, by virtue of a War Department General Order of February 9, 1918, a historical section was at last established under the Director of the War Plans Division who also acted as President of the Army War College.³ On March 5, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Weeks was designated Chief of the Historical Section, War Plans Division, and eventually, in the course of the year the Section reached a personnel peak of 80 persons.⁴

A Historical Sub-section was established in France, at the Chaumont headquarters of General Pershing⁵ and this unit was activated in May 1918, with the arrival of Major Robert M. Johnston and staff. After the Armistice, this Section selected some 100,000 documents of those accumulated at Chaumont, and returned with these to Washington, where the returning overseas unit was merged with the Historical Section, War Plans Division. A year after the close of the war the Historical Section was transferred to the Army War College where it has since remained.

We cannot here go into the minutiae of work at the War College. Without a doubt the devoted officers who threw themselves into this pioneer field, both abroad and in Washington, performed a vast amount of labor. In general, after the war, work proceeded on monographic lines, confined to military operations. But the fact remains that of the 35,000 filing cases of records, said to have been stored in an eight-winged building in Washington, and now removed to High Point, North Carolina, only a fraction had been processed through historical channels.⁶ Furthermore, at the rate of progress maintained up to the outbreak of the Second World War, the operational monographs alone were not expected to be completed before 1946, while administrative history was wholly untouched.

The conclusion is inescapable that in a quarter of a century we have not established control over the subject. It poses, too, the monumental problem facing the historians of the current war. Storage, of course,

³War Department, General Orders, No. 14, February 9, 1918.

⁴Hanson, *op. cit.*

⁵General Order No. 31, General Headquarters, A.E.F., February 16, 1918 (Hanson, *op. cit.*).

⁶Based on statements recorded by the writer in an interview with Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, and with R. S. Thomas, Chief Clerk, Historical Section, Army War College, January 21, 1943.

is not the problem; tht can be obtained at will, that is, at the will of the budgeteers. But the manner of storage is important, as well as time-liness of selection. A large share of the work performed in the inter-war period appears to have been expended on the weeding and selection of pertinent documents, and thereafter their evaluation and indexing. The ideal here indicated is to perform, by the aid of the developing art of records administration, as many of these operations as possible currently during the war period.

In a manner of speaking one may say that a pre-war mobilization plan is as necessary for historical work to be conducted during hostilities as is a mobilization plan for industry and for the military forces. The situation is that we developed no such plan prior to the outbreak of the present war, and the usual procedures of historiography, while good enough in their way in their emphasis on verification and documentation, cannot get to the core of the problem. After all, there are two basic operations involved, (1) the assembly of information from original sources—the data, and (2) the arrangement and description of the data. The latter particularly is an archival function of primary importance, and, unfortunately, it is only within the past half a dozen years that we have been developing large scale archival methods in the United States, due to the establishment of the National Archives in 1934.

Thus we entered World War II, facing mass production history with craft produced methods. Army historical sections began to be established from May 1942 onwards, although the official directive authorizing them did not appear until 15 July 1942.⁷ Though rigidly specifying administrative history as the sole objective of the historical sections, in practice these organizations enjoyed a large measure of operational autonomy during their first year of existence. Whether consciously intended or not, this was probably the wisest course, since in any new venture pragmatism is the key to orientation, and that is best served by flexibility.

Although given the same general objective, the relative independence of the historical sections produced a resultant diversity of practices, policies, and accomplishments which refracted the view of the general objective into an appearance of discrete aims. Of course, co-operative historical work of so vast a scope is bound to be uneven in

⁷Major General J. A. Ulio, *The Adjutant General, to the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Services of Supply*, July 15, 1942.

character, lacking in unity of treatment, indifferently balanced, and heterogeneous in result.

Aside from mechanical difficulties the historical sections have suffered from the handicap of multiple-purpose assignments within the ostensible general objective. Besides gathering and compiling large aggregates of source material, some of them have produced what amount to spot narratives, and "hot" policy and tactical studies for immediate use. It is a moot point whether wartime historical effort should go beyond the realm of the compiler into that of the thinker, that is, from the objective to the subjective mood.

In no sense of the word is there a desire to impugn the trail blazing of the devoted early pioneers led by such recognized stalwarts as Johnston, Spaulding, Wright, Weeks, Paxson, and a host of others. Those who build on foundations laid by them must ever acknowledge their debt. But earlier efforts, however brilliant, were still cast in the traditions of individualism, and therefore of historical artistry. Yet the chiefs of the historical sections of today are faced with an appalling volume of mass production data which calls for a new form of historical technology based on archival science and modern records administration. The difficulty is that only within recent years have the latter subjects been accorded serious consideration in government.

In attacking a specific problem, one looks first into the history of the problem, which consists of the collection, organization, and study of the evidence. Since a real diagnosis is then possible, the mere treatment of symptoms can be avoided and the true treatment prescribed. Thus the perplexing struggles with significant reportage, collation, and documentation, which beset the work in current military history, are merely symptoms of the basic difficulty of inchoate archival practices.

The inability to manage records begs for primary solution. Production of records is uncontrolled and mountainous, and the military historian is overwhelmed by the avalanche. The fundamental need is the rapid, if possible automatic, separation of policy records from the obliterating mass of ephemera.⁸

Several agencies of the Federal Government, notably the Navy Department, the Department of Agriculture, and the National Archives, have already begun individual attacks on this problem, and a close follow-up of their developing practices should prove a boon to those in

⁸See articles by Emmett J. Leahy, "Records Administration and the War," *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, VI (Summer 1942), 97-108; and Philip C. Brooks, "What Records Shall We Preserve?" *The National Archives*, Staff Information Circulars, No. 9, June 1940.

charge of Army historiography. In accordance with a recent act of Congress,⁹ the National Archives is moving with all possible vigor and speed to implement the newly authorized disposal policy by the issuance of records disposal tables to all War Department bureaus and organizations. This delegates to them the legal right, at the expiration of stated time limits, of automatically disposing of all records listed in the tables. By thus periodically ridding the files of accumulations of irrelevant material, and coincidentally forcing the stricter current classification of significant documents, the intolerable burden on the shoulders of the military historian as well as the statistician should be appreciably lightened.

It will be recalled by readers that the founding directive of 15 July 1942 merely called for the production of administration histories and, after viewing the results of six months of operation under this directive, we reported,

"Upon inspection it is obvious . . . that a dissonance exists between actual practice . . . and the directive of July 15, 1942. The Historical Section at the Army War College works solely on operational history (and) . . . The three War Department Commands likewise tend to break out of the confining limits of the directive. Since the directive is . . . being modified in practice, it may be advisable to amend it to conform with the realities."

Furthermore we pointed out that "both operational and administrative histories are vitally necessary. The difficulty is that often the twilight zone between them is wide and indivisible."¹⁰

For example, in the case of highly technical production fields, such as Ordnance, it would have been begging the question to concentrate on administration alone when the story of the actual production of the weapons is a subject of overwhelming practical as well as historical importance.

Colonels Leo A. Codd and Calvin Goddard, officers of outstanding ability in the field of ordnance, immediately recognized this fact, and proceeded to design their multi-volumed ordnance history plan about the theme of weapons, and the know-how of their production. Administrative history became a step-child; and the story, with variations of emphasis, was repeated in the Army Air Forces, as well as in some of the other offices. In activities such as those of the Office of the Quartermaster General, or the Office of the Chief of Finance, where administration of the central office, *per se*, is the preponderant element in the operations of the organization, a stricter hewing to the line of the

⁹Public No. 115, 78th Congress, 1st Sess., approved July 7, 1943.

¹⁰"Army Historiography," *op. cit.*

directive of 15 July was wholly practicable; and, indeed, the Office of the Quartermaster General, with knowledgeable professionals like Thornton and Setser, Pitkin and Rifkind, led the way in the compilation of administrative history.

The Memorandum of 3 August 1943 recognizes the need for catholicity of view, as well as the de facto situation, and officially expands objectives to department store size, stating that "responsibility for the preparation and publication of the following objectives, and such other objectives as may be recommended and approved at later dates" is vested in the new overall control unit, the Historical Branch in the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, "whose functions are to plan and supervise the *compilation of the military history of the Second World War*" (italics ours).¹¹

- (1) Operational monographs. These are to be narrative accounts of individual military combat operations.
- (2) Theater and campaign histories. These narratives will include not only the material covered in the operational monographs, but all pertinent Army activities and that of cooperating forces.
- (3) Administrative histories.
- (4) A general popular history.
- (5) An official history.
- (6) Publication of documents.

It is noteworthy that administrative history which, insofar as official approval was concerned, hitherto held the spotlight exclusively, has now been shunted to third place, merely sharing effort with half a dozen different though pertinent aims. As Major J. D. Millett, Historical Officer of the Army Service Forces, cogently remarked, administrative history is only useful when directly related to a particular job, since it does not occur in a vacuum, but rather as a function of an operation, and is therefore best described by means of the color, the plot, the nomenclature of the operation concerned.

The new departure in Army Historiography is based on a confidential report submitted by a group composed of the members of the newly named Advisory Committee. For the present this report is restricted, and therefore not available for public inspection. It may be stated, however, that in the main, the Memorandum of 3 August, with its four sections and seventeen paragraphs, is a reduction to outline form of the recommendations contained in the report.

The members of the Advisory Committee are James Phinney Bax-

¹¹War Department, The Adjutant General's Office, Memorandum No. W345-21-43, 3 August 1943, "Military History of the Second World War."

ter, Chairman, President of Williams College; Henry Steele Commager, Professor of American History at Columbia University; Edward Pendleton Herring, Executive Secretary of the Committee on Records of War Administration; Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, Chief of the Historical Section of the Army War College; and Colonel Thomas D. Stamps, Professor of Military Art and Engineering at West Point. This body, it appears, was not instituted for purposes of window dressing. The Advisory Committee expanded the objectives from the former one-point to the present six-point plan. The Committee will advise the Chief of the newly-created Historical Branch, and its influence will extend to problems of procedure, methodology, scale of projects, and historical administration in general.

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Kemper has been appointed to the post of Chief, Historical Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department. Colonel Kemper received his education at West Point and the graduate history department at Columbia University. Serving under the supervision of Colonel Kemper will be a Chief Historian whose identity is not yet known. The staff of the Historical Branch is still in process of organization, consequently personnel lists are not presently available.

The creation of the Historical Branch wholly alters the power equation in the field of Army history. The Branch has absolute power of censorship since "all historical manuscripts prepared for publication by all agencies of the War Department"¹² are subject to its final editing and approval. Obviously, therefore, if the policies of any historical section are not amended to conform with the views of the Branch, its product cannot see the light of day. To intrude a simile, this is equivalent to the immemorial power of the purse.

To state matter in brief, the Memorandum of 3 August 1943 contains three vital points:

- (1) Mandates operational histories, as well as opens wide the field of historical objectives from its former narrower scope.
- (2) Centralizes the direction and supervision of all Army historical work.
- (3) Supersedes the Historical Section, Army War College, with the Historical Branch, G-2, War Department General Staff, as the primary supervisory head of all Army historical units.

In addition, the memorandum extends coverage to every element of the Army, including the War Department General Staff, which hitherto had not had adequate historical coverage.

¹²*Ibid.*

The Historical Branch, in addition to its domestic duties, assumes control over all overseas historical work in the theatres of operation. This may require future adjustments on the part of the Army Air Forces, whose historical section has enterprisingly proceeded in solving the question of overseas coverage.

As presently understood, the organizational set-up in this activity will be so arranged that the Historical Branch will designate personnel for overseas duty, for the collection and transmittal of material to the headquarters of the Historical Branch in Washington. In turn, the Historical Branch will distribute to the historical sections of the several arms and services, for collation and compilation, the items pertinent to their respective fields.

Some of the historical sections, particularly those of Ordnance, the Army Air Forces, and the Quartermaster General, have issued interesting checklists and other memoranda dealing with some of the problems mentioned above. Other sections, like that of the Transportation Corps, and the Signal Corps, have only lately commenced operations, and therefore, although they are under an initial handicap, they have the advantage of utilizing some of the experience already gained.

All hands in Army Historiography, more particularly those in the field forces, need to keep in mind at all times that mere whitewashing or laudatory reporting should be strictly eschewed. Such activities are properly the province of the accredited propagandist. Today's military historian is the chronicler of the sweat and blood, of the ruck and roil of a great people, a people who, through the agency of total war, are emerging from provincialism unto unaccustomed planes of imperial grandeur. The recording of this epic is a job for other than small, atomistic, circumscribed minds. It's a job for minds capable of kinetic imagination, whole-souled vision, and of working élan.

In the longer range perspective of a quarter of a century, a developmental thread can be traced in our conception of the organization, administration, and methodology of current military history. From the first, halting attempts of World War I, ending in storage warehouses in High Point, North Carolina; through the occasionally well-integrated but independent organizations of the first year of the Second World War; to the unified, central authority just established, one must concede definite, if not rapid progress, and at least a promise for the future.

MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS, 1933-1942¹

By ELIAS HUZAR

Representative J. Buell Snyder, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the War Department, said recently that

... one of our colleagues ... made the following statement: "... the military has always asked for too much." ... I know that the Army before Pearl Harbor never did ask for enough. Of course they did not get all that they asked for of the Bureau of the Budget in those years, but ... my committee in many war items gave them more than ... the estimates.

This is only one of numerous attempts that have been made during the past three or four years to place responsibility for the nation's "inadequate preparedness" at the outbreak of the second World War. Data on which to base an answer require inquiry into legislative-administrative relations in financing the Military Establishment. And, since requests for funds pass through departmental, presidential, and congressional "strainers," it will be convenient to discuss the roles in the fiscal process of each in turn.

Of the three sets of agencies involved, the War Department appears to be the least vulnerable and has been the least criticized. Occasionally it is suggested that the Army was unequipped to cope effectively with threats to national security: "If you did not have plans, it does not necessarily mean that anybody was derelict * * * This thing crashed in on this country just as it crashed in on other countries!" Yet there has been no dearth of preparedness schemes in recent years, notably the series of Protective Mobilization plans of 1931, *et seq.*, though this is nothing remarkable in view of the existence of a General Staff whose activity centers around such preparation. The adequacy of the plans is another question. The War Department declares that it has adhered to their major outlines (an assertion rarely challenged in Congress), and that its difficulties have stemmed not from lack of policy but from problems of timing—in part, the rate of activation to meet the growing prospects of involvement in the current war; in part, adjustment to politics and public opinion. In fact, once the extent of our military shortages was perceived by the people—as well as by the Administration and Congress—"complete indifference" gave way to "tremendous impatience" on which, for a while, the Department to some extent may have acted as a brake. If the Army was not vulnerable on the ground

¹The writer is indebted to the Social Science Research Council for a grant-in-aid for a study from which material for this article has been drawn.

of planlessness, it certainly was not open to the charge of failure to ask for funds to carry out its programs. In Gen. MacArthur's words:

You may blame the War Department for a great many things. They have made their mistakes and sometimes bitter mistakes, but you cannot blame us for not asking for money. That is one fault to which we plead not guilty. * * * always the estimates of the Department have been subjected to this system of shrinkage. Read the annual reports . . . and always there is that one great cry, that the national defense was not being financially supported.

This "one great cry" is even less surprising than preparation, since poor planners might seek to conceal confusion and deficiency by excessive estimates—"just in case." Probably it is not often that public administrators are so self-effacing or lacking confidence that they do not want to improve the quality or expand the scope of their services to the community.

In these matters the President acts through the Bureau of the Budget. To what extent Mr. Roosevelt (reputedly a "Navy man") has concerned himself with military estimates is not clear; but the practice of Army and Congress has been to regard the hand of the Budget Bureau as the voice of the President. While the War Department must determine priorities in its needs among which limiting figures from the Bureau are to be apportioned, the latter has its own difficulties in applying the Administration's expenditure policy to all the agencies of the government. The capacity of Budget to pass on details of Army estimates sometimes is challenged by an officer-witness who labels a reduction "arbitrary," or by a member of the Appropriations Committee who perceives insufficient funds for an activity in which he is especially interested. Yet, in spite of some skepticism in the committees about the Bureau's technical competence, they have tended to adhere to its estimates. The Army generally has been satisfied that these are about as good as they can be, for, while Budget applies reductions to particular appropriation titles, it takes into consideration the Army's priorities.² It is with the limits imposed on expenditure totals that the War Department's chief complaint has lain. The House Committee on Appropriations has refused to publish a summary of the "deviations" between the estimates submitted to the Budget Bureau and those allowed by it, but by examining the hearings it is possible to compile some data, which are summarized in the table.

If one may judge by the reactions of Chiefs of Staff, whose senses of

²Among the few published statements on the process of making up the military estimates are those of General Carmichael in the House hearings on the Army appropriation act for fiscal 1932, p. 23 ff., and of General Helmick in the Senate hearings on the measure for fiscal 1943, p. 69 ff.

urgency and sufficiency have varied, the depression years were the worst recent ones for Army finance. During the early 1920's there were large reserves of trained manpower and material carried over from the World War. But by the early 'thirties, the former had aged and lost their knack for soldiering, while the latter had become obsolete and depleted by the practice of drawing on it for current needs without adequate replacement. Gen. MacArthur declared that the Budget for fiscal 1934 provided "only the naked framework" and called attention to "the folly and danger of undoing what we have laboriously accomplished at expense of blood and treasure." The "meager but balanced" estimates for 1935 "provide[d] for essentials" but little "progress." In the bill for 1936, however, he found cause for cheer.

. . . of all the appearances I have made before this committee, the one today has been the one that has inspired and enthused me more than all others * * * During no similar peace-time period within my memory has the existence of the Military Establishment been beset with more trying vicissitudes. Now, for the first time in that long period, unmistakable evidences of improved military conditions are ahead. The change comes none too soon . . . the turn has at last been reached . . .

Gen. Malin Craig, his successor as Chief of Staff, had his troubles, too, but appeared to suffer less anguish than had Gen. MacArthur. The difference was partly one of temperament, but it also reflected objective conditions. Gen. Craig called the House measure for 1937 "an excellent bill"; the one for 1938 was "a very good . . . and a well balanced bill," while the measure for 1939 was "excellent and . . . well-balanced"; but the (House) bill for 1940 was merely "in accordance with the President's . . . Budget." One of his constant problems was to secure additional personnel, a difficulty experienced also by Gen. MacArthur. Toward the end of his tour of duty, however, he was greatly concerned with material shortages, just as Gen. Marshall was for some time after becoming Chief of Staff in 1939.³

The grounds for the Army's disappointments and satisfactions in these years will be apparent from the table. The Budget Bureau's reductions clearly were substantial—though we do not know that other departments fared better, and the War Department's appropriations

³Wars are fought by men with weapons, so personnel and matériel must be considered in relation to each other instead of being regarded as "opposing conceptions of warfare," although a military establishment may emphasize one or the other. Within the narrower limits of the Army supply bills, however, the War Department each year is faced with a similar problem since the estimators are obliged to reach conclusions on the comparative importance of its many unfulfilled needs. Items of highest priority have changed from time to time, as some needs have been met and as new demands on the Army have emerged. The committees have not passed on the military budgets without challenging the distribution of estimates; and Congress has made some additions for equipment. But the chief beneficiaries of its editorial work have been the civilian components.

were eked out with relief and public works funds. After fiscal 1935, however, the balances remaining even after the cuts increased steadily, even if not fast enough for the Chiefs of Staff. It was particularly in 1939 and early 1940 that the Bureau's treatment of Army requests seemed weakest when measured against the Administration's analyses

APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS⁴

Fiscal year	Reductions by Bureau of Budget	Estimates sent by President to Congress	Changes made by Congress	Allocations from emergency funds	Total of military funds
1934	at least \$23,000,000	\$280,730,841	—	\$680,460	\$96,688,252
					\$62,618,830 impounded; net: \$315,323,503
1935	estimates restricted to withdraw- als for 1934	263,624,208 9,409,363 6,000 15,904,584	— + 16,000	5,098,061	8,857,678
1936	40,096,336	317,459,277 10,000,000 3,949,000	+ — —	31,575,680 150,000	9,551,451
					292,719,772
1937	at least 61,000,000	383,025,510 8,431,000	+ +	10,749,135 100,000	18,069,820
1938	40,121,620	426,948,461 1,921,875	+ +	10,202,087	74,939,334
					420,375,465
1939	net: 36,665,000	478,815,729 7,625,000 119,200,287	+ — —	18,881,393 6,825,000 798,544	31,097,625
1940		546,944,388 17,360,300 309,500,000	+ — —	1,989,944 423,000 15,604,453	18,220,400
	30,000,000	119,999,842 76,750	— —	10,583,153	
					647,996,490
1941	59,665,217 552,054,732	(847,158,489) (93,978,765) 941,137,254			
	6,750,000 50,000,000	18,000,000 864,000,000			
		1,823,137,254	—	584,296	
		753,328,000	+	321,850,808	
		3,911,995,417	+	133,107,115	
		338,263,902			
		1,375,187,974	—	2,000,000	
		680,118,000	+	15,000,000	
		4,125,182,297	—	33,917,943	
		175,000,000 3,400,000 135,000			
					13,619,203,528
1942		9,366,246,253 6,500,000 4,860,872,988	+1,201,721,066 —		
		6,755,651,731	+	606,915,325 620,374,852	
		12,525,872,474 23,485,737,900			
	186,623,463	17,579,311,253	—	184,633,910	75,610,739,282
1943	1,885,000,000	39,532,309,062	+3,287,694,005		42,820,003,067

and policies in international relations, in which there was no guarantee that involvement would stop short of war.⁵

Chief of Staff MacArthur observed in 1934 that "the maximum numbers appropriated for since 1922 have been 12,000 officers and 118,750 enlisted men. This is . . . far below essential requirements, although for several years the Department had urged an "irreducible minimum" of 14,000 and 165,000 respectively. Authorization, prerequisite to lagging appropriations, for the larger commissioned strength (14,659), attained in fiscal 1941, was not legislated until 1938. In 1939 it was raised to 16,719, with increments spread over a ten-year period to avoid another "hump" in the promotion list. Presidential estimates and expenditures for expansion of enlisted strength tended to be less than appropriations. Contrary to Budget recommendations for 118,750 men, Congress made available appropriations for 165,000 men for fiscal 1936, but funds were released for only 147,000, which was the estimate for 1937. By the end of fiscal 1937 the strength was 158,626 although money was available for 165,000, as was the case, also, in fiscal 1938 when budgetary limitations held the number to an average of 162,000. By the time the original goal was reached in fiscal 1939 the Department calculated its minimum needs at 173,000 men, but withheld recommendation for such a force in favor of funds for matériel. The appropriations act for fiscal 1940 provided a strength of 165,000 which was increased by Executive order and legislative

⁴These data have been adapted from committee hearings and reports, Representative Ross A. Collins' table in 88 *Cong. Rec.*, daily ed., pp. 5683-4, June 23, 1942, the Appropriations Committees' *Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc.*, 1934-5 through 1942-3, and the Treasury Department's annual *Digest of Appropriations*, 1934 through 1942. Statements of reductions by the Bureau of the Budget are available for only some of the estimates. Amounts for 1934 and 1937 were compiled by adding scattered references, while blanks indicate absence in print of even such partial data or their presence only in ambiguous form. Among changes reckoned as "reductions" for 1941 (the only year for which such a breakdown is available), and presumably for other years, were substitution of contract authorization [C.A.] (\$6,680,000) in lieu of requests for cash, denial of C.A. (\$2,000,000), and reduction (\$15,837,000) in prior C.A.'s to be paid in that fiscal year. A table inserted by Senator Elmer Thomas in 89 *Cong. Rec.*, daily ed., p. 6840, June 29, 1943, (after this article had been written), showed the following cash reductions by the Budget Bureau (contract authorizations not included): for 1935, \$19,311,166; for 1936, \$29,703,877; for 1937, \$81,734,762; for 1938, \$40,448,432; for 1939, \$52,479,476; for 1940, \$75,996,065. Military estimates also undergo pruning in the War Department, e.g., \$60,000,000 for fiscal 1939, before they reach the Bureau of the Budget. In column three the first figure for each year is for the annual bill, in which supplemental estimates were incorporated for 1939 and 1941; the other sums represent deficiency and supplemental measures. Column four shows the net change by Congress: House and Senate actions are not distinguished, substitutions of C.A. for cash are not shown, and reallocations of estimates among military programs are not indicated. Amounts in columns three and six are inflated since cash and contract authorizations have been combined. Some 5.5 billion dollars (about \$47,000,000 more than was sought in the estimates) of the latter must be subtracted from totals in column six to show appropriations of money.

⁵See "Peace and War—United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941," in the *New York Times*, January 6, 1943.

action to 227,000 by February 1940. Even in that year, however, the Department had difficulty in securing complete Executive approval for its personnel programs: In May Congress provided funds for 25,000 men more than recommended by the President for fiscal 1941 to bring the strength to the 280,000 sought by General Marshall; and in June it acted once more without presidential approval of the Chief of Staff's request by supplying funds to increase the Regular Army by an additional 95,000 men.

The matériel story is essentially the same. In aircraft the Department took comfort from the fact that "the quality was vastly improved" although it was dissatisfied with quantities, authorizations for which increased from 1800 planes in 1926 to 2320 in 1936 and 6000 in 1939. For the rest, military equipment in 1933 consisted chiefly of World War types. Improved models had been developed but few were available in quantities sufficient for current training or for initial emergency use, matériel for which was "considerably short of . . . a safe minimum." In 1934 General MacArthur reported "the absence of modern equipment in all essential categories". On hand there were twelve modern tanks, eighty semiautomatic rifles, 75 mm. field guns unadapted to rapid transportation and increased flexibility of fire, an "insignificant amount" of improved antiaircraft equipment, and there were deficiencies in modern motor vehicles and ammunition. After 1933 allocations from P.W.A. funds and direct appropriations, based on presidential estimates as well as on Congressional initiative, permitted "continuous improvement" and "marked progress." The 1937 revision of the Department's Protective Mobilization Plan (P.M.P.) envisaged an Initial Protective Force (I.P.F.) of 400,000 (the Regular Army and National Guard) and an augmented P.M.P. Force of 1,000,000 men. The immediate objective was to procure critical items (those not ordinarily available from commercial sources) at a cost of \$160,000,000 for the I.P.F., since "if it fails in its protective mission the fate of the reinforcing citizens' armies is sealed." The Department also wanted early provision of such matériel for the remainder of the P.M.P. Force. Yet it was not until May 1940 that it obtained all the funds needed for the initial requirements for the smaller force. In the original estimates for fiscal 1941, processed shortly after the outbreak of war in 1939, the Department was unable to obtain Executive approval for \$39,000,000 still needed for I.P.F. critical items as well as for other large sums, including \$240,000,000 for critical and \$205,000,000 for essential (commercially available) items for the P.M.P. Force.

Transfer of funds by the House reduced the \$39,000,000 to \$24,750,000. The Department could persuade the President to include only \$18,000,000 of this amount in his supplemental estimate at the end of April 1940, but the estimates for an additional \$864,000,000 in May provided funds for all the equipment it then sought. Thereafter, the Department's chief concern ceased to be appropriations for matériel and became one of industrial capacity for its manufacture.

In 1939, however, the problems of the Army were complicated by the fact that it would require considerable time to produce the equipment which it sought now as first priority. The Bureau's (Administration's) change of heart dates, as noted, from about May 1940, from the "catastrophic occurrences" of the battles of the Lowlands and France. Until this time estimates allowed for the Military Establishment appear to have been determined on a "relative" basis of allocation of departmental requests within the total of the President's program. Since this time the sums approved appear to have been determined on an "absolute" basis of need and industrial capacity to absorb appropriations. Not everything requested by the Army has been approved by Budget, but there is a significant distinction between the Bureau's reductions before and after the dividing point. In the earlier period the denials tended to be final, at least for the fiscal year. In the later period most cuts either have been "agreed to" or even suggested by the Army or merely have been "deferred" until the need became more immediate or could be gauged more accurately.⁶ The five supplemental appropriation bills for the Military Establishment in fiscal 1941 and the same number for 1942 indicate the extent of this practice, as well as the War Department's continuous adjustment to shifting developments. Certainly, the dissatisfactions and occasional resentments discernible in previous hearings are absent on the whole from the recent ones and testify to treatment by the Bureau that is gratifying to the Army.

Congress has been content to check estimates and to alter them moderately. Never in the past decade has it undertaken to reconstruct them radically. Nor is this surprising in view of their approval by the Army and of legislative limitations. The House Committee on Appropriations, which bears the brunt of responsibility in processing Army supply bills, has suffered from turnover in personnel, and even the experience of repeated hearings is not adequate compensation for lack

⁶General Helmick said last year: "... The Bureau of the Budget said, 'We want to give you all the money that you can show that you need.' * * * And if you need more later, we will authorize you to submit supplemental estimates."¹¹

of that technical competence which comes from professional military training and for which there is little civilian analogy. Congress as a whole lacks the advantages resulting from the committees' specialization and experience, and has not shown much disposition to amend Army appropriation bills from the floor. The War Department has welcomed increases over Budget estimates (but has not always agreed with Congress on the application of these additions); and it has been willing, even anxious, to inform the legislature of needs which currently are not "in accord with the President's financial program." The committees have had only to ask and-sometimes merely to listen to unsolicited recitals of grievances.

A Member has declared that "in years gone by, the Budget did a plenty to the regular fiscal year War Department bills, and we have found that out much too late." This statement is accurate only as a reference to belated action on the Army's pleas for funds, since Congress has had knowledge of these requests through communications to the House committee and in the hearings and reports of the Secretaries of War and the Chiefs of Staff. The fact is that the last five Congresses have been inclined to go along with the President's military program, which, no doubt, has been formulated with some consideration for sentiment on Capitol Hill.⁷ During the early depression years, when the Budget Bureau was reducing severely the requests of the War Department, the legislature was not particularly solicitous about the Army's condition. Gen. MacArthur declared that:

The responsibility for the skeletonization of all elements of the Army rests squarely upon those two groups, the Budget and the Congress. That fact is thoroughly known by everyone. * * * I certainly think that there is a sharing of responsibility . . . but because the Budget does not send the figures up here, that does not relieve the Congress of the United States from raising and mainta[in]ing armies, and they had themselves established the 5-year program [for planes which had not been completed when nearly nine years had passed]. It does not relieve their responsibility that the Budget may have curtailed before the figures reached here. You are not bound by Budget figures. The Constitution places the final responsibility not upon the Budget, not upon the War Department, but upon one group alone, and that is the Congress of the United States.

⁷The conception which seems to have dominated the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the War Department in its handling of military estimates was expressed well by Mr. Snyder: ". . . We are not . . . required to abide by the Budget's action. [But] If we are going to have a Budget system, it seems to me we have got to adhere rather closely to the total amount recommended by the Budget . . ." The committee seems to have felt that it has done well if it has remained within the estimates in marking up the bill. Its reductions have been in the totals less often than in some of their details so that others might be increased. "Respect" for the Budget, however, appears to depend pretty much on whose ox is gored. It is a useful document both in support of and in opposition to proposed expenditures: "They have no Budget estimate, but they had the votes."

Senator Copeland, who handled the bills in the upper house, conceded that "the Congress may have hidden behind the petticoats of the Budget." But there is a reply to the General's criticism not spoken so much as it probably is thought by legislators. Even if the Army really had been neglected, the fact made little difference since we had not been engaged in war during its "impoverishment." And, if material had been acquired earlier, it might have become obsolete by the time it was needed. Thus, the nation was money in pocket through non-obsolescence of non-equipment.

Congress, in truth, was slow to react to the military implications of the deterioration in international relations. In the six years before mid-1940 the chief characteristics of the legislative debates on the Army supply bills were complaints against "unproductive" expenditures by a few Members and lack of interest or acquiescence in the insurance theory of preparedness by most Congressmen. "Peaceful oceans and peaceful neighbors," remembered pains of the first World War, suspicion that alarums were simply propaganda of Army lobbyists and munitions makers (then under investigation), the will to believe in peace and the reluctance to accept the reality of threats to national security, the insulation against involvement in future wars believed to be provided by neutrality legislation, intermittent (1934, 1937, 1940) emphasis on "economy" in public finance, all these and other forces contributed to the criticisms of Army funds, the occasional attempts to cut them, and the lack of disposition to increase them substantially.⁸

Probably the most hostile hearing on military appropriations during the Roosevelt Administration occurred in May 1939 on the program to expand the Army air force from 2320 to 5500 planes in response to changes in war technology and political tensions. Although there were some cogent criticisms against the size of the proposed reserve, the bill was passed. But the temper of the Congress was significant and foreshadowed the hindsightedly mistaken action of the House, approving its committee's report, on the estimates for 1940-1941. Under the influence of election year economy-mindedness, etc., it reduced the 940 million Budget by some 110 million dollars,⁹ including a large cut

⁸The purpose for which the military establishment was to be used was not often made clear, apart from the dominant belief that it was intended for defense of our interests, territorial and other. Cf. Edward Mead Earle, "American Security—Its Changing Conditions," 218 *Annals* 186-193, November 1941.

⁹Of this sum about \$67,000,000 was in cash and \$43,000,000 in contract authorizations. The committee commented that "by far the greater portion of [the reduction] is justifiable only upon the ground that foreign demands for airplanes and munitions of war, added to the greatly increased flow of orders from our own defense establishments . . . are serving to mobilize and to increase the capacity of domestic industries and to stimulate production."

in planes and the Alaska air base. The turning point in Army appropriations came in May 1940 at the Senate hearings on this bill, conducted in the light of events all could read, events which led in the following September to the enactment of the nation's first peace-time selective service law. Since then the committees have exhibited more curiosity about Administration treatment of military estimates and have been great friends of the Army, acting as the War Department's advocates against the Budget Bureau's restrictions. Congress has adopted one "largest single appropriation measure in all our history" after another, with little discussion and even less criticism, which has been reserved chiefly for the Administration's failure to demand more earlier.¹⁰ Our legislators have done much of the country's collective soul-searching and breast-beating. But they have not been monopolists. Rather, they have been careful to share the responsibility—a little *mea*, much more *tua*, *culpa*—for the condition of our defenses in 1939. Since 1940 (and especially since the declaration of war) Congress has been anxious that the Army should have all it needs and vocal doubts have been concerned principally with the possibility of spending all that has been asked. The only important legislative reduction in the estimates has been the Senate's elimination from the first supplemental for 1942 of funds for special ordnance items whose quantity it considered to be unnecessary or not readily procurable. Part of this sum was restored by the conference committee and the rest was included in later bills.

This is not to say that Congressmen have been happy about these developments. Some Members have been upset by the cost and have expressed fears that "undue liberality" would lead to financial collapse and internal disaster; but repeated enactments of huge Army appropriations have calloused many others. The formalities of legislative review and approval continue to be observed. The committees hold their hearings; they inquire into progress of production; they warn against waste and threaten investigations. But the bills reflect the feelings that security and victory are bargains at the price and that, in any case, there is no option but to "trust in God and General Marshall." So it is reasonably safe to predict that for the duration of the war the Army will have pretty much its own way in securing funds. Its real problem will continue to be the conversion of cash into commodities in a war economy of scarcity.

¹⁰There has been a tendency among legislators of both parties to place responsibility at the door of the Executive, though Republican Congressmen prefer to blame Democratic Presidents, and *vice versa*.

AN EXPERIMENT IN WRITING ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

BY CAPTAIN A. M. THORNTON

The number of historical units that the War Department has in operation indicates the value it places on recording its wartime experiences. Some of these have been established for over a year while others are still in their infancy. One of the pioneers in War Department historical work during the present emergency is the Office of The Quartermaster General. With the hope that the experience of its Historical Section may be of interest and perhaps value, there is set forth here an account of its objectives and problems, and the manner in which those objectives are being attained and the problems solved.

The Historical Section, Office of The Quartermaster General, was not created officially until July 11, 1942, although an historical officer had been designated since June 1.¹ Initially it was charged "with the collection and evaluation of historical data and its compilation into the history of the Quartermaster Corps from July 1, 1940." To do this for an agency that was charged with the tremendous responsibility of feeding, clothing, and equipping an army that would ultimately number 10,000,000 men was no simple task.

The historical officer's first consideration was to prepare plans for the project and to acquire a competent staff. After due consideration, suggestions were submitted to The Quartermaster General outlining the *modus operandi* and emphasizing the need for a group of sensible and realistic persons. It was decided to seek persons who had both training in the social sciences and experience in research with Government records, and who could cooperate with others. It was realized that the historical positions established should be graded sufficiently high to attract able men. Good salaries were authorized and, as a result, an able staff was found. As finally set up, the staff included former employees of The National Archives, the Historical Records Survey, the National Park Service, and members of history and political science departments of state universities. By the middle of August, six weeks after the historical officer was designated, a staff was on the job.

All available literature on the organization and functions of the

¹The Quartermaster General saw a need for and initiated the Quartermaster Corps historical project before a directive was issued by the Secretary of War on July 15, 1942. In fact, it was the first such program to be established in the War Department during the present emergency.

Quartermaster Corps was gathered and given to new staff members to enable them to learn the background of the huge organization about which they were to write. At the same time, compilation of a bibliography of materials relating to the Quartermaster Corps was started. This was done with a view to aiding the staff in its work and also with a view to ultimate publication.

In addition to the bibliography of materials relating to the Quartermaster Corps, the Section has maintained since October 1, 1942, a file of clippings from the *New York Times*, arranged topically in folders. This was undertaken to provide materials from which there could be constructed a general account of the economic mobilization of the nation as a whole, which would serve as a background against which the activities of the Quartermaster Corps could be placed. The topics have been so chosen as to afford complete coverage of the economic activities of the nation that are related to the war effort and should be of considerable value to future historians who undertake to write the history of the economic phases of the war in the United States.

Subsequently the staff members were given more specialized assignments. They were directed to make survey reports on individual divisions, in accordance with the organizational set-up of the office. These surveys were intended to provide a basis for future project planning, to acquaint individual staff members with the detailed workings of a division, and to provide written accounts of divisional records and record keeping activities. Through these surveys the staff learned whether there was an antecedent unit, if so, what had been the disposition of its records; they learned the nature and volume of files maintained by the existing units, the inclusive dates of such files, their rate of accumulation, whether stenographic transcripts of conferences and telephone conversations were kept, and other pertinent information.

The survey reports, together with suggestions from the staff, provided a basis for charting the research work for the Section. It was decided to prepare a series of approximately thirty monographs, which together would provide fairly complete coverage of the office's operations. This technique was adopted for several reasons. The Historical Section was cognizant of the mistakes made by Government historical units in World War I. One of these was their failure to accomplish much in actual publication. Since the termination of the war might bring dispersion of the staff, it was decided to publish reports on individual activities of the service or on limited subject fields relating to it

as soon as sufficient data were collected to permit the presentation of a fairly complete picture. Otherwise, it was felt, there was danger of creating no better record of Quartermaster activities than a group of filing cabinets full of notes. Moreover, the preparation of monographs, for which the staff members are given full credit, has been conducive to good morale.

Although an effort has been made to maintain high research standards in the preparation of monographs, they were never intended to reach the acme of perfection. Obviously it would be impossible to cover such a large field definitively with the limited staff authorized. It is believed, however, that these studies will be sufficiently comprehensive to prove of considerable value to future Army officers, historians, and Government administrators and will furnish information that undoubtedly could not be obtained by a future examination of records alone. Some of them have proven to be of immediate value. For example, a study of production problems facing Quartermaster Corps suppliers, the views of industrial analysts brought to the Office of The Quartermaster General to help overcome these problems, and the methods conceived and instituted to avoid contract delinquencies has been of incalculable value to all concerned with Government purchasing. A broad perspective of their problems, which these historical studies make available to busy officers, enables them to cope with their tasks with greater effectiveness and imagination.

Several monographs have already been completed. They include *Procurement Planning in the Quartermaster Corps, 1920-1940*, by Thomas M. Pitkin and Herbert R. Rifkind; *The Small Business Man and Quartermaster Contracts, 1940-1942*, by Harry B. Yoshpe; *The Development of Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers*, by Joseph J. Mathews; *Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 1920-1940*, by Harold W. Thatcher; *The Subsistence Research Laboratory*, by Walter Porges; and *Streamlining Procurement Methods in the Quartermaster Corps*, by Harry B. Yoshpe. Other studies being prepared or which are projected include such subjects as the administrative history of the Office of The Quartermaster General during the emergency, the development of subsistence items, labor problems, the development of Quartermaster equipment, the procurement and distribution of food and clothing, the operation of the depot system, animals in a mechanized army, etc.

It is not intended that a series of monographs should be the final work of the Historical Section. If time and funds are available at

the close of the war, it is planned to integrate the monographs into a one- or two-volume general history covering the work of the Quartermaster Corps. The monographs can then be used primarily as reference works. At the present time, 250 copies of each are being reproduced. Although this is a very limited number, it is believed that a fairly good geographical distribution can be attained by preparing a highly selective mailing list of state and large university libraries, learned societies, Government agencies, and a few interested individuals.

Several knotty problems have confronted the Historical Section in its work, but in most instances their solution has been found. In the beginning the staff encountered some difficulty in getting access to important files, which were maintained in the various divisions. This was due largely to the lack of knowledge on the part of officials as to what the historical project intended to accomplish. It was natural, therefore, for them to view the historians with some suspicion. Other officials, already overburdened with work, found it difficult to understand why it was necessary to write history during such critical times. By tact, perseverance, and good judgment the staff has been able to overcome these obstacles. An historian never approaches an official until he is sure of his ground and can talk the official's language. Usually, as soon as an administrator learns that the historian is well informed about his work, he cooperates fully.

The circumstances surrounding records maintenance and the huge volume of records created daily presented other problems. The central depository for OQMG records is the Mail and Records Branch. This Branch classifies and files records into broad categories in accordance with the War Department classification scheme, which is largely a modification of the Dewey Decimal library classification plan. This scheme is not supplemented by an index and was designed to locate documents for administrative use—certainly not for historical research purposes. The documents filed in Mail and Records are widely dispersed under a multitude of subject headings, and the locating of all documents relating to a specific activity is an extremely laborious task. As a supplement to this source, however, the staff has had the benefit of the "reading files" and "policy books" of the various OQMG units, which are maintained for ready reference purposes by stenographers and clerks and discarded when no longer needed for current business.

With documents created at the rate of from 16,000 to 30,000 items

a day, and a small staff to catch up the backlog and keep abreast of current developments, research could only be undertaken on a highly selective basis.

Although all notes are typewritten or hand written on 5 x 8 cards and a uniform system for notetaking was established, it was realized that there would be considerable reluctance on the part of future scholars to use notes left behind by the historians. The solution to this problem was found in the use of a portable photostat machine recently developed by a prominent office machine manufacturer, which costs little more than the average typewriter. Instead of copying notes, the historian now photostats pertinent documents on 5 x 8 slips. This not only provides a means of collecting policy and other important documents, but also will furnish scholars with well classified selective materials which they should have no compunction about using.

The life of the project being indeterminable, the staff has been faced with still other problems. This unknown factor made it especially difficult to decide how much time could be devoted to each field of study, for it was known that sufficient material was available on various subjects to keep the entire staff busy for years. It was essential, however, that over-all coverage of the Quartermaster Corps be accomplished. In order to reach this objective, it was necessary to create an arbitrary deadline at which time the writing of each monograph is to be completed. Such factors as importance of the subject, accessibility of materials, and the individual's adeptness for writing were all considered in preparing deadlines for the monographs. The nature of source materials occasionally makes it economical for the historian to do research on several monographs at one time. The deadlines enable the staff to plan their work more effectively in accordance with the amount of time allotted. Thus there is a reasonable degree of assurance that over-all coverage can be attained. It is planned to bring studies up to date by publication of revised editions or supplementary reports.

Field Projects

The formulation of plans and policies for the Quartermaster Corps is largely the responsibility of the Office of The Quartermaster General. Many of these plans are executed by depots located throughout the country, which are under the supervision of The Quartermaster General. All have distinct missions, such as centralized procurement of specialty items, storage for reserve supplies, distribution to a par-

ticular area or to ports of embarkation. In most instances each depot has more than one mission, while all have procurement functions. Two depots, those at Jeffersonville, Indiana, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, are manufacturing centers. Extensive training programs are executed at the Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers at Camp Lee, Virginia, and Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming.

In order to insure adequate coverage, historians have been appointed at some of the more important field installations. The field historians have two main functions: (1) To prepare comprehensive narrative and descriptive accounts, in form for publication, of the policies, activities, and accomplishments of the individual field installations; (2) to search out, copy, and assemble in a central accessible file significant documents relating to the organization, functions, and accomplishments of the installations.

The depots operate under standardized procedures. Unless adequate instructions were given to field historians, much duplication and overlapping would result. To reduce these to a minimum, the field historians have been instructed to place emphasis on the unique features of their installations. Thus a depot may have unique labor and transportation problems, particular areas of distribution, and specialized procurement not in common with other depots; these would be emphasized. Field historians submit "Monthly Progress Reports." They are guided by manuals prepared in Washington headquarters.

Through their findings the depot historians will do much to enrich the over-all history because of their close contact with details of operation. They are in a position to see what problems are involved in executing the plans and policies emanating from headquarters. The bulk of such information is inaccessible to the historian in the Office of The Quartermaster General.

Industry Projects

That Government contractors have contributed greatly to the winning of the war is widely known. It is also known that few businesses have ever recorded their wartime experiences. In order to provide a well balanced picture of Quartermaster Corps operations, a few selected QMC contractors were invited to participate in the historical program, and these invitations were received with considerable enthusiasm.

Contractors have been encouraged to prepare accounts of the problems, accomplishments, and activities of their individual plants with a view to publication by the companies. A description of physical plant,

capitalization, nature of production, manufacturing techniques, sources of raw material, volume of production, market areas, personnel management, labor problems, development work, and conversion problems are among the subjects given consideration.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the valid criticisms that can be levelled against historical work of this nature, it is felt that a worthwhile contribution can be made. To be sure, such work can be considered neither definitive nor final, for it is virtually impossible to write an account in its true perspective when one is so close to operations. Nevertheless, valuable information can be recorded that otherwise would be lost forever. This is especially true in the War Department, where emphasis is placed on brevity in communications and where so many important decisions are reached verbally. By being present as events occur, an historian can sometimes prove that an action which the documents indicate was taken was in reality not taken at all. Likewise, it is frequently found that units never existed or operated as their organization charts and other records indicate. It appears that this work is sufficiently valuable to warrant a permanent place for historians in Government agencies. It would be absurd to suggest that historical accounts of the activities of Government agencies will provide a solution to all future Governmental problems. But as General Douglas MacArthur once wrote concerning military strategy:

. . . research does bring to light fundamental principles, . . . which in the light of the past, have been productive of success. These principles know no limitations of time. . . . Those callow critics who hold that only in the most recent battles are there to be found truths applicable to our present problems have utterly failed to see this.

THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN COMBAT TEAM

BY STUART PORTNER

On January 28, 1943, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced that service in a special combat team of the Army of the United States was open to Japanese-American volunteers. By this action American citizens of Japanese ancestry who had been excluded from general service since the spring of 1942, and who had been placed in Selective Service category 4C, a classification reserved for aliens unfit for military service, were once again permitted to enter the Army. The combat team, when activated, was to include the customary infantry, artillery, engineer, and medical units. The only restrictions on volunteers were that they be between the ages of 18 and 38, meet the literacy and physical requirements for general service, and acknowledge loyalty to this country.

The opening of service in the combat team drew more than 10,000 volunteers, of which total approximately 1,200 were from the relocation centers in the United States and the remainder from Hawaii. By May 15, more than 2,500 Japanese-Americans were in training in Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

The announcement by Secretary Stimson came after several months of study by the War Department and followed requests by *nisei*, American citizens of Japanese extraction, who sought to participate in the fight against the Axis. These requests were based upon the belief that it was the responsibility of every citizen to take up arms in defense of his country, and complemented other proposals calling for the termination of the program of evacuation and the return to pre-Pearl Harbor status and residence. Objecting to categorization as 4C in the Selective Service, Japanese-American citizens of military age sought some measure of relief by the Federal Government which would permit them to enter combat service in the Army. As early as August 6, 1942, 218 residents of the Manzanar Relocation Center in California had sent a petition to President Roosevelt, asking that they be allowed to fight on the European front. Japanese-American college students residing in Hawaii, excluded from service in the Army, had presented themselves for work in labor corps shortly after Pearl Harbor. The Varsity Victory Volunteers, as they were called, served faithfully and ably for months prior to Secretary Stimson's announcement.

Military service for the Japanese-American had significance not only as a means of individual expression of loyalty, but also was related directly to the entire problem of relocation for Japanese-Americans resident in the United States. By Executive Order, 9066, February 19, 1942, the Secretary of War and military commanders were authorized to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded for reasons of military security. Various restrictive orders by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commander of the Fourth Army and the Western Defense Command, established two military areas along the Pacific Coast. All Japanese—United States citizen and alien alike—were excluded from these areas. The Japanese were temporarily located at assembly centers along the Pacific Coast and then were evacuated to relocation centers.

These relocation centers were—and still are—located in the states of California, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Idaho, and Arkansas and were administered by the War Relocation Authority, a civilian agency. External security was maintained by a company of Army military police and entrance and exit were only by permission of the authorities. From the very day the Western Defense Command ordered evacuation, efforts were made by the Japanese to establish their loyalty and effect a return to their former homes. No expression of loyalty seemed more definite than the desire to fight for the United States, and the theme that Japanese-Americans should be permitted to serve with the armed forces of the United States was to be found in many of the publications of this group throughout the summer and fall of 1942.

That there was opposition to service in the Army among groups of Japanese in the relocation centers also was evident in the months preceding Secretary Stimson's announcement. Some Japanese aliens, parents of American citizens, were caught in a conflict of loyalties and were reluctant to see their children fighting against kinsfolk in Japan. Their children, in many cases, faced the prospect of an open break with their parents if they petitioned too vigorously for the right to enter the armed forces. Other residents, though American citizens, had received part of their academic training in Japan and were not sympathetic to the American pattern of life. And for all who were in relocation centers, there was the reality that they had been uprooted from their former homes and were now living apart from the rest of the nation. But the idea persisted that service in the armed forces by eligible Japanese-Americans might help in bringing eventual abandonment of the

relocation centers and a return to the conditions that had existed before Pearl Harbor.

In an editorial of September 3, 1942, the *Pacific Citizen*, official publication of the Japanese-American Citizens League and most influential of all Japanese-American newspapers, called upon the United States government to use Japanese-American troops for combat service. "In the American Japanese soldiers," declared the *Pacific Citizen*, "the U. S. Army has a propaganda medium worth fleets of bombers. . . . We can think of no better way to counter the paper bullets of Tokyo's propaganda mill than by the use of American Japanese troops on an important war mission. The people of India and Free China, the people of occupied Asia and of the home islands of Japan's army of conquest would be interested to know that there are thousands of Japanese in this country who do not share the fanaticism of the present rulers of Japan and who know that the ultimate destiny of the Nippon war makers is death and dereliction."

At the time of Secretary Stimson's announcement, there were almost 5,000 American-born citizens of Japanese parentage in the Army. Most of these men had entered the Army prior to Pearl Harbor, but some had enlisted for special services since that time. Many were being trained in special Army language schools, although the great majority were in general service at posts throughout the United States and Hawaii. Gaining special prominence for their efforts were Japanese-American units of the Hawaiian National Guard in training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.

There were many references in the Japanese-American press to the presence of individual Japanese-Americans in combat areas. The *Pacific Citizen* reprinted a story from a Kauai Island, Territory of Hawaii, newspaper detailing the career of Master Sergeant Arthur Komari, Army Air Forces, who served with General MacArthur's troops in the Philippines. The *Daily Tulean Dispatch*, newspaper of the Tule Lake Relocation Center, in its issue of January 4, 1943, reprinted a letter narrating the exploits of Sergeant Fred Nishitsuji who was fighting with the American forces in New Guinea. The Rohwer Relocation Center *Outpost* reviewed the experiences of Sergeant Ben Furoki, turret gunner on a Liberator bomber, who had been in several engagements over Europe. The fact that Staff Sergeant Paul Sakai, who entered the Army in 1941, took part in the North African campaign, was worthy of special attention in another front page story in the *Pacific Citizen* of January 7, 1943. There were added references to the heroism of Japa-

nese-Americans who had assisted in the defense of Hawaii on the day of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and constant reiteration of the desire to participate in the war against the Axis.

The opening of service in the Army was accepted by Japanese-Americans as a major step toward regaining their rights as citizens. The *Pacific Citizen* of January 28, 1943, carried the gist of the Stimson announcement in a banner headline. Extra editions of all relocation center newspapers carried the story. Editorially the *Pacific Citizen* on February 4, 1943, called upon the Japanese-American citizens to volunteer. "An overwhelming response to the new fighting unit will prove, far better than by vocal protestations, the worthiness of the *nisei* to share the common lot of all Americans during and after the emergency. . . . The issue has now been squarely put. The *nisei* will have an opportunity to show that, despite the vicissitudes of the past year, their faith in democracy is still strong and whole."

Introducing its program to the Japanese-Americans, the Army explained why a special team had been proposed. It was emphasized that no segregation was implied by the establishment of a special unit. The Army told prospective volunteers, "If your strength were diffused through the Army of the United States—as has already been done with many other Americans of your blood—relatively little account would be taken of your action. You would be important only as manpower—nothing more. But united and working together, you would become a symbol of something greater than your individual selves, and the effect would be felt both in the United States and abroad. All other Americans would long remember what you had done for the country, and you would be a living reproach to those who have been prejudiced against you because of your Japanese blood."

The volunteers appreciated the meaning of these words for themselves, their friends and relatives. Dyke Miyagawa writing in the *Irrigator*, newspaper of the Minidoka Relocation Center, declared, "For the burden we bear is that we are to decide in no small measure whether the generations to follow us will walk on the main streets of America as equal citizens, or seek the side-streets as despised pariahs." The Heart Mountain Relocation Center *Sentinel* held that the War Department's decision "to induct Americans of Japanese descent into the United States Army on a volunteer basis is an epic milestone in the long uphill battle to reestablish our positions as Americans." The Manzanar Relocation Center *Free Press* declared the action of the Army to be a "vindication against the suspicions and vilifications which

have been directed at us during the past year. This decision by the American Government resolves our purposes for existence. Perhaps the fusing of the lives of our second and third and the succeeding generations of the citizens of Japanese descent into the strain of American life could not successfully be negotiated without this test of our fortitude and willingness to serve. May we be deserving fully of this privilege."

News that the Army was accepting Japanese-American volunteers was received favorably throughout the country. Even the newspapers on the Pacific Coast did not object too vigorously; the *San Francisco News* used bold face type to inform the public "Army to Take Loyal Japs." The *New York Times*, reviewing the background of the case, held editorially that "Secretary Stimson's action was amply justified by a year's experience with the evacuees." The proposed induction in Hawaii also drew widespread comment and special attention was paid to a statement by Lieutenant Colonel Farrant L. Turner that he had "never had more wholehearted, serious minded cooperation from any troops" than from the Hawaiian *nisei* soldiers at Camp McCoy.

By the end of April the Hawaiian *nisei* volunteers who had been accepted for the combat team had been transported to the United States and were in training at Camp Shelby. The departure of the volunteers from Honolulu was the occasion for a major celebration. A crowd of more than 20,000 persons, one of the largest gatherings in the history of the city, bade them farewell at a reception on the grounds of the military governor's mansion.

In early May the first volunteers from the relocation centers in the United States arrived in Camp Shelby to join the Hawaiian contingent. *Nisei* girls, seeking to emulate the men, petitioned for the right to enter the women's auxiliaries of the armed services and their petitions were being reviewed as the men trained for their part in the conflict.

Having been permitted to volunteer, Japanese-Americans now hoped for the reestablishment of Selective Service. They recalled President Roosevelt's statement of February 1, 1943, when he held the formation of the combat team "a natural and logical step toward the reinstitution of the Selective Service procedures which were temporarily disrupted by the evacuation from the West Coast." They looked forward to Selective Service as still another step on the road to regaining their standing in the American community.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

With the publication of this issue, Dr. Stuart Portner succeeds Dr. Edward G. Campbell as Editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*.

Dr. Robert H. Bahmer, Treasurer of the American Military Institute, announces the admission of Major William D. Campbell, FA, and Lieutenant William A. Knowlton to life membership in the Institute.

Recent inquiries concerning the library of the American Military Institute prompts us to repeat that the library is located in the Division of War Department Archives, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Members of the Institute and students interested in military affairs are welcome to use the library from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Saturday. Gifts of books and periodicals will be appreciated.

Research in the wartime functions of Federal agencies has been accelerated during the past few months with the completion of studies of their basic activities by several of the agencies. Other agencies, including the Veterans Administration, the War Production Board, the Office of Price Administration, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Office of War Information, which heretofore have not had administrative historians, have instituted programs of current documentation. Mrs. Kathleen D. Smith is undertaking documentation work for the Veterans Administration; James W. Fesler, chief of the Policy Analysis and Records Branch, is in charge of the work for the War Production Board; and Robert E. Stone, William Lonsdale Taylor, and Reed Harris occupy similar positions with the Office of Price Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, and Office of War Information, respectively.

Contributors to This Issue

Captain Victor Gondos, Jr. (Coast Artillery Reserve), is an associate editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, whose articles on Army historiography in the present war have appeared in recent issues of the journal.

Dr. Elias Huzar, a new contributor, is on the staff of the Department of Political Science, Cornell University.

Captain A. M. Thornton is Chief of the Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster General.

Dr. Stuart Portner is Editor of MILITARY AFFAIRS.

Hyman Roudman is a member of the staff of the Division of War Department Archives, National Archives, whose book reviews have appeared in previous issues of MILITARY AFFAIRS.

John R. Cuneo, author of *The German Air Weapon* and other studies on military aviation, is completing the second and third volumes of his projected trilogy, *Winged Mars*, a history of aviation.

Among the book reviewers, J. Perry Stewart is now at work on a study of the military policy of the United States; Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, author of *Blitzkrieg* and other books and articles on armored warfare, is one of the outstanding writers on military affairs in the United States; Captain Hugh M. Flick, formerly Archivist of the State of New York, is now engaged in records administration with the War Department; Dr. Alfred Vagts is a frequent contributor to MILITARY AFFAIRS and other military periodicals; Dr. Joseph Roucek, of Hofstra College, is an authority on Balkan affairs; Dr. Bell I. Wiley is the author of *Life of Johnny Reb*, a study of the common soldier in the Confederate Army.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Surprise, by General Waldemar Erfurth, tr. by Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 200. \$1.00.)

Defense, by Field Marshal General Wilhelm von Leeb, tr. by Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 159. \$1.00.)

Armored Warfare, by Major General J. F. C. Fuller. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 189. \$1.00.)

The publication of these three modern classics on the art of war is indicative of a trend that may yet result in serious study of military affairs in this country. For years it has been obvious that the scholars and the scholarly institutions of the United States have neglected the study of military history. There have been precious few colleges offering anything in the way of adequate courses in the field, and the number of students doing research in military history has been inconsequential. Today, under the stress of war, there has been an awakening interest in matters military and it takes no stretch of the imagination to conceive of that interest carrying over into the post-war period. There is a distinct need for the review of the operational and administrative activities of our military, and the growing realization of that need by educators and scholars may soon witness new courses in the collegiate curriculum and extensive research in the still untouched records of the military establishments of the nation.

The Military Service Publishing Company of Harrisburg is to be congratulated on making available the first American edition of these three volumes. *Surprise*, by General Erfurth, chief of the Historical Section, German General Staff, is a detailed study of the meaning of surprise in modern warfare. With Clausewitz, Erfurth maintains that "Surprise is more or less at the bottom of all military enterprises." He further asserts, after references to Moltke, Schlieffen, Clausewitz, and others, that annihilation, which is the chief objective of war, cannot be achieved unless the enemy has previously been surprised.

Von Leeb's *Defense* is a translation of *Die Abwehr*, which appeared

in Berlin in 1936 after having run serially in the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau* of the German War Office. In these articles von Leeb critically examined Germany's war potential and his plan of action for the next war in which Germany was to engage rested upon an initial active defense, to be succeeded by an offensive. He maintained that "Since in any war to come we cannot count on numerical superiority or superiority in war materials, the defense must help to support and prepare the attack, which alone can try a decision. In the event of the enemy's absolute superiority, his strength and power must be worn down." Defense was to be adjusted in accordance with the enemy's war plan, in order that balance of power always be maintained. He conceived of attrition as being basic in reducing the superiority of the enemy. He further emphasized the importance of two fundamental combat forms—battle in depth and systematic cooperation between different service arms. The validity of von Leeb's thesis has been well established—but unfortunately for the German High Command, such demonstration has been by the Soviet forces.

Major General Fuller's *Armored Warfare* is an annotated edition of the already famous *FSR III*, the first complete manual on operations between mechanized armies. The volume is further enhanced by a splendid introduction by Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall, AUS, one of the outstanding students of the art of war in the United States. We agree with Marshall when he states in his introduction that "one cannot truly weigh the pure gold" contained in this volume. Originally published in 1932 as a field service manual for the British army, this volume has since become a textbook for armies throughout the world. Fuller reasoned that the ultimate limitations of tanks were unknown and that one could predict their potential in combat. In great detail he set fundamental principles for the use of mechanized forces in combat, and the campaigns of the last four years have proved beyond a doubt the truth of his position.

J. PERRY STEWART

Chicago, Illinois

Masters of Mobile Warfare, by Elbridge Colby. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. 155. \$2.00.)

There is something in what Colonel G. F. R. Henderson once wrote on the subject of military studies. He told the young officer to heed Napoleon's advice and "study the campaigns of the Great Captains" if he would learn about war.

But something more was added. He said that the young officer should read Napoleon and see what he meant by that statement. So doing, he would find to his amazement that the master made no reference to tactics or strategy. He was not speaking of the movements of masses. Rather, his mind was upon the fundamental things which give an army coherence. He meant the study of raw human nature, its reaction to the stresses of discipline, fatigue, death, love, hate and hunger, and the way the commander used these things to shape an army to do his will.

This, it seems to me, is the very guts of war; or call it the sanctum sanctorum of command. But how much of it is there to be found in the literature of war? Practically nothing at all. We are told that mobility is the essence. We are reminded that the commander who can achieve the superior concentration at the decisive point will invariably be crowned with success. Therefore mobility and concentration are the things to be considered above all; they provide the basis for that self-confidence which, combining with a proper estimate of situation, leads to decision.

But these are explanations which do not explain. I doubt that there ever lived a commander who did not believe in the value of mobility. They all subscribe to the ideal. They all try for it. But few are able to achieve it in decisive measure. Why is it so? It is because mobility is a condition of mind. With the army as with its leader.

It is not a matter of relative movement on the battlefield—the product of mobility—but of an entire system of thinking about, and training for war which will bring about a coherent and powerful response in the hour of crisis. Wherever we glance during the present war, we find this lesson heavily underscored. Mobility is secondarily a matter of tactics; of superiority in transport and the supply system. It is primarily a matter of training an army to march one mile more than the possible; of passing on to junior officers the doctrine by which all ranks can be instilled with a belief in themselves and confidence in their leaders; of imparting to higher subordinates part of the dynamic spark and understanding of “the system” of the commander.

Manifestly, this is the kind of information which is hardest found. So much of it is inextricably linked with the personality of the commander or else has not been made of record. It is always battle and the clash of armies which attract the military historian; there is rarely even a glance at training and almost no regard for the philosophy and the little tricks by which the great commander makes a personal

weapon of his army. The result is that we continue to mistake the shadow for the substance. We see the effect but we do not find the reason.

Colonel Colby's study of Marlborough, Frederick and Napoleon is splendid as far as it goes—a brief but vivid discussion of the facts of movement and decision on the field of battle. Sparks fly from his words. The value of the writing is greatly enhanced by his personal reflections. But I did not find in it “the principal characteristics which brought success to three men who excelled in mobile warfare.” After reading, I know what they did, but how they did it still eludes me.

S. L. A. MARSHALL¹

Lt. Col., Infantry, AUS

Bridgehead to Victory; Plans for the Invasion of Europe, by L. V. Randall. (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1943. Pp. vi, 183. \$2.00.)

Landing operations present highly speculative investments of men and materials. What is true of actual enterprises, is equally true of theoretical discussions about “bridgeheads to victory.” The present little work, of less than 50,000 words, appearing under a title which is, of course, a misnomer, having “beachheads” for its subject rather than bridgeheads, the landings on the *litus* rather than the *ripa*, has not proved very successful in its prognoses for this year's landings. But it would be decidedly unjust to dismiss it on that account as simply bad guesswork. Its “thought engineering” is considerably above that. In the first instance, it was courageous to think and write it—the preface is dated March 1943—and publish it on the eve of the attacks upon Festung Europa from the south; and in the second place the author realized fully and expounded the nearly innumerable elements of failure and risks involved in water and air borne landings, what can be known about them and what must be considered in connection with them and what necessarily should remain dark and secret in the counsels of statesmen and generals. For such a wholesome public discussion of landings it would have been better to include data on the actually required items of “expenditure” like shipping space, to give more on the tactics of embarkation, disembarkation and landing, to which only eight small pages are devoted; something ought also to have been said

¹The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the above review are those of the individual officer. They do not necessarily represent official War Department opinions nor that of the service at large.

on the complicated psychology of such enterprises. The special forces required are discussed and even a new kind proposed, so-called "crew troops" for the defense of beachheads once landings are achieved, after-landing commandos so to speak, warding off enemy counter-attacks. Generally speaking, the author's analysis of the situation which confronts the invaders and the consequent proposals proceed from the "geostratic" features of the theater of war, much as if a staff officer had been given the order by his commander to work out this side of things alone and largely with map and compass. His conclusions the superior might well find too bold considering the forces he has available in numbers and kind.

As the man of the compass and the strategic ponderation Mr. Randall, a German officer of the last war according to the publishers, would for example propose to begin the attack on Italy by a landing in Calabria-Apulia rather than Sicily, which would soon become untenable without a fight. It looks definitely bolder and more "promising," but was hardly secure and certain enough for the general commanding in the Mediterranean or for the Inter-Allied councils. The latter are constantly aware that as yet they have to fight the Germans with a "learning force," a force with a firm nucleus of tested fighters and clustered around them a nebula of untried forces which will emerge only after battle as firm constellations of their own. Forces of such character when used in the hazardous tasks of landings, must by preference be employed at first on the more distant periphery of the Fortress Europa, rather than close to the citadel which is Germany herself. While the Germans began the war with boldness, we shall use our daring nearer the end and for the end. But meanwhile, because such a large part of the Allied forces still have to study war, the author's basic conviction that "we must hope for one large-scale attack" directed simultaneously against nearly all German-held coasts, is necessarily fallacious. In opposition to such prescriptive convictions the historian of the war, writing at some later time, may hold it a blessing only thinly disguised that Italy went into the war and offered first North Africa and then her metropolitan area as battle-learning ground for American and Dominion troops who after Dunkerque might not easily have been landed elsewhere. Mussolini provided us with the "beachheads to victory." Or, to put things as far as America is concerned in a formula, we might say that Tunisia, 1942-3 = Cantigny, 1918.

ALFRED VAGTS
Sherman, Conn.

Balkan Firebrand, by Kosta Todorov. (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co. 1943. Pp. 340. \$3.50.)

Here we have a volume characterized by extraordinary shortcomings as well as by its contributions to our knowledge of Balkan politics. Todorov linked his political life to that of Alexander Stambuliski, the head of the Bulgarian Peasant Party, and has served the cause of the liberation of Bulgaria and her close union with Yugoslavia. In the name of this cause he was a terrorist and an ambassador, had friendships with kings and with extreme revolutionists of different countries, most of whom will be unknown to the non-specialist in the Balkan affairs. Professional assassins, corrupted journalists, bribable diplomats stalk across the pages of Todorov's memoirs. If anything, the work proves why the Balkans were and remain the powder keg of Europe. No AMGOT, however efficient, will be capable of solving the deep-going contradictions between the various Balkan states and within these states. In this respect, Todorov has performed no service for his cause, for the average American reader is bound to react to him as Marcellus Cockerel, one of the heroes of a novel by James, who said: "If we wretched Americans could only say once for all: 'Oh, Europe be hanged!' we should attend much better to our proper business."

From the standpoint of military history, Todorov has nothing to contribute. The man's personality can be judged, possibly, from such exaggerations as: "Back home again, I soon found that I could spread almost as much terror with my pen as with my pistol" (p. 41); or, "My own luck was incredible; I outlived nearly everyone I knew" (p. 61). Occasionally he slips on his facts; Todorov could not have heard Clemenceau in the Chamber of Representatives in Palais Bourbon in 1914 (p. 44), for Clemenceau at that time was neither a member of the Chamber nor a Minister; furthermore Clemenceau lived not on Rue Francois Premier (p. 124) but on Rue Franklin; Marshal "Bazin" (p. 320) was actually called Bazaine. But these minor mistakes are unimportant. Those who have never found time to go through other substantial books on the Balkans and like to have their reading as exciting and intense as any opium-saturated fiction will praise Todorov. But the author has failed either to achieve a penetrating imaginative analysis of the already available facts or to make any very important contribution to them. In any case, we must not accept his verdict on the Balkan politics as that of an impartial judge, what is in reality but one-sided argument of an intensely biased advocate.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
Hofstra College

The Battle for Buenos Aires, by Sax Bradford. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1943. Pp. 313. \$2.50.)

Although Argentina may not make the headlines every day she is nevertheless destined to play an increasingly important part in the international scene. Valiant and costly efforts to foster an understanding of ideas and ideals of Pan Americanism have yielded little interest or appreciation of the potential strength of Argentina and its capital, Buenos Aires. As the third largest city in the western hemisphere and the largest Latin City in the world Buenos Aires is certainly worth a place in our thinking. The totalitarian powers have not only recognized the potential strength of the city but have fitted their thinking to action and sown their propaganda with consummate care. The polygot background of Buenos Aires and its strong cultural and sentimental ties with the old world presented an especially fertile field for the growth and development of Nazi patterns, beliefs and ideologies.

While North Americans with smug misunderstanding refused to take the isms of Europe seriously the agents of Nazis, Falangists and Fascists were worming their way into the life and thoughts of Argentina. Buenos Aires has always been a colony of European thought in the Americas and fell easy prey to the infiltration tactics of the Axis. The story of this invasion and its potential threat to the rest of the Americas is the theme of Mr. Bradford's book. He presents a well documented picture and shows that the real danger comes from within as was the case in the conquered countries of Europe. He explains the reasons why Argentina has taken so little positive action as far as the Axis menace is concerned. The real power of the book lies in the answer to such questions as why in a country whose "voiceless majority" desires "liberty and freedom of conscience," the opposite should be the order of the day. Americans should know the facts and discard their self complacency. Mr. Bradford, now Lt. Bradford, USN, explores the field with unusual skill and unravels the complicated pattern of cultural, economic and commercial life which is the warp and woof of Buenos Aires.

The Battle for Buenos Aires deserves to be widely read. It is both timely in the light of recent developments of far reaching importance and unusually well presented. The volume is both a literary and an educational contribution to the field of history. To the military historian this study affords an excellent opportunity to understand the organization and operation of the fifth column which the author de-

clares is better prepared for aggressive action in Argentina than in any of the countries that have been conquered in Europe.

HUGH M. FLICK¹

Capt., A.G.D., AUS

Morgan and His Raiders, by Cecil Fletcher Holland. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1942. Pp. x, 373. \$3.50.)

John Hunt Morgan was probably the most glamorous of all Confederate leaders. Back in the stirring days of 1862 when he made his first great Kentucky raid, and in 1863 when he carried the Confederate Stars and Bars into Indiana and Ohio, his name was a synonym of gallantry throughout the South. At his zenith he was a sort of Rebel version of Jimmy Doolittle.

His command was not large. His most successful raids were accomplished with fewer than 3,000 men. But he did amazing things. Time and again he rode through the heart of Federal-occupied country and with a handful of followers spread consternation, if not destruction, in his wake.

The ingredients of his success were daring, speed, surprise and resourcefulness. If he found himself unexpectedly face to face with a superior force he immediately ordered a charge. On several occasions he eluded what seemed to be certain capture by coolly impersonating a Federal commander and sending the hostile contingent off on a wild-goose chase after "that villain Morgan."

Another favorite ruse was to have his telegraph operator, Ellsworth, cut in on the Federal telegraph lines and send confusing and terrifying messages to those who were trying to nab him. Once he even had Ellsworth order a train laden with Federal supplies to a point where he could seize it. His entire career reads like a story book.

Naturally a subject of such fascination has attracted numerous writers. Basil Duke, Morgan's brother-in-law and lieutenant, wrote two books about him. In 1934 Howard Swiggert wrote a moving account entitled *The Rebel Raider*. Now a new author, a youngish newspaperman of Chattanooga and Washington background, at present a captain in the Army Air Forces, has entered the list.

Holland's prime reason for undertaking a new study of Morgan was

¹The opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in the above review are those of the individual officer. They do not necessarily represent an official War Department opinion nor that of the service at large.

his accidental discovery, several years back, in Lebanon, Tenn., of a trunkful of the general's personal and official papers. Extensive and ingenious searching turned up other valuable manuscripts.

The author has made good use of his finds. His picture of Morgan as a military chieftain is not markedly different from that of prior biographers, but he gives a richer, deeper insight into Morgan, the man. Extracts from the general's letters to his bride afford a delicious slant on his chivalry, sentimentality, impetuosity, and remarkable confidence in himself. And Morgan's correspondence with his associates reveals strikingly the demoralization and the depression—due largely to the disfavor in which the general fell in Richmond after his escape from prison—that overtook him and his command shortly before his tragic and untimely death in Greeneville, Tenn., in 1864.

Holland is unquestionably an admirer of the audacious Confederate. He sees in his tactics a foreshadowment of the lightning panzer movements of modern warfare. And he credits Morgan with the realization to an unusual extent of the vital necessity of the South waging an unrelenting and an aggressive fight. But the author is not blind to Morgan's faults. He admits readily that Morgan took unwarranted chances; that he was impatient at the restraint of his superiors; and that he was neglectful of discipline.

I found the author's treatment of background and collateral material a bit heavy at times, but his portrait of Morgan is vibrant and engrossing.

BELL I. WILEY
Memphis, Tenn.

SHORT REVIEWS

Airborne Invasion: The Story of the Battle of Crete, by John Hetherington. (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 1943. Pp. 178. \$2.50.)

"A few minutes after eight o'clock on May 27 (1941), General Sir Archibald Wavell, in Cairo, wrote out a message addressed to Mr. Churchill. It said: 'Crete is no longer tenable.'" And so it was that Crete fell, another victim of Nazi aggression.

John Hetherington does not write a full explanation of the fall of Crete, nor does he completely answer the critics who have questioned the advisability of defending Crete, in the first place, without adequate if not superior air support. This book, as its title suggests, is the story of a magnificent defense of an island "doomed to destruction" by the Luftwaffe, as seen through the eyes of a single war correspondent. Consequently, insofar as Hetherington deals with the terror that rained down on Crete, his book is praiseworthy.

The book is not a definitive military treatise on the defense and fall of the island of Crete. Much remains to be done, but *Airborne Invasion* is one of the better written works on the British strategy in the Mediterranean theatre of operations during those hectic days when Britain "stood alone" and faced the common enemy of all free men.

The author was not overwhelmed at the sight of the first fullscale paratroop invasion in the records of time, nor was he convinced of its invincibility even though the venture proved to be another Nazi triumph. It must be assumed, however, that Hetherington was hypnotized by the great and terrible

sight of soldiers floating out of the sky to fight on land, and so were the brave defenders themselves, but only for a short while. Quickly, those who watched the unreality, returned to the task at hand, and with unerring marksmanship, made the Nazi Army pay heavily in blood for the victory. Hetherington believes that the initial cost to the Nazis in dead and wounded was so heavy that the Nazi High Command seriously considered giving up the attempt to conquer Crete from the skies.

Airborne Invasion does deserve credit for its vivid descriptions, several of which are superbly done. Among the best descriptions are the brilliant evacuation from Sphakia, the Royal Navy and its part in the defense and evacuation, and the "fearless" Bernard Freyberg, Major-General, commanding officer of the British and Greek forces in Crete.

The battle of Crete is over, for the present. The Nazi Army is in full control of that island, but surely, Crete will be liberated. Whether the United Nations will retake Crete through "airborne invasion" is highly questionable. However, the story of the men who withstood that first invasion so well, even though for only a short period, and the lessons to be drawn from the battle of Crete itself, will never be forgotten.

LOUIS I. ROSE

Don't Blame the Generals, by Alan Moorehead. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1943. Pp. 312. \$3.50.)

The British Eighth Army between August 1941 and 1942 is the center of interest of Australian-born Alan Moorehead, correspondent for the London *Daily Telegraph*. The Cripps mission to India, the invasion of Persia, and the stopping of the Japanese in Ceylon were also "covered" to give a more rounded picture of the factors involved in the defense of the Empire.

Moorehead's reasons for not blaming the generals for the retreats of this period were based on his observation of a half dozen campaigns in Western Asia and Eastern Africa as well as in the desert. Not the generals but "A series of events and influences had come into play and the result could not have been otherwise than it was."

In the desert fighting in Libya and Egypt, the German Army was then superior in equipment, training, organization, and morale. Generals were held responsible for a situation in which they were not the decisive element. Complications arose from the several nationalities involved in the area. Strategy was planned by the War Cabinet in London; while tactics were recommended by the staffs of experts in many fields. Smoothness of the system in operation was clogged by the demand "Just let me have a chit for that (in triplicate)." Between officers and men there was less integration than seemed to be the case in the German Army.

Even though victory in North Africa followed the flood of superior weapons, the deepest question of morale—an explanation of the reasons why the soldiers fought, in terms of the post war world—seems even yet to be unanswered.

GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

Greece Against the Axis, by Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Casson. (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs. 1943. Pp. 150. Cloth, \$2.50; paper, \$2.00.)

The author, in civilian life a distinguished student of the archaeology of ancient Greece, writes here admiringly and at first hand of the epic resistance of modern Greece to the Italian and German invaders. He is conscious that almost three years after the destruction of the independence of Greece we may need to be reminded of the contribution which that little country made to the common cause of the United Nations.

Lieutenant Colonel Casson's work does not pretend to offer a detailed military outline of the events of the Greek campaign. He gives us rather a record of his experiences while in Greece as a member of the British Military Mission. Without the effort to assume the role of military historian, he does make at least two observations of importance in assessing the significance of the Axis invasion of Greece. He points out that the temporary Greek penetration into Albania must be considered one of the most successful examples of the use of mountain tactics in modern warfare. He sees the occupation of Greece by Germany in its proper perspective as not merely Hitler's effort to extricate his ally from an embarrassing situation but as a stage in the bid for Mediterranean domination and as a preparation for the assault on Russia.

As a personal history, however, Lieutenant Colonel Casson's work lacks the pungency and snap of the best accounts by correspondents of this war. His book suffers from a dearth of freshly revelatory incident. In addition, he is often led astray into unfortunate generalizations about the racial

character of the enemy. The Italian soldier emerges from his pages as a kind of congenital idiot and the German soldier as a kind of subhuman brute. Such generalizations, however much they may flatter our own self-esteem, contribute very little to that understanding of the mind of the enemy which we must gain in order really to defeat him.

EDWARD HANDLER

NOTES

Several recent books on aviation have significance for students of military affairs. Among these is Cy Caldwell's *Air Power and Total War* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. 1943. Pp. 244. \$2.50.). Caldwell has written a brilliant survey in terms of the last four years. He treats of the value of aircraft in land and sea warfare and pays special attention to the lessons to be learned from the experiences in Norway, Crete, Malta, Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Singapore. He concludes that air power is in the ascendancy, but is cautious in stating its full strategic significance, holding that time alone will prove the validity of the claims of General Douhet and others.

Another stimulating book on the same subject is *The Use of Air Power* by Flight Lieutenant V. E. R. Blunt, RAF (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 162. \$1.00.). This is the first American edition of a book that created great discussion when originally published in England. Blunt stresses the importance of air power in affording extreme mobility in combat. He does not claim that air power alone can win the war, but conceives of the air force as a decisive auxiliary to land forces occupying the territory bombed.

In the *Navy Has Wings* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. Pp. 224. \$2.75.), Fletcher Pratt offers an illuminating description of naval aviation from pre-flight training to combat. Here is a detailed discussion of naval aviation as it has not been presented before. Pratt takes occasion to discuss the relative merits of carrier and battleship, but does not offer conclusive judgment on the relative value of naval elements. Informative, well written, and a real contribution to the knowledge of the field.

Combat Aviation, by Keith Ayling (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 253. \$2.00.), is vital and valuable reading. Concentrating information and covering the subject in detail, Ayling offers a quick history of formations, warplanes, and fighter tactics to introduce accounts of World War II. Technical précis are short, simple, and illustrated with diagrams, photographs, and water-wash drawings. Practical ideals are constantly placed in the fore and solutions are advanced for the winning of today's war.

Personal accounts of air warfare render a distinct contribution in revealing the details of combat in the various theatres of operations. Captain Ted W. Lawson, one of the pilots in the raid on Tokyo in April 1942, has written a simple but stirring account of his experiences with the Doolittle flyers in *Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo* (New York: Random House. 1943. Pp. 221. \$2.00.). Ira Wolfert, Pulitzer Prize winner for his stories of action in the Solomons, has treated of the experiences of a Navy aircraft torpedo squadron in *Torpedo 8* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 125. \$2.00.). Wolfert follows the squadron from the Battle of Midway through weeks of intensive action against Japanese naval forces in the waters around the Solomons. In *Malta Story* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 222. \$2.50.), W. L. River has vividly portrayed life on that Mediterranean island through the reconstruction of the diary of Howard M. Coffin, an American flying with the RAF units based on Malta.

Houghton Mifflin has released two volumes on sea warfare. The first of these, Archie Gibbs' *U-Boat Prisoner* (Boston. 1943. Pp. 208. \$2.00.), is a personal history of an American sailor who was held prisoner by the crew of a German U-boat after his ship had been torpedoed under him. In *Pick Out the Biggest* (Boston. 1943. Pp. 132. \$2.00.), Frank Morris describes the naval engagement north of Guadalcanal in which Captain "Iron Mike" Moran and the crew of the cruiser *Boise* sank six Japanese vessels in 27 minutes.

Two books on the period of the American Revolution have current importance. The first is a historical study on *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army* by Allen Bowman (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs. 1943. Pp. 160. Cloth, \$2.50; paper, \$2.00.). Bowman, in a well-documented account, examines the physical and psychological factors affecting the morale of the Revolutionary Army. While Bowman has written a valuable general account, Carl Van Doren in *Mutiny in January* (New York: The Viking Press. 1943. Pp. 288. \$3.50.) has described in detail the events of the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line in January 1781.

Our Soldiers Speak, 1775-1918, by William Mathews and Dixon Wector, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. 376. \$3.50.) is a well-edited military history of the United States as revealed in the diaries of the common soldier through the years.

Wythe Williams, the radio commentator, and William Van Narvig, in *Secret Sources* (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 326. \$3.00.) offer information on the sources of the sensational news scoops of the years 1939-41.

Kill or Get Killed, by Major Rex Applegate (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 175. \$3.00.) is the best of the manuals to appear to date on hand-to-hand fighting. Profusely illustrated and intensive in its detail.

Handbook of Health for Overseas Service, by Drs. George C. Shattuck and William J. Mixer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2nd ed. 1943. Pp. 228.), is a revised and enlarged edition of a pocket-sized manual that already has been accepted in many quarters as an outstanding guide for first aid.

The University of Chicago Press has issued two new items in its Public Policy Pamphlet Series. These are *What Shall We Do with Germany?* by Bernadotte E. Schmitt (Chicago. 1943. Pp. 22. \$.25.), and *Alien Enemies and Alien Friends in the United States* by Ernst W. Puttkammer (Chicago. 1943. Pp. 22. \$.25.).

The National Planning Association has released another in their series of pamphlets, *The Economic Pattern of World Population*, by John C. Condliffe (Washington, D. C. 1943. Pp. 54. \$.25.).

Selection of Officer Candidates, by Drs. William L. Woods, Lucien Brouha, and Carl C. Seltzer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1943. Pp. 46.) stresses the correlation between physical fitness, personality and performance of officer candidates.

Personal Leadership for Combat Officers, by Lieutenant Prentiss B. Read, Jr. (New York: Whittlesey House. 1943. Pp. 116. \$1.50.), is a handbook providing the combat leader with a clear statement of the basic objectives of his position as the head of a unit.

Basic Mathematics for Aviation, by Frank Ayres, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 211. \$3.75.), is a single volume, self-teaching guide to mathematics for the aviator. Here in the space of little more than 200 pages Professor Ayres starts at the fundamental operations of arithmetic and takes the student through plane and spherical geometry.

The World Since 1914, by Walter C. Langsam, has appeared in its fifth edition (New York: Macmillan Company, 1943. Pp. 837. \$4.00.). Entirely revamped, and rewritten in great measure, this textbook is a fine popular guide to the history of the last thirty years.

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Economic Reconstruction; A Study of Post War Problems, Vol. 1, National Industrial and Regional Planning, by John Bellerby. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 396. \$5.00.)

The Latin American Policy of the United States, by Samuel F. Bemis. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1943. Pp. 470. \$4.50.)

A Five-Year Peace Plan; A Schedule for Peace Building, by Edward J. Byng. (New York: Coward McCann. 1943. Pp. 191. \$2.00.)

The British Commonwealth at War, by William Y. Elliott and H. Duncan Hall, eds. (New York: Alfred Knopf. 1943. Pp. 539. \$5.00.)

Discharged; A Commentary on Civil Reestablishment of Veterans in Canada, by Robert England. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 468. \$5.50.)

The Origins and Background of the Second World War, by Charles G. Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1943. Pp. 659. \$4.25. College edition, \$3.25.)

America's Role in Asia, by Harry P. Howard. (New York: Howell Soskin and Company. 1943. Pp. 463. \$3.00.)

- Atlantic Charter*, by Cecil King. (New York: Studio Publications. 1943. Pp. 232. \$4.50.)
- Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, by Harold L. Laski. (New York: Viking Press. 1943. Pp. 428. \$3.50.)
- U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, by Walter Lippmann. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. 194. \$1.50.)
- A Social Psychology of War and Peace*, by Mark A. May. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1943. Pp. 194. \$2.75.)
- Peace Plans and American Choices*, by Arthur C. Millspaugh. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute. 1943. \$1.00.)
- Atlantic Meeting*, by Henry C. V. Morton. (New York: Dodd Mead and Company. 1943. Pp. 216. \$2.50.)

NATIONAL WARFARE

- Africa, the Near East and the War*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1943. Pp. 224. \$1.50. Paper \$1.00.)
- My War with Japan*, by Carroll Alcott. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1943. Pp. 368. \$3.00.)
- The Spy in America*, by George S. Bryan. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott and Company. 1943. Pp. 256. \$3.00.)
- Under Cover; My Four Years in the Nazi Underworld of America; The Amazing Revelation of How Axis Agents and Our Enemies Within Are Now Plotting to Destroy the United States*, by John R. Carlson. (New York: F. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 375. \$3.00.)
- Moscow Dateline*, by Henry C. Cassidy. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 367. \$3.50.)
- Falange, the Axis Secret Army in the Americas*, by Allan Chase. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1943. Pp. 288. \$3.00.)
- The United States at War; Our Enemies and Our Associates*, by Christopher B. Coleman. (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society. 1943. Pp. 79. \$1.25. Paper \$.25.)
- Trading With the Enemy in World War II*, by Martin Domke. (New York: Central Book Company. 1943. Pp. 656. \$10.00.)
- Modern Iran*, by Laurence P. Elwell-Sutton. (Forest Hills, N. Y.: Transatlantic Arts. 1943. Pp. 246. \$3.75.)
- The Arabs; A Short History*, by Philip K. Hitti. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. 233. \$2.00.)
- Soviet Labor and Industry*, by L. F. Hubbard. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 315. \$3.25.)
- Russia Fights*, by James E. Brown. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1943. Pp. 287. \$2.50.)
- Hong Kong Aftermath*, by Wenzell Brown. (New York: Smith and Durrell. 1943. Pp. 283. \$2.75.)
- Combined Operations, The Official Story of the Commandos*. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 168. \$2.00.)
- Victory Through Africa*, by Samuel Dashiell. (New York: Smith and Durrell. 1943. Pp. 320. \$2.75.)
- Prisoner of the Japs*, by Gwen Dew. (New York: Alfred Knopf. 1943. Pp. 317. \$3.00.)
- Short Cut to Tokyo; The Battle for the Aleutians*, by Corey Ford. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1943. Pp. 144. \$1.75.)

- But Soldiers Wondered Why*, by Frank Gervasi. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1943. Pp. 284. \$2.75.)
- They Who Wait*, by Robert Guerlain, pseud., tr. by Theodore R. Jaekel. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1943. Pp. 217. \$2.00.)
- Blood on the Rising Sun*, by Douglas G. Haring. (Philadelphia: Macrae-Smith. 1943. Pp. 251. \$2.50.)
- Letter from New Guinea*, by Vern Haugland. (New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 1943. Pp. 148. \$1.50.)
- War in the Sun*, by James L. Hodson. (New York: Dial Press. 1943. Pp. 449. \$3.00.)
- Victories of Army Medicine*, by Colonel Edgar E. Hume. (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott and Company. 1943. Pp. 264. \$3.00.)
- Twelve Months That Changed the World*, by Larry Leseur. (New York: Alfred Knopf. 1943. Pp. 345. \$3.00.)
- Japan's Military Masters; The Army in Japanese Life*, by Hillis Lory. (New York: Viking Press. 1943. Pp. 256. \$2.50.)
- Before Bataan and After*, by Frederic S. Marquardt. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 1943. Pp. 315. \$2.50.)
- Why Japan Was Strong; A Journey of Adventure*, by John Patric. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1943. Pp. 318. \$2.50.)

LAND WARFARE

- Jeeps and Jests*, by Bruce Bairnsfather. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1943. Pp. 51. \$2.00.)
- The Unknown Army; The Nature and History of the Russian Military Forces*, by Nikolaus Basseches, tr. from the German by Marion Searchinger. (New York: Viking Press. 1943. Pp. 239. \$2.50.)
- Speech for the Military*, by Cole S. Brembeck and Albert A. Rights. (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Sons. 1943. Pp. 210. \$1.20.)
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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

POCKET-SIZED MILITARY BOOKS

BY HYMAN ROUDMAN

Within the last year and a half, a *Fighting Force* and a *Penguin Book* run of pocket-sized military books have been published. At present the combined total is about thirty, and more are being added from month to month. Both series were initiated by the *Infantry Journal*, Colonel Joseph I. Greene being chiefly responsible for the realization of the idea: to place in the soldier's hands literature of immediate military interest in the handiest form possible, priced so low that price is no object in purchase. This has been fully realized. The compact little issues deal with military history, experience, and pertinent miscellany, weigh close to nothing, will drop inconspicuously into a blouse pocket or knapsack, withstand considerable battering, and cost only a quarter (25c) each. Standard size is 7 inches by 4¼ by one half inch or less in thickness, though some of the newer ones are even smaller than this.

In harmony with their original purpose almost all the *Fighting Force Series* are sales restricted to men in the armed forces. In such cases ordinary editions can be had at the usual bookstore levels. The greater number, of course, are reprints, but three in particular, *Machine Warfare* by Major General J. F. C. Fuller, *Psychology for the Fighting Man*, and *What to do Aboard a Transport* are new to the market. It is the first of these which is the most significant, the subject being central to the consideration of almost every book herein presented.

No need for a special introduction of General Fuller. Advocacy of the new, armored, mobile warfare has been his life. *Machine Warfare* is merely the most recent summary of his views with the events of World War II in support of his strategic and tactical theory. Colonel Greene and Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall (author of *Blitzkrieg*) had a hand in its making, so the thought represents an impressive conjunction of agreement on the revolutionary possibilities inherent in the new armament, as well as lessons derived from the war to date. Only a commander who has seen considerable service could begin the

task of evaluation, particularly at this time. There are, however, the general premises of the work which, condensed, are:

- (1) All warfare hinges on practical mobility.
- (2) In the 20th century this means the primacy of machines.
- (3) The army having machine superiority and making use of it will win.
- (4) The machines of greatest potential are the tank and aeroplane.
- (5) Machine warfare cannot be contained in two dimensions: no rear is safe.
- (6) Machines are dependent on industrial power: the whole nation is at war and constitutes a target.
- (7) Machine warfare makes a ruthless, comprehensive and quick strategy imperative.
- (8) Human military material must be trained in accordance with the use of current tools.

As a prophet General Fuller has had to overemphasize the obvious to the British army and public, hence the exposition is somewhat repetitious. There is no question, however, that the lessons must be driven home. With the offensive fully ascendent, the best defense can provide only a short respite to prepare counterblows. The army adopting static warfare has fatally handicapped itself: movement is vital. Tactics are diagrammed to show how linear tactics have been transformed into incessant zonal operations with different laws of break-through. Graphic sketches of war, like a new biologic order on earth, hint at incredible emotional tensions and machine velocities. The clash of armored divisions is like a scene from the Jurassic Age. To an unlimited strategy are added extremes of mortal ferocity, mailed everywhere, incapable of stopping short of annihilation. No wonder the British granted the new forms and the return to mobility only when on the verge of ruin.

Despite General Fuller's preoccupation with machines, confident as he is that the new weapons will teach themselves to the rising class of generals, it must be clear that the human element plays not a lesser part, but an enhanced role, if only because it is not possible to retrieve mistakes in time at the higher battle-speeds. There is no room for mediocrity; generalship is on call 24 hours a day for the entire course of the war. It is less an inferiority in mechanized power than a lack of imaginative grasp on the part of its military leaders which in my opinion is the worst curse a nation may labor under. Franco-British "strategy" in the *sitzkrieg* is a good example of this, a negation largely

mental, and a major contribution in itself to the triumph of German armor. The fact is the Allied generals were in an intellectual funk, afraid of being "found out" by the necessity of experimenting with the upsetting tactics of weapons they never really trusted. Thus they sat tight, and refused to accept responsibility for a mobile offensive. The Germans, with the confidence of pioneers, better equipped to be sure *but knowing their enemies*, were not afraid to chance it.

There are other practical and human objections to General Fuller's overwhelming emphasis on superior machine power as the simple key to victory. This takes too much for granted. Men animate machines just as Will sparks the human machine. As individuals vary in readiness to fight or think so do nations according to time and place. The quality of national resiliency was never at a higher premium than in totalitarian warfare.

All of the author's shortcomings come to a focus in the perfunctory story of the war in Russia. Part of this is due to the unsatisfactory nature of the information furnished to the outside world by both combatants, but part is also due to ignorance of Russian history and to a basic disregard of morale, in this case a revolutionary potential. Unlike the French, who were defeated before hostilities began, surrounded or flanked Soviet units of all kinds did not surrender, but if completely cut off, transformed themselves into guerrillas and worked up extensive and constant attacks on the German rear. General Fuller calls it stubborn resistance and "refusal when surrounded to get rattled" but it is evident that it is much more positive in essence than that, for it "rattled" the Germans in turn, and denied them the fruits of penetration except in the usual Pyrrhic coin. His explanation of the failure of the Russians to mount effective counter-offensives leaves too much blank: "The reason is, I think, that, throughout their history, the Russians have proved themselves to be not so much an offensively or defensively as a nomadically minded people." Similarly, the half paragraph on the growth of the Russian empire lacks that power of analysis which is really profound when he treats of Western military phenomena. Russian territorial expansion was harnessed to the same social and geographic laws which determined the growth of other European land powers and varied in proportion to the strength of her neighbors. Wars against Poland, Prussia and Sweden—wars which forced the modernization of the Russian state—are hardly comparable with the Cossack harassment of nomadic peoples which opened the southern steppes

and Siberia to safe colonization. So much for this curious, semi-mystical, rather British misconception of things Russian.

Fundamentally, *Machine Warfare* is the case for mobile artillery whether considered as tanks mounting 75 mm. guns on an all-around traverse, field artillery mounted in steel cupolas and self propelled, or cannon-firing planes assisting bombers in their mission. Reduced to the moving, armored gun, the basic theory seems obvious enough, yet as General Fuller illustrates, the corollaries have made necessary a radically different military organization than that which existed in the long Age of Linear Tactics.

Less concerned with battles in the grand manner and the fulfillment of theory than in the bare course of events is *Modern Battle* by Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Thompson. Nothing else is quite so apparent than that things do not go quite according to plan. Simple error, elementary obstacles, false information, irresolution, and other weaknesses to which human flesh is prone, detract from the picture of sweeping advances and ideal manoeuvres. World War II becomes even humorous in the telling as advertisement is separated from fact. Nevertheless, the basic complex machine warfare as given by General Fuller is not denied: speed joined to armor and gunpower was indeed the German recipe for success.

The transformation of blitzkrieg into a war of exhaustion by organizing popular resistance is the theme of *New Ways of War* by Tom Wintringham and of *Guerrilla Warfare* by "Yank" Levy. Method is derived from experience in the Spanish civil war. Tough amateurs, their instruction is amazingly fresh, full of optimism, and free of all personal reticence with no signs of deference to anyone or anything. World War II has proved them to be "sound" and the British Home Guard has accepted the doctrine and action as its own.

Personal accounts of actual combat are undoubtedly the most valuable of the series from the viewpoint of the soldier. The authors—a journalist, army officers, and a civilian who happened to be there—actors not trained historians, are our true guide to living history. Ridden by their jobs, Tregaskis, Gerard, Triplet and the others, pass through active fronts, and live to write what they saw.

Guadalcanal Diary is the story of our first major seizure of enemy ground in this war as seen by Richard Tregaskis, INS reporter with the expedition. Our green troops had yet to adapt themselves to jungle warfare and specifically to fighting Japs. The going was tough, foreshadowing similar campaigns to be waged all over the island-studded

western Pacific. The hardest part, however, the gaining of initial battle experience, was achieved with fair economy. This moment-to-moment narrative makes exciting reading.

Sergeant Terry Bull (Colonel Triplet) and the authors of *Americans vs. Germans 1917-18*, write of World War I. Platoon officers, for them it was indeed a democratic war. Fog of war is universally prevalent, but perforce they learned a great deal. Elementary suggestions both direct and implicit are many and have pointed reference to the new training schedules.

There is less "fog" in Lieutenant Robert M. Gerard's *Tank-Fighter Team*. At least, the author's Groupe Franc knew its job, acted quickly to the limit of its means, and was cognizant of the general situation as it deepened into the fall of France. Pictures emerge with startling clarity: a panicked colonel-class disorganizing their commands, bewilderment—the enigmatic strategy of the French High Command with treason filtering down like a blight to unnerve the whole army, the cautious advance of the Germans, the tentative almost timid movement of their "irresistible armor" vulnerable and limited as it was. Aggressive needling of panzer spearheads determined on breakthrough did not occur within any of the small zones occupied by this unit. If this is a typical detail of the Battle of France, it was less the Nazi Panzers than the continuing domestic crisis within the Republic which delivered the nation over intact to the enemy.

The Fight at Pearl Harbor by Blake Clark is narrowly restricted to the Honolulu defense area during December 7-8, 1941. The writer's reactions were too personal and immediate to include an appreciation of our higher officialdom. The subject, therefore, is incomplete, but will do as a popular introduction to the tale of retribution.

Rifleman Dodd by C. S. Forester is fiction. An English soldier is cut off from his regiment during the fighting in Spain-Portugal, 1813-14, manages to subsist and even to inflict damage on the enemy with the assistance of local guerrillas before rejoining his comrades. As actions are given in detail the value of Dodd's example lies in maximum impressions gained by easy teaching.

How the Jap Army Fights represents an effort to collect our meagre knowledge of the Japanese Army, its indoctrination, moral, mental, and physical capacity to take punishment and see a first class war through. Events are brought down to the capitulation of Corregidor, but the time-span is too slight, and the reader finishes the book still

starved for information. A supplementary edition bringing it up to date would do much to remedy this.

The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz contains some of the more significant matter of *On War*. For Clausewitz the genius of war is purely human, and the object of his study, like all good military philosophy, was to lay the bed of military inspiration. Written for the benefit of a resurrected Prussian officer-caste in an era of national awakening, the classic chapters are still the finest to be found in Western military literature. Since 1870 the world influence of German military thought has spelled the name of Clausewitz in almost every book treating of modern war. This publication, therefore, has been overdue for a long time.

Harold Lamb's *Genghis Khan*, the biography of the greatest director of mobile warfare in history, is an appropriate addition to the series. The book itself is too well known to require further review.

Studies on War is made up of choice articles from the Journal of The American Military Institute, half dealing with the economic, military and philosophic problems raised by a resurgent Germany, and half presenting details of historical interest on the American scene. Less for the soldier than the officer-student of war interested in the cultural growth of the enemy war-organism.

The theory behind *Psychology for the Fighting Man* is that enough of it sticks (subconsciously as it were) to modify the soldier's reactions when up against food, sex, morale, panic, and propaganda problems. Maybe it does. Generally speaking, however, it is much less successful as a readable, serviceable reference than *What to do Aboard a Transport*, which is in the nature of a lively, factual boy-scout handbook on weather, marine life, geology, elementary ship and engine construction, simple astronomy and a variety of other items likely to come to the soldier's attention and possessing lasting interest.

Gas Warfare by Brigadier-General Alden H. Waitt, *What's That Plane* by Walter B. Pitkin, Jr., *Aircraft Recognition* by R. A. Saville-Sneath, and *The Soldier's Handbook* are straight information handbooks or manuals, and require no comment.

THE BALLOON AT HELL'S CORNER

By JOHN R. CUNEO

Perhaps in a reminiscent mood after reading about modern air power, some veterans of the Spanish-American War recall the balloon that was towed down the narrow Santiago road into the jungle before San Juan Hill on July 1, 1898. They probably recall it as the damned target that drew the Spanish fire on the dismounted cavalry and infantry crowded on the trail. But that is not the entire story. . . .

In April 1898 Major J. E. Maxfield of the Signal Corps received orders transferring him from the Department of the Lakes to Governor's Island, New York. There he was set to repairing the balloon equipment forwarded from Fort Logan, Colorado, where a detachment had been experimenting with balloons. It was intimated that the apparatus was to be used at Sandy Hook to watch for the possible approach of Spanish warships. However this intimation was dispelled when Maxfield was ordered to prepare two balloon sections for a campaign in the field.

It was not an easy task, for the Spanish-American War marked the extension of this nation's unfortunate tradition of military unpreparedness to the air arm. Aside from a small silk balloon, an insufficient number of steel hydrogen tubes and a few wagons, the equipment was unsuitable for field operations. However Maxfield managed to repair and purchase material not only for the field units but also for a permanent gas plant to be set up at Tampa, Florida. He received valuable assistance from L. B. Wildman, who was experienced in aeronautics and who afterwards became a first lieutenant in the United States Volunteer Signal Corps.

Maxfield's difficulties were multiplied by the fact that he had no men under him. It was an arduous task even to get sufficient details from the small garrison at Fort Wadsworth to handle the shipment of heavy and unwieldy equipment to Tampa. Moreover Maxfield had other duties aside from the balloons. He was censor of the cables terminating at New York, a duty sufficient in itself. When the time came that he felt that he could follow the material to Tampa, the Chief Signal Officer refused permission because of the importance of his other work.

Some attempts were made to attract experienced personnel. There were some professional aeronauts who were willing to enlist but Maxfield discouraged their acceptance when he learned that exhibitionists

always ascended with the intention of landing in the shortest possible time. After he left New York two French balloonists offered their services, possibly being attracted by the fact that Maxfield had purchased some French-made balloons. This came to naught when it was discovered that their idea of a proper salary was a good deal higher than the pay in the United States army.

Finally on May 31 Maxfield was ordered to Tampa. On arriving he was informed that he had only *two* or *three* days to organize a balloon section for the Santiago expedition. It seemed an impossible task; he had no men and the equipment had not been unloaded. He commenced by searching for it and immediately discovered the shipping "blockade" which was only one example of the confusion that characterized all the preparations for the expedition. At the Tampa railroad yards the depot quartermaster knew nothing of the shipments. Maxfield finally discovered the bills of lading but some failed to give the numbers of the cars holding the goods. However a clerk was detailed by the depot quartermaster and with good luck he found most of the cars.

In the meantime Maxfield received his men, some from the Signal Corps and some from the infantry. Here he met Sergeant Ivy Baldwin of the Signal Corps, a former professional aeronaut, who had been the leading spirit at the balloon station in Fort Logan. Maxfield managed to get them tents but few had any mess kits and none had firearms.

Eventually men and material were sent on to Fort Tampa where the transports were being loaded. Here again confusion reigned. The balloon section had not been assigned to any ship and considerable time elapsed before the commanding general issued the necessary orders. In view of the wild happenings—troops holding up railroad trains at bayonet point, seizing cars and even transports, holding space allotted to other units—the tiny balloon detachment was rather fortunate to get aboard any boat.

As a result of a false report of two Spanish warships off the coast, the desperate haste of the expedition to embark was matched by a leisurely week at anchor under a hot sun in the harbor of Port Tampa. Finally all spectres were dispelled and the ships were crawling over a placid but burning sea towards Cuba, Maxfield twice had the balloon spread on deck because he feared the effects of its long sojourn in the freight car and hold of the vessel. His worries were justified; the heat had softened the varnish and the sides of the envelope were sticking

together. The balloon was the old one from Fort Logan and rapidly deteriorating.

On June 20 the expedition was off Santiago and a decision was made to land at Daiquiri, a small town eighteen miles to the east. Two days later after a short bombardment the troops were landed, the Spanish offering no opposition. General Shafter had ordered that no persons were to be landed who were not serving with the units designated in the orders—thus the balloon detachment continued to languish on its transport, the *Rio Grande*.

On June 27, Major Maxfield was told that General Shafter had ordered the landing of the balloon for the purpose of making a reconnaissance. Maxfield asked permission to land his hydrogen generator because his tubes held only enough gas to fill the balloon once. This was refused. That evening the tubes were placed in a lighter but the sea became so rough that a man fell overboard, and was rescued with difficulty. The unloading was delayed until the next morning.

As the army had moved on, the equipment was transported over the wretched roads to Siboney, eight miles to the east. The journey took all day due to the necessity of partially unloading the wagons to surmount bog-holes. It is singular that the landing was not made directly at Siboney which had a better beach than Daiquiri. It was not so well sheltered from the prevailing winds but landings had been made there since June 23, when General Lawton had occupied the town.

On the evening of June 28, Maxfield reported to General Shafter and was ordered to continue his march on the next morning until he reached the point selected as headquarters. From Siboney the road turned inland, the army had not advanced far and the designated point was reached early on the following morning. Heavy rains prevented any activity. On the following day, as the balloon was spread out it was discovered that the extreme heat had caused the two sides to stick together. Parts had rotted away and there were a great many small holes. However the rents were sewed and covered, the sections of the envelope separated and the balloon was inflated.

Three ascensions were made during the afternoon of June 30, although Maxfield later admitted that the balloon "was in such condition that had the ascents to be made in time of peace it would have been felt unsafe to use it." First to ascend were Sergeant Baldwin and himself. Next were Second Lieutenant Walter S. Volkmar and Gen-

eral Castillo of the Cuban army. Last were Colonel Derby, chief engineer officer of the Fifth Army Corps, and Maxfield.

On the same afternoon, after a week of inaction, the army began to advance down the Santiago road. Just as all the regiments moved onto the trail in considerable confusion, for no order of march had apparently been issued, the balloon went up for the first time. According to Richard Harding Davis "the men in the different regiments, picking their way along the trail, gazed upon it open-mouthed."

"Twelve thousand men, with their eyes fixed on a balloon, and treading on each other's heels in three inches of mud, move slowly, and after three hours, it seemed as though every man in the United States was under arms and stumbling and slipping down that trail."

One of the strange things about the Santiago campaign was the failure of the Americans to thoroughly reconnoitre the wooden basin before the ridges commonly called San Juan Hill. Although they had encamped for six days in the same place, no effort was apparently made to discover the best cover, the fords, the open places or enflanking trails that might lie in the forest covering the mile and a half between the Cuban outposts on El Poso Hill and the blockhouse on San Juan Hill. The Americans calmly watched the Spanish build trenches on the ridges while the Spanish politely allowed their foe a week of undisturbed rest.

Only two trails were known to leave the woods to the open country before the hill. As some of the lesser American commanders feared, the enemy was aware of this fact and had their guns trained on the trails. Yet all the Americans were sent down *one* trail.

A reconnaissance at the very time the advance started could have made little difference but it was not Maxfield's fault that the balloon was put to such tardy use. Had it been brought ashore and used daily from the time of landing, some valuable information might have been obtained. But the ascensions on June 30 were the first made by the detachment, for practice or otherwise, and naturally they were "not rich in results" as Maxfield later admitted. However Colonel Derby was impressed by his ascension and made a very flattering report to General Shafter, recommending its use during the battle expected on the next day. As a result verbal orders were brought that evening by Derby to Maxfield for the balloon section to report at an early hour at El Poso which had been selected as the headquarters for the battle. There Derby and Maxfield were to make ascensions.

At daybreak the men of the unit were astir, replacing the gas lost in the balloon during the night and repairing holes. Then they

marched to El Poso towing the balloon. Halting the detachment at the foot of the hill, Maxfield rode up in search of Derby. On the top which was under a "slow but remarkably accurate" enemy fire he found no staff officers. As he rode over the hill his horse was killed.

Returning to the bottom, Maxfield found Derby. The balloon was carried to a point about a quarter of a mile to the rear where, with the two officers in the basket, an ascent was made. They reported the movement of the troops on the trail before them and of those who were proceeding on their right against El Caney.

Colonel Derby then ordered the balloon pulled down to within a few hundred feet of the ground and with the occupants still in the basket, towed towards the front. Maxfield thought that they would halt at El Poso as originally planned. But when no stop was made, he began to protest pointing out the dangers of dragging such a tempting target to the front. He recalled the foreign practice of directing artillery fire from captive balloons but his suggestions fell on deaf ears. Maxfield finally desisted, fearing to go too far with his protests.

The Santiago road down which the balloon was towed was so narrow in spots that the columns of troops advanced in double file. The congestion caused by thousands of men, hemmed in by dense jungle, was increased when the leaders came to the open at the last ford of the San Juan River. They halted and made some motions at deployment. The enemy began to direct a heavy fire on them. "Bloody Ford" or "Hell's Corner" commenced to acquire its name.

Down this trail came the men towing the balloon. They blocked troops trying to get to the front; the balloon advertised the line of advance to the enemy and drew the enemy fire. This forerunner of air power met with no approval in the eyes of the nervous, sweating, jostling men on the ground. Nevertheless Derby had the balloon carried to the very line of deployment and across the bed of the San Juan River into a large meadow to the right of the road. While passing, the ropes became entangled in the brush and for a time no movement was possible.

Colonel Derby may have had mistaken ideas concerning the employment of balloons, but he was no coward. He and Maxfield continued to make observations despite the heavy fire directed at the balloon which actually was not high enough for satisfactory reconnaissance. Not only were the occupants of the basket a target at easy range for Spanish rifles, but the old rotten balloon threatened to split at every gust of wind. Finally the balloon was hit and Maxfield ordered it

hauled down, hoping that the ropes could be disentangled and the balloon refilled. This was done under fire but the river bank sheltered the men, only one being wounded. As the envelope had too many holes it was left on the spot while the detachment returned to El Poso. Later Volkmar went forward and decided that the balloon could not be repaired. He put the envelope into the basket which was later recovered and brought to Siboney.

Maxfield later received a cablegram that a new balloon had been shipped but when he reported this news to General Shafter, the latter informed him that no further work with a balloon was necessary. Permission to send back the empty gas tubes for refilling was also refused. The men turned to telephone work, others to repairing telegraph lines, while Maxfield and ten men left to assist in laying a cable from Daiquiri to Quantanamo. The aerial activities of the Spanish-American War had ended.

The balloonists accomplished little of importance. The first ascensions on June 31 had resulted in slight additions to the maps and in a glimpse of the Spanish fleet at anchor in Santiago harbor. One report on July 1 had recommended that the artillery open fire. Only a small battery under Major Grimes stationed on El Poso Hill was available. It opened fire early in the morning but ceased when it achieved no results. Despite an assertion to the contrary by Maxfield in his report, the message from the balloon apparently had no results. The battery did not reopen fire until late in the afternoon—long after the balloon was down. Even then its fire was hardly helpful for it caused more alarm among the Americans storming the ridges than it did among the retreating Spaniards.

The most noteworthy result was the discovery by the balloonists of an unknown trail leading to the left from the Santiago road which appeared to give another entrance to the meadow before San Juan Hill. Brigadier-General Kent who commanded the 1st Division, Fifth Army Corps, sent the 71st New York Regiment down it. That unit—the only volunteer section aside from Rough Riders—was taken by panic while going down an unknown trail while under fire and only added to the confusion. However following units used the trail even more than the main road. Thus the air scouting undoubtedly served to relieve some of the congestion on the Santiago road.

To the soldiers the balloon merely served to attract enemy fire. Their idea of the emptiness of the aerial scouting was shown by a

story—probably apocryphal—which was repeated by Richard Harding Davis:

“Captain Howse, of General Sumner’s staff, rode down the trail . . . and was hailed by Colonel Derby, who was just descending from the shattered balloon.

“‘I saw men up there on those hills!’ Colonel Derby shouted; ‘they are firing at our troops.’ . . . Captain Howse’s reply is lost to history.”

Had General Shafter brought along any siege or heavy artillery, in view of the fact that he was intending to attack fortified positions, the balloon might have been of immense assistance. However, only a few light guns were taken along. Even if it had been left to assist Grimes’ battery, the balloon might have enabled the latter to play a more important part in the battle, especially when its actual inglorious role is considered.

There is a curious discrepancy in the accounts of the number of occupants in the balloon. Some stories portray—rather bitterly it seems—Colonel Derby riding in solitary glory above the tree-tops. Ivy Baldwin later told of being in the basket under fire, and some contemporary accounts mention three occupants. Maxfield does not mention the presence of Baldwin during the events of July 1 but definitely identifies himself as an occupant of the basket.

The balloon incident was only a small occurrence in a campaign abounding in military blunders. However the casual references to its role have rendered scant recognition to the signal achievements of Major Maxfield who certainly has deserved better mention in the footnotes of aeronautical history.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH: THE EARLY RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 1814-48

BY ARTHUR F. OWEN

One of the most fertile sources of information on the early history of our military establishment is to be found in the records of the inspectors general of the Army during the first century of our national life. Here, in the reports of inspections, surveys, and investigations are to be found a wealth of detail on the structure and organization of the Army, the competence of officers and soldiers, and the conditions at stations throughout the country. But here also are references not only to conditions in the Army, but also thorough and graphic treatment of

the climate, terrain, fertility of soil, civilian life, relations with the Indians, and other matters related only incidentally to the life of the soldier. Major Jesse S. Douglas, in the course of his researches on military posts in the Oregon Territory, has brought to light the great body of material to be found in the reports of the inspectors general in the period between 1848 and the outbreak of the Civil War, but earlier records, though not as voluminous nor as complete, offer similar finds for the student of military history.

The reports of the inspectors general for the period prior to 1848 warrant further study. Neither Major J. P. Sanger¹ nor Brigadier General Randolph B. Marcy,² in their short reviews of the history of the Inspector General's Department, have offered adequate treatment of the period. More recent scholars of American military institutions have similarly neglected the field and it remains untouched.³

The older records of the Office of the Inspector General, covering the period prior to that under investigation by Major Douglas, include approximately 100 inspection reports for the period 1814-48. These records are now in the custody of the National Archives at Washington and are available for investigation. Many are written to specification employing the pattern of reportage laid down in the Army Regulations of 1820, 1835, 1841, and 1847, but the great majority of the reports are far from being formalized in their recital of events in the field. It is obvious that the extant reports of the period are not the full total produced during these years, but they are sufficient to render information on the activities of Colonels Smyth, Hayne, Wool, Croghan, Archer, and other inspectors general, as well as present a fascinating and revealing account of the rigors of service at frontier posts.

¹"The Inspector General's Department," *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, XVI (January-May 1895), 417-37.

²*Historical Sketch of the Inspector General's Department*. Washington, 1876

³The short notes on the history of the Inspector General's Department by Lieutenant Colonel George Fox Mott, "History of the Inspector General's Department" (pp. 31-34), and Captain Arno Jewett "Inspectors General between 1778 and 1850 Established a Tradition of Service" (pp. 40-42), in the December 1942 issue of the *Information Circular* of the Inspector General's Office offer no great detail on the history of the department during the period prior to 1850.

THE EVOLUTION OF NEW FLEET TACTICS

BY HYMAN ROUDMAN

For the United States the line of battleships long the symbol of naval supremacy faded with the dawn of Pearl Harbor. The ancient stalwarts were raised, but they were raised individually—the “line” concept is the permanent casualty. When the great wagons came back they found themselves “bypassed” by carrier-cruiser groups, combinations forced on us during the period of our weakness. In the present tough and versatile formations only the newest battleships, capable of cruiser speed, are able to fit in with anything like their old pride. The others are too vulnerable, too slow. Even the general public realizes now that the navies of all nations have been unable to resist revolutionary changes, underlined with disaster everywhere brought on by bombing planes, torpedo planes, and torpedo-destroyers.

Not that there was not sufficient warning. All human history is marked by a consistent organic development, and naval history is no exception. Machine warfare, introduced as new theory for war on land, first appeared at sea, from the time steel warships began to rely on steam. The platform of the mobile armored gun at sea is (when most formidable) the battleship, on land the tank. Anti-tank units on land correspond to destroyers and PT boats, both agile torpedo-slingers. The great tactical question is: if speed and numbers are components of AT (destroyer flotillas), can they pierce medium tank (cruiser) screens and get at the superdreadnoughts? Anglo-American navies with a clear superiority in capital ships preferred to slug it to a finish in a royal clash of heavy armor, leaving minor outfits to polish each other off. Other nations of course concentrated on antidotes, principally torpedo planes, PTs and destroyers. With emphasis on speed, numbers, invisibility, barrage fire, surprise, a more fluid arrangement of units, and the general doctrine of *swarm*, AT theory began to put on flesh and grow into a deadly challenge. The Battle of Jutland was the first instance in which the two were near equals. Twice the British line of battle turned away from a German destroyer charge. At night the Grand Fleet, fearing another attack, huddled behind its destroyers while the Germans drove through to safety. Undoubtedly Scheer's destroyers saved his fleet, for the British yielded twice to actual torpedo attack and once to destroyers-in-being (at night when they lay to, inactive), and each time forfeited victory.

World War I closed with the British on top and blockade vindicated. Flotillas of destroyers and cruisers protected the giants, seaplanes kept distant reconnaissance; in London, Washington, Tokyo, Berlin, it was the Age of Dinosaurs.

The French, as always, differed. Educated by centuries of opposition to Britain and the need of economizing on the sea-front, they had finally worked out an AT or minor theory of seapower which was nothing short of revolutionary. In the narrow confines of the Mediterranean (1900-14) a French fleet made of cruisers and destroyers began to take shape. *Jeune école* theory as it was called, was planned to take effect somewhat in this manner: hordes of destroyers, light cruisers and planes assail the enemy, firing dense barrages and torpedo salvoes. Around them squadrons of PTs roar in for the kill while above torpedo-bomber planes wing down to complete the ruin of the enemy. Heavy cruisers pace the contact area, blasting a path through the enemy's cruiser screen. Destruction of the enemy is assured provided *jeune école* gets the smallcraft superiority it wants. "Superiority" is two ships to the enemy's one with three to two acceptable fighting odds, the object being to cancel out similar hostile units and have enough left over to deal with his heavies. These formations were maintained as the nuclei of the French fleet. From 1930 on, fast battleships ranging upward from 26,500 tons were added as insurance against Germany's *von Spee*, *Scheer*, *Bismarck*, *Tirpitz*, so that on the eve of the second World War as in the first, the French possessed a fast, powerful, singularly well-balanced fleet.

Unfortunately, in neither war was the *jeune école* navy ever put to the test. In World War I, the French merely assisted the British and had nothing but submarines to contend with. In World War II, involved in political arabesques, kept impotent by divided loyalties, punished by friend and foe, the French Navy was hopelessly dissipated. The Italians who had adopted the same tenets built to the same model. When war came, however, they lacked the essential guts to close with their fast (and rather fragile) battleships or attack persistently with smallcraft. Between lack of character and the necessary reserves Italy remained a negligible quantity at sea. Nowhere among the nations which had sponsored marine AT was the theory really put to proof.

It was the British, paradoxically, refusing to risk battleships to German air power who began using cruiser-carrier-destroyer groups. They denied giving up battleship doctrine in any way of course, but this has

its niche in the venerable Abbey wherein are buried all the other denials in British history. The fact remains that in the absence of a strong German battle fleet, and in narrow seas overlooked by the Luftwaffe, the British are able to dispense with battleships. Against Italy a similar adjustment was effected, this time because only cruisers and planes could catch up with the Italian fleet.

As American practice shifted to hit and run tactics the Pacific theatre began to resemble the Mediterranean. Here too the Axis appeared with land-based planes in superior numbers, and with carriers equal to ours in overall plane capacity. In addition, their surface seapower was in full command of the sea. In the face of such odds the uniform success of our task forces, aided sometimes by the Army's Flying Fortresses, has been a magnificent justification of *jeune école*. The supplementary activity of our PTs is further evidence in support, nor can it be doubted that the physical limits of plane and torpedo boat, rapid as their evolution has been, are still on the other side of the horizon. By contrast, battleship development is circumscribed by the armor weight and gunpower which distinguish the type. Recent creations have jumped tonnage from 35,000 to perhaps 60,000, achieved an increase in speed from approximately 22 knots an hour to well over 30, and have probably doubled the protective capacity of the ship in deck armor (on each of four decks), underwater subcompartmentation, and AA batteries. How much longer naval architects can add metal before diminishing returns on invulnerability cripple speed is an unknown; however the ratio of battleship to plane development is so unfavorable that it will be sooner rather than later. At Midway, surface forces never came within range of each other but were pounded from afar by planes, this situation being typical. In such cases, with all its huge armament, the battleship can punch only with its AA. Its presence, to be sure, is a security factor. It inhibits the advance of heavy units in the enemy fleet, but even this is modified by admissions from our admirals that enemy aircraft repeatedly ignored nearby battleships in pressing home mass attacks on the carriers. Our own aviation reacts in like manner, all their doubts resolved (from the time of Billy Mitchell) to the simple matter of the best choice.

Our conclusion here is that the battleship has become a flank guard to a loose grouping of aircraft carriers, its duty to reinforce the fire of cruisers against surface forces and assist with its superb AA complement in repelling air attacks. By and large the line has been abandoned for

the group, dispersion being necessary to avoid straight bomber and torpedo runs or concentrated attacks on clearly defined segments of the line. Dispersion also provides for maximum fleet AA bearing on hostile aircraft whether barrage-fire is focussed on a single flight or bunched to cover the whole sky. Residual dispositions consist of spotting ships around the carriers, destroyers close in to ward against submarines, most of the cruisers on the fringes to scout and beat back surface opposition. This combination can be countered only by overwhelming airpower or by a host of torpedo vessels attacking with every vantage of surprise. Assuming equal air *and* battleship resistance, the carrier fleet can outdistance pursuit with ease, inflicting loss on the enemy as it withdraws.

Ultimately the old-time battle fleet faces transformation into successive waves or aggregations of cruiser-destroyer flotillas. This will take place perhaps as the aircraft carrier, really a makeshift until the coming of longer-range land planes, is eliminated altogether as a distinct warship. The date of this event cannot be later than the next war. Multi-motored bombers of over 6,000 miles range (six-motored as pictured by Severesky in *Victory Through Air Power*) are being built now to flatten the enemy's cities sometime in 1944.

For the rest of this war, newspaper rumors quoting "official sources," indicate carrier fleets powerful enough to batter down all sea and island opposition. Specific reference is made to a nucleus of 17 carriers in *one* task force aimed to crush Japan's isolated outposts in the west and mid-Pacific, and clear the way to the heart of the Empire along the central sea approaches.

A more significant role is also forecast for the PT. Originally conceived as harbor defense, the PT in squadrons is now sent ranging far out to sea in search of the enemy. They operate in fair weather and foul and are especially effective at night, penetrating harbors in search of targets, a deadly menace to all enemy shipping from battleships to submarines. Motor-noise is their greatest handicap, but its elimination is well within scientific proficiency, and when achieved, cannot fail to raise the PT to a new plane of shock-surprise efficiency. It is unlikely that the PT will ever become an adjunct to the fleet as its virtues are peculiarly those of the mosquito. Any attempt to increase its fuel capacity and hence its size will work against its special naval qualities of high speed, tricky manoeuvre, and small target area in proportion

to firepower, and encroach on the destroyer, itself descended from just this prototype.

It appears certain that the end of World War II will see the first stabilization of seapower in terms of air and torpedocraft domination. The relegation of capital ships to AA protection as their primary function (not in theory but in practice) undermines their previous mission; however this is not to say that the principle of the heavy-gunpower ship may not survive in this form as well as the other. This is heresy I know, but the evolution of this particular ship may take any one of many alternatives, *e.g.* omit the upper turrets of 16-inchers in favor of a tripled AA firepower, increase speed by cutting down belt armor, even augmenting dimensions by including another pair of boilers to gain more speed. Doing without auxiliary facilities would enhance the result, tending to simplify construction and the siting of AA batteries.

Tradition being what it is in the Navy, revolutionary changes will be a long time in coming, the longer as the urgency behind them is modified by our advantage in every class of weapon. However, unless we conform to new tactical exigencies while there is still time, the next Pearl Harbor may be fatal, not so much from lack of specific ships as missing out on the emergence of a new system of command. "Combined operations" are no longer temporary: the alliance of land planes and seapower must be accepted as permanent. We must recognize that the union of all arms in any region requires that the superior jurisdictions of admirals, generals and air marshals be superseded by that of a *strategos*, a general commander in the higher sense, alone responsible and fully controlling all fighting resources in the region to support that responsibility. Unless this is done, the lessons and evolution of tactics borne in on the services are dangerously incomplete.

SPEZIA: AN AMERICAN NAVAL BASE, 1848-68

BY HOWARD R. MARRARO

In the year 1806, the great Napoleon, foreseeing the strategic importance of Spezia for the control of the Mediterranean, decided to transfer to this port on the Tyrrhenian Sea the naval establishments that were then located in Genoa.¹ With the avowed purpose of overthrowing England's naval power, Napoleon commissioned Agostino Chiodo, the military engineer, to prepare plans for making the Gulf of Spezia an important naval base. Actual construction was commenced in 1811, and continued for several years. After the downfall of Napoleon, however, the Piedmontese Government abandoned the project. It was not revived until 1849, when Alfonso La Marmora, the future commander of the Sardinian troops in the Crimean War, proposed to the government at Turin a plan to transfer the headquarters of the royal navy from Genoa to Spezia.

Meanwhile, in June 1848, the United States Government received the permission of the Sardinian Government to establish an American naval depot at Spezia. The privilege was granted for an initial period of three years, with annual renewals thereafter. Cordial relations were established between the American naval officers stationed at the depot and the Piedmontese Government authorities.

On February 3, 1851, Count Camillo Benso di Cavour presented a bill to the Piedmontese Parliament providing for the establishment of a new military port at Spezia, and the construction of a large customs-free warehouse at Genoa which was imperatively needed because of the rising commercial activity of the country. Parliament did not pass the bill, but in the meantime the Sardinian Government notified the American minister at Turin that it planned to use Spezia for a naval base, and, in exchange, offered the American squadron a depot on the Sardinian coast. In the course of the diplomatic correspondence relating to the Sardinian offer, the commander of the American Mediterranean Squadron, Commodore Charles W. Morgan, concisely stated the advantages of Spezia, in a letter to the American Chargé d'Affaires, William B. Kinney, dated from the flagship "Mississippi," Leghorn Roads, July 23, 1851.

¹For an authoritative account of the rôle of La Spezia as a naval base, see G. Gonnì, "L'arsenale marittimo del Risorgimento italiano," *Rassegna Nazionale*, March 16, 1909; see also U. Formentini and T. Valenti, *La Spezia e la sua provincia* (Milan, 1923); and U. Mazzini, *Guida della Spezia e del suo golfo* (n.p., 1896).

. . . may I beg the favour of you to convey to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, my acknowledgements of the very polite terms in which he has been pleased to express the friendly feelings of His Majesty the King of Sardinia for the Government of the United States, and especially for his kind proposition to place at the disposal of the United States Squadron, in this sea, some position on the coast of Sardinia, which may be convenient as a depot. I know of no locality, however, upon the coast of His Majesty, which would afford the facilities offered in the Gulf of Spezia, for our purpose. . . At almost any point on the western shore of the Gulf of Spezia, sufficient security and convenience would be afforded to the Squadron. The Bay, about a mile and a half to the north of the Lazzaretto, and above Fort Pezzino, or between that and the town of Spezia, immediately off a little town, named Fezzano, at which point storehouses may be rented for the use of our stores, would be acceptable—if a proximity of three English miles of the naval forces of the two powers, may not be regarded by His Excellency as exceptional.²

The following year, the new commander of the American squadron, exchanged further correspondence on the subject with *Chargé d'Affaires* Kinney. Commodore Silas H. Stringham wrote Kinney that

Before my departure from the United States it was intimated to me by our Government that the Sardinian Government were somewhat averse to allowing our ships of war the same facilities in the way of a depot for stores as had been for some years extended to us in this port. Accordingly upon my arrival on the station. . . I addressed a communication to our Minister at the Court of Madrid, requesting to know if the Spanish Government would interpose objections to once more marking a depot at port Mahon in the Island of Minorca.³

Nevertheless, on second thought, the Commodore stated his belief that the Sardinian Government was kindly disposed towards the Americans, and from his own knowledge of Mediterranean facilities he preferred to remain in the Spezia region.

Kinney replied that the question of removal was originally raised when the United States Navy Department offered to repair a wharf damaged by the American squadron. The Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that repairs would be unnecessary since a project was afoot to relocate the marine arsenal from Genoa to Spezia, which would require radical alterations of the wharves anyway. It further appeared probable that it would also require the removal of the American naval depot from Spezia.⁴ Nevertheless the Americans repaired

²Commodore Charles W. Morgan to William B. Kinney, Leghorn Roads, July 23, 1851, in Archivio di Stato, Turin.

³Commodore Silas H. Stringham to William B. Kinney, Spezia, September 20, 1852, in American Embassy Archives, Rome. All materials cited as being found in the American Embassy Archives, Rome have been removed to the National Archives, Washington.

⁴William B. Kinney to Commodore Silas H. Stringham, Turin, September 25, 1852, in American Embassy Archives, Rome.

the wharf in the hope that the relocation project would be indefinitely postponed because of budgetary opposition to the bill in Parliament.

In 1853, in the belief that he now had the support of Parliament, Cavour presented a new bill in which he proposed the formation of a national company for the construction of the naval base and customs-free warehouse at Spezia. However, the outbreak of the Crimean War, in which Piedmont participated, once again forced the government to postpone the project.

But Cavour was not to be denied, and on February 28, 1857, after carefully laying the groundwork in the public press, he reintroduced the relocation bill in Parliament, and this time it was passed. So sure was the government of the passage of the bill that more than a month prior to its introduction, on January 2, the Piedmontese Minister of Foreign Affairs notified John M. Daniel, the new American minister at Turin, that the government was about to move its navy to the Gulf of Spezia and would therefore need the buildings then occupied by the United States naval depot. Daniel immediately sent a dispatch to Secretary of State William L. Marcy, and also initiated new discussions with Cavour which resulted in the Sardinian Government offering Panigaglia Bay, in the Gulf of Spezia, for the use of the American squadron.⁵

Unfortunately for Cavour's project, the outbreak of war with Austria in 1859 again interfered with the transfer of the Italian naval base. Work on the base was resumed after the war, under the direction of Domenico Chiodo, a nephew of Agostino Chiodo who had started the project years before. However, the new base was not built at Varignano, as originally planned, but in the area between Spezia and Marola.

After Garibaldi's successful campaign in the Two Sicilies, and the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in March 1861, the ships that formerly belonged to the Bourbon Government were added to the navy of Sardinia. The increased number of ships caused the government to feel keenly the need for a base at Spezia. In this favorable atmosphere, Cavour once again pressed for funds for the completion of the naval base, but he did not live to see the day the Chamber finally approved his bill, July 28, 1861.

Meanwhile, the United States naval depot remained at Spezia. Now,

⁵John M. Daniel to William Marcy, January 9, 1857; The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Piedmont to John M. Daniel, January 2, 1857; Daniel to Marcy, Turin, March 1, 1857; American Embassy Archives, Rome.

however, that the completion of the Italian naval port became a certainty, the time had come for the evacuation from the site of American naval installations. Accordingly, the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marquis Emilio Visconti-Venosta, informed the American minister, George Perkins Marsh, that no further delay could be granted. Nevertheless, the Italian Government offered alternative anchorages in the southern waters of the island of Sardinia, at either Anchorage St. Peter, or that of St. Antiochus.⁶

Marsh informed the American Consul at Spezia, William T. Rice, and Captain Stellwagen of the United States Navy, of the proposal of the Italian Government, and suggested that the American naval officers inspect the locations offered. On July 18, 1864, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles instructed Colonel William L. Long, United States Naval Storekeeper at Spezia, to remove the stores belonging to the Navy Department from the premises, and transport them to the Anchorages St. Peter or St. Antiochus, provided good storage could be obtained at either place. If that course proved not feasible the colonel was authorized to charter a vessel and keep the stores on board until other arrangements were made. Colonel Long inspected the two Sardinian anchorages, but decided that they were not suited for the purposes of a naval depot. In a letter to Marsh, the colonel stated that Cagliari had excellent magazines and a splendid bay, and requested the American minister to make representations to the Italian Government with a view to permitting the use of Cagliari.⁷

Lacking instructions from the Department of State, Marsh communicated with Secretary of State Seward, informing him that Cagliari was reported to be inadequately supplied with water, although Pula, twenty miles down the coast from Cagliari, and frequented by the British Mediterranean fleet, was reputed to be a very healthy station with an abundance of excellent water. He further suggested to the Secretary that a naval officer should visit Pula before contracts were made for magazines at Cagliari.⁸

In a note to Minister La Marmora Marsh declared

The Storekeeper in charge of the naval stores of the United States at Spezia having been instructed by the Secretary of the Navy to visit the roads of San Pietro and San

⁶Marquis Visconti-Venosta to George Perkins Marsh, Turin, June 1, 1864, in American Embassy Archives, Rome.

⁷Long to Marsh, Spezia, September 10, 1864, in American Embassy Archives, Rome.

⁸Marsh to Secretary of State Seward, Turin, September 20, 1864, in American Embassy Archives, Rome.

t'Antioeo . . . informs me that he finds them not suited for the purpose. . . . There are at neither of these points . . . existing magazines or houses that can be rented. They are unable to furnish the ordinary supply of bread, meats, fruits and vegetables which are required for the crews of men of war, and . . . are not in any respect well fitted for occupation as naval depots. Upon inquiry at Cagliari the storekeeper found that magazines and a residence for the keeper could be hired in a position which would not interfere with the convenience of the commerce of that bay . . . and he asks permission to remove the naval stores of the United States from the Bay of Spezia to that of Cagliari and to deposit them there in magazines until this government or that of the United States shall otherwise direct. The magazines long used by the United States at Panigaglia in the Bay of Spezia have been surrendered to the Italian Government, and the stores embarked on . . . a vessel chartered . . . at a very high rate . . . and now lying at anchor in the Bay of Spezia. The United States have at present no vessel of war in the Mediterranean, and it would be a matter of much convenience if the stores could be landed at Cagliari before ships are sent out.⁹

La Marmora, on behalf of his government, acceded to the request for the use of the port of Cagliari, but stipulated five provisos, (1) the Italian Government reserved the right to revoke the leases at any time, granting a four months' notice; (2) the stores must be evacuated immediately should war occur between the United States and a European power; (3) the United States was never to claim indemnity for any losses sustained as a result of the evacuation of stores at Cagliari; (4) the warships of the United States were to comply with the measures of neutrality of the ports of the Kingdom of Italy as stipulated in the Royal Decree of August 6, 1864; (5) the measures in the Royal Decree of August 6, 1864, relating to warships of belligerent nations were to be applied to the warships of the United States, in the event of war between the United States and other powers, or as soon as warships of the Southern Confederacy appeared in the Mediterranean.¹⁰

But in the meantime, Marsh had received instructions from the State Department that the Navy Department felt it inexpedient to take immediate steps to establish a new depot in the Mediterranean, and he therefore informed La Marmora that consideration of the Cagliari matter would have to be postponed.¹¹

When the news of the deferment of the negotiations reached Cagliari, the citizens of that port were thrown into a ferment. Certain landlords of the port were accused by indignant citizens of causing the abandonment of the project of using the port as a naval depot because they wanted exorbitant rents for their warehouses. On December 20,

⁹George P. Marsh to A. La Marmora, Turin, September 26, 1864, American Embassy Archives, Rome.

¹⁰A. La Marmora to Marsh, Turin, November 1, 1864, American Embassy Archives, Rome.

¹¹Marsh to La Marmora, Turin, November 3, 1864, American Embassy Archives, Rome.

1864, the City Council of Cagliari passed a resolution expressing its willingness to afford every facility required by the American Government for the establishment of the naval depot at that city.¹²

But the good citizens of Cagliari had wholly misinterpreted the situation and had jumped to the wrong conclusions with reference to the true reasons for the non-employment of their port. When the circumstances attending the formulation of the resolution came to the notice of Colonel T. Bigelow Lawrence, the American Consul General at Florence, he immediately wrote Eugene Pernis, the American Consular Agent at Cagliari, explaining the reasons for the decision. The United States, the colonel stated, did not then have any men-of-war in Italian waters, and they were not likely to keep a squadron there as long as the American Civil War continued. Moreover, the naval stores which were then on board a chartered vessel in Spezia harbor were to be transported back to the United States.¹³

While the United States storeship was still at Spezia, Admiral David G. Farragut arrived at that port in the frigate *Franklin*, on February 4, 1868. The Admiral visited Florence, Venice, and Genoa, and at Florence he dined with King Victor Emanuel, and he was also lavishly entertained by Italian and foreign officials. An unfounded rumor connected the Admiral's name with certain machinations of General Garibaldi encompassing the establishment of a republican government in Italy. General Menabrea, the Prime Minister, felt constrained to appeal to American Minister Marsh for confidential information as to the credibility of the reports. Marsh immediately repudiated all such reports as mere fabrications, but even so the Italian Minister in Washington, Cerruti, was ordered to sound out Secretary of State Seward on the question. The incident was closed by Cerruti's reply to General Ménabrea that Seward had assured him that Admiral Farragut never gave the slightest encouragement to parties opposed to the existing Italian Government.¹⁴

Admiral Farragut was very favorably impressed with the works at the Spezia naval base, writing Secretary of the Navy Wells that

. . . After the usual interchange of international courtesies, I visited . . . the navy yard, which is extensively laid out and bids fair to be one of the largest in Europe.

¹²William T. Rice to Colonel T. Bigelow Lawrence, Spezia, November 5, 1864, in American Consulate Archives, Florence. See also Eugene Pernis to Colonel Lawrence, Cagliari, December 19 and 22, 1864, in American Consulate Archives, Florence.

¹³Colonel Lawrence to Pernis, December 27, 1864, in American Consulate Archives, Florence.

¹⁴Marsh to Seward (letter No. 205), Florence, February 17, 1868, and (letter No. 214), Florence, June 24, 1868, in American Embassy Archives, Rome.

There are ten dry docks on the plan, two of which will be finished by July next. Nearly the whole bay is occupied by building slips, machine shops, storehouses, etc. . . The navy yard at Genoa is small and cramped. As it is intended to make Spezia the great naval depot of Italy, most of the machinery now at Genoa will be transferred to Spezia, and Genoa will simply be reserved for temporary repairs to vessels.¹⁵

On August 28, 1869, the waters of the Tyrrhenian Sea flowed into the dockyards of the base at Spezia. But American hopes to utilize these waters would not die down. United States Consul Rice reported to Minister Marsh that conversations with Italian naval officers led him to believe that an application from the United States Government for permission to establish another naval depot in the Gulf of Spezia, at a point other than that formerly occupied, would be favorably considered.

In communicating this information to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, Marsh pointed out that he had not spoken of the matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but that some of the former American Ministers seemed inclined to favor the return of the American squadron to a post where its frequent presence was attended with much advantage.¹⁶ Once again Marsh returned to the attack and addressed a communication to the Italian Foreign Minister Menabrea, requesting permission to establish a depot at the Lazzaretto at Vignano on the Gulf. Minister of Marine Admiral Riboty in his reply of November 9, 1869, reiterated the objections to that location, and offered depot privileges at either Cagliari or Syracuse.¹⁷

Count Luigi Colobiano, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, continued discussion of the subject with Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, which resulted in Secretary Fish's instructions to Admiral Radford, through the Secretary of the Navy, to come to an agreement with the Royal Italian Government. These final efforts of the singularly long-drawn-out negotiations did not meet with success, chiefly because in April 1870, the Italian Government, at long last, transferred its naval base from Genoa to Spezia.¹⁸

¹⁵*Report of the Secretary of the Navy, (1868)*, pp. x, 10-11.

¹⁶Marsh to Fish (letter No. 258), Florence, August 12, 1869, in American Embassy Archives, Rome.

¹⁷Foreign Minister Menabrea to Count Luigi Colobiano, Florence, November 20, 1869, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Rome.

¹⁸Colobiano to Menabrea, Washington, January 11, 1870, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Rome. See also "Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States," transmitted to Congress with the annual message of the President, December 2, 1872 (Washington, 1873), p. 314.

UNITED STATES NAVAL DETACHMENT IN TURKISH WATERS, 1919-24¹

BY HENRY P. BEERS

Turkey entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers in the fall of 1914, and was the last nation to make peace with the Allies. The defeat of the Turks by the British in Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, and Syria and the surrender of Bulgaria on the western border of Turkey forced her to sign an armistice on board the British battleship *Agamemnon* at the island of Mudros on October 30, 1918. As soon as the mine fields were cleared away, Allied forces occupied the forts on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and on November 10 the first British destroyer reached Constantinople. Three days later a large squadron of British, French, Italian, and Greek warships anchored off that place. Thus the Allies came into possession of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, a highway which had been a source of international rivalry and warfare for centuries.

The United States had no part in the defeat and occupation of Turkey, which was largely a British show, a fact which resulted in the British assuming the upper hand in the Allied occupation of Constantinople. Upon the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany in April 1917, Turkey under German pressure severed diplomatic relations with the United States, but war was not declared between the two countries. The considerable investment of Americans in missionary, education, philanthropic, and commercial enterprises in Turkey apparently influenced the decision of the United States Government in this connection. The U. S. S. *Scorpion*, a converted yacht purchased for use during the Spanish War in 1898 which had been the American stationnaire at Constantinople for a number of years, was interned in 1917. On November 9, 1918 the *Scorpion* was permitted to raise its flag and began to receive military equipment which had been removed by the Turks. A relief crew arrived on board the U. S. S. *Nahma* on December 16, and two days later Commander Elmer W. Tod relieved Lieutenant Herbert S. Babbitt in command of the *Scorpion*.

The question of a United States representative at Constantinople was

¹This study was undertaken in the Office of Records Administration, Navy Department; permission to publish this report has been granted by the Navy Department.

taken up in Washington after the armistice. It was decided not to re-establish diplomatic relations with Turkey immediately, so early in December Lewis Heck, the former Secretary of the American Embassy at Constantinople, was ordered to return there as United States Commissioner. The Swedish Legation was to continue to handle our diplomatic affairs. In practice Commissioner Heck carried on much business by word of mouth, formal written communications being handled by the Swedish Legation. Agreeing to the desires of the State Department, the Secretary of the Navy directed Admiral William S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, then in London, to detail an officer of rank from personnel abroad to duty in Constantinople, where a station ship was to be maintained. The naval officer selected for the post at Constantinople was Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, a veteran of thirty-six years' service in the Navy. During the war he had served on convoy duty in command of the U. S. S. *North Carolina* until placed in command of Naval Base 27 at Plymouth, England on October 24, 1918. He later had additional duty as United States representative on the Allied Commission in Belgium to enforce naval terms of the armistice with Germany. Pursuant to orders of December 30, 1918, he proceeded to London and received instructions from Admiral William S. Sims, Force Commander of the United States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. In Paris a few days later he conferred with the American officials assembled there for the peace conference, including Admiral Benson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Herbert Hoover of the Food Administration, Edward N. Hurley of the United States Shipping Board, and President Wilson. He was told to represent the United States Government in looking after American interests and to do what was right. On January 8, 1919 he was assigned to duty as Senior United States Naval Officer, Turkey, in command of the waters east of longitude 21°, which included all of Greece, except Corfu, and the region to the east. From Paris he travelled via Rome to Taranto where he boarded the U. S. S. *Schley* on January 24 for the voyage to Constantinople.

The United States Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters came into existence on January 28 when Admiral Bristol raised his flag on the *Scorpion*. During the first few days visits of ceremony were exchanged with the High Commissioners of Great Britain and France and the commanding naval officers of those countries and Italy and Greece. Admiral Bristol got the impression from British Vice Admiral A. S.

Gough-Calthorpe that he considered himself in the position of chief authority in the occupying forces. Relations with the Allied officials and with those of Turkey were thereafter handled by Admiral Bristol as Senior Representative of the United States. Commissioner Heck, handled ordinary diplomatic and consular matters, until his departure for the United States in April 1919 when he was succeeded as Acting Commissioner by Gabriel Bie Ravndal who had recently resumed the post of Consul General which he held before the breaking of diplomatic relations with Turkey. Admiral Bristol concerned himself with matters pertaining to the armistice, military and naval affairs, relations between the United States and Turkey, and with the representatives of all other countries.

The accommodations on board the *Scorpion* being quite inadequate for business and entertainment purposes, it was necessary to establish headquarters on shore. On his own authority Admiral Bristol moved into the American Embassy, where the United States Commissioner and Howard Heinz, the representative of the Food Administration, were already located. As communication by cable was limited and expensive, a radio station was set up in the Embassy by means of which continuous and confidential communication was had with the naval vessels operating in the command and with Washington. The naval communication office served all American activities in the area, including relief organizations and business concerns. A newspaper containing intelligence received by radio was distributed in mimeographed form among American organizations and became so much in demand even among foreigners that the edition had to be enlarged.

As Senior United States Representative in Turkey, Admiral Bristol was the head of all the American agents in Constantinople and performed duties which were diplomatic in character. Agreeable working relations were established with Commissioner Heck and Howard Heinz, Admiral Bristol being constantly consulted in regard to their problems. Documents relating to American policy in the Near East were referred to him for his opinion. For a time, until the appointment of a director, Admiral Bristol represented the United States Shipping Board in connection with operations of its ships in the district, and afterwards he took up matters for it with the Allied authorities. To successfully combat the competition of the European nations, who had the advantage of being on the Allied High Commission, it was realized that a smoothly running machine was necessary.

The foremost task handled by the American officials in Constantinople in 1919-20 was the administration of American relief. This had to be undertaken immediately, for naval cargo ships began arriving in February 1919. The American Committee for Relief in the Near East, more commonly known as the Near East Relief, originally organized in 1915 to alleviate the sufferings of the oppressed Armenians and Syrians, began pouring in supplies purchased from contributions taken up in the United States. Its managing director, Major Davis G. Arnold, was located at Constantinople. An appropriation of \$100,000,000 was made by an act of Congress approved February 24, 1919 for the relief of the non-enemy countries of Europe but not excluding the Armenians, Syrians, Greeks, and other Christian and Jewish population of Asia Minor. The Constantinople office of the American Relief Administration under Heinz controlled activities of the ARA in Turkey, Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Caucasus. Hundreds of agents of these organizations began working throughout the Near East and South Russia. The American Red Cross, a branch of which had been established in Turkey in 1911, opened a headquarters for south-eastern Europe in Constantinople in January 1920 and engaged in relief activities among Russian refugees in Constantinople, Greece, Bulgaria, and South Russia. Large numbers of American missionaries who returned to the region after the war worked with these agencies, besides carrying on their missions and schools.

Admiral Bristol made all necessary arrangements with the Allied authorities. He designated naval officers to serve as port officers at Smyrna, Constantinople, Derindje, and Constanza, Roumania, to handle relief cargoes. As far as it was available, transportation was furnished to employees of the agencies to ports visited by naval vessels. The ships also carried mail for all American interests and supplied radio communication. Five million dollars in gold received from the government of Bulgaria for American flour supplied by the Grain Corporation was deposited on board destroyers at Constantinople and in the fall of 1919 transported on board the U. S. S. *Laub* to New York.

The same assistance was given to American business concerns operating in the Near East. The most active of these was apparently the Standard Oil Company of New York, which had an office in Constantinople and branches in Turkey and the Balkan States. Numerous other companies established offices after the reopening of the region to commercial activity. A naval officer represented the United States on the

Associated Governments' Advisory Trade Committee, seeking to promote fair competitive practices among businessmen. Gold used to pay for products exported to the United States, particularly tobacco, was transported in naval vessels, the commanders of which under the laws and regulations were entitled to collect a small commission for this service. Transportation was furnished to the employees of commercial companies at the small charge of \$1 a day.

During the first part of 1919 the naval detachment comprised three converted yachts, the *Scorpion*, the *Noma*, and the *Nahma*, and subchasers 82, 128, 129, and 215. The subchasers were active in the beginning in Grecian waters on connection with relief operations particularly at Piraeus, the port of Athens. After the arrival of four destroyers in May the operations of the detachment were more extensive. Their arrival was soon followed by the detachment of the *Noma* and the *Nahma* and some of the subchasers.

In dealing with the representatives of the Allies in Constantinople Admiral Bristol soon found that he was placed at a disadvantage because his position as Senior United States Representative was not as exalted as that of High Commissioner which was held by them. Through persistence he succeeded in largely overcoming this hindrance, but in July he finally communicated the difficulty to Admiral Benson and Admiral Harry S. Knapp, who had succeeded Admiral Sims as Force Commander, United States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, expressing the opinion that if the State Department had done the right thing by him he could have accomplished more. Both of these officers agreed that his position ought to be clarified. It also became apparent in Washington that friction had developed between Admiral Bristol and Commissioner Ravndal because of their ill-defined relations. Admiral Benson effected an arrangement with the State Department and on August 12, 1919 Admiral Bristol was named High Commissioner. In communicating this action to the Admiral, Secretary of State Lansing stated that Commissioner Ravndal and other consular representatives of the United States would be directed to report to him and place themselves under his direction. As High Commissioner, Bristol was responsible to the State Department and was to receive instructions from it which were to be communicated through the Navy Department in order to keep it properly advised.

Although he had been performing the duties, the official bestowal upon Admiral Bristol of the rank of High Commissioner enabled him

to function more effectively. The appointment concentrated in the Admiral full responsibility for safeguarding all American interests. Since he had control of the warships of the United States in those waters, his knowledge of political conditions enabled him to employ them to the best advantage and to have them in the right place at the right time. Through the American consuls at Smyrna, Bagdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, and Samsun, who were designated by the State Department as the delegates of the High Commissioner, and through other Americans — official and unofficial — stationed or travelling in the region, Admiral Bristol was able to keep well informed of occurrences in the interior. Americans passing through Constantinople were always welcomed at the Embassy where the Admiral made himself accessible although it increased the problems on his hands. Subsequently a delegate was also stationed at Angora (Ankara) which became the new capital of Turkey under the Nationalists.

After his appointment as High Commissioner, Admiral Bristol maintained both a diplomatic and a naval staff in the American Embassy. To the former were attached several secretaries, a commercial attaché, and a military attaché. A counsellor was later added to this staff. Separate files were kept for the two staffs, so that in case the Admiral should be relieved of his diplomatic post no difficulty would be experienced and the Embassy files could be left intact. In 1920 the consular section of the High Commission was removed from the Embassy, much to the relief of the remainder of the staff.

For more than five years following the conclusion of World War I, the United States naval detachment in Turkish waters saw plenty of action and Admiral Bristol played a leading part in these activities. On May 11, 1919, by virtue of an order by President Wilson, the United States battleship *Arizona*, Captain J. H. Dayton commanding, and the destroyers *Dyer*, *Gregory*, *Luce*, and *Manley* reached Smyrna, three days before forces from Allied warships took over the city from the Turkish authorities and handed it over to the Greeks. Admiral Bristol had reached there the day before on the return from a trip to Beirut in the *Nahma*. The captain and the admiral conferred, and on May 12, pursuant to orders from Admiral Knapp, Admiral Bristol steamed away for Constantinople accompanied by the *Luce*, the *Gregory*, and the *Stribling* which had been at Smyrna on special duty. At the time of the occupation of Smyrna, the *Arizona* landed a legation guard of twenty men which remained on shore until May 28. The

Arizona escorted by the *Barney* and the *Hazelwood* left Smyrna on June 9 for Constantinople, where it remained only a short time before returning to the United States. Admiral Bristol regarded the Greek occupation as impolitic and unnecessary and reported that American participation, limited though it was, had a damaging effect on our influence with the Turks. The harsh methods employed by the Greeks led to the appointment in August 1919 of an International Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna of which Admiral Bristol was United States member and president, but nothing was done after it reported.

A further problem in the Near Eastern situation was the question of Armenia, whose people had been oppressed by the Turks for many years. There was considerable sentiment in the United States for the establishment of an independent Armenia. Admiral Bristol returned from a trip to the Caucasus early in the summer of 1919 strongly convinced that the republics which had been set up there during the war should remain part of Turkey and that from the national point of view there was no such thing as Armenia. An American army officer, Colonel William N. Haskell, was appointed Allied High Commissioner to Armenia that summer. This was an entering wedge, believed the Admiral, for an American mandate over Armenia, which would get the United States involved politically in the situation in the Near East. The advance of the Bolsheviks forced the evacuation of the personnel of the High Commission and the Near East Relief from Armenia and the Caucasus in May 1920. This was effected by the U. S. S. *Pittsburgh*, flagship of Vice Admiral Knapp, then on a cruise in the Black Sea, and the destroyer *Cole*. Following an agreement with the Bolsheviks, the Turks in the fall of 1920 reoccupied Armenia.

On the northern shore of the Black Sea the struggle between the White Russians and the Bolsheviks went on until the end of 1920. After the defeat of the former under General Denikin at the end of 1919 and his flight to Constantinople, the command was taken over by General Wrangel. Apparently at the suggestion of Admiral Bristol, Rear Admiral Newton A. McCully, USN, and a party of officers and enlisted men of the U. S. Navy, including Lieutenant Commander H. W. Koehler, were sent into South Russia early in 1920 on a special mission for the State Department for the purpose of keeping the government informed of developments in that region. Transportation was furnished the mission by vessels of Bristol's detachment, and a de-

stroyer was stationed on the coast of South Russia to assist it. Mail and radio communication were continuously maintained with Admiral McCully. Lieutenant Commander Hamilton V. Bryan was detached by Admiral Bristol to serve as Admiral McCully's agent at Odessa; he was also to keep Admiral Bristol informed of happenings. When General Wrangel's defeat threatened in the Crimea in November 1920, the U. S. S. *Overton* was at Sevastopol. Upon receiving a message from Admiral McCully, Admiral Bristol sent the destroyers *John D. Edwards*, *Humphreys*, *Fox*, and *Whipple* from other places in the Black Sea to the Crimea for possible use in evacuation. These vessels and the *St. Louis* and the *Long*, which were sent upon receiving news of the continued advance of the Bolsheviks, took part with the American steamships *Faraby* and *Navahoe* in the evacuation of all Americans authorized by Admiral McCully. From Odessa, Sevastopol, and Novorossisk were evacuated, besides these Americans, the American consuls and their archives; representatives of the American Red Cross and the YMCA; relief workers; American citizens, and Russian refugees. Large numbers of Russian soldiers and civilian refugees, who could expect no mercy from the Bolsheviks, were moved out on Russian warships and merchant ships. Following the evacuation, the United States Navy under the immediate supervision of Lieutenant Commander Bryan assisted in caring for over 100,000 Russian refugees on board eighty Russian ships in the harbor at Constantinople. By the end of the year many of these people had been transported to the warmer climate of Bizerte, Tunis where the warships, which were part of the old imperial Russian Navy, were laid up for years.

From its base in Constantinople the vessels of the detachment were dispatched throughout the station to cope with the conditions which developed following the armistice and the occupation of Turkey. After June 1919, when the detachment had been increased to a strength which permitted the establishment of regular patrolling, destroyers were distributed on the coasts of Syria and Palestine (Mersina and Beirut), South Russia (Sevastopol), Caucasus (Batum), the north coast of Asia Minor (Samsun), while subchasers covered the Gulf of Ismid and the south coast of the Sea of Marmora (Mudania). Another destroyer was maintained at Constanza or Varna on the western coast of the Black Sea as a radio relay ship to communicate with Europe and the United States and with the vessels operating in the Black Sea. These vessels were relieved periodically by the different ships changing

stations, a practice which gave the men an opportunity to visit new places and thus kept up their morale. A reinforcement consisting of the destroyers *Dupont*, *Tattnall*, *Cole*, and *Biddle* reached Constantinople in August 1919. The vessels assigned to the detachment remained with it only a few months when they were ordered to some other station according to the system then followed by the Navy Department. In the summer of 1920 the naval force in the Near East was increased to a total of twelve destroyers. Present in October were the *Chattanooga*, *Scorpion*, nine destroyers, and two sub-chasers, while the *St. Louis* and three more destroyers were on the way to Constantinople. The *St. Louis* arrived on October 19 and served with the detachment for almost a year, nearly half of the period under the command of Captain William D. Leahy. Early in 1921 after the Bolsheviks had successfully liquidated the White Russians from South Russia, the Navy Department wanted to reduce the naval force in the Near East, but the State Department did not feel it was the psychological moment for a reduction since conditions there were still confused and the Supreme Council of the Allies was about to meet.

In the fall of 1921 vessels of the detachment resumed visits to Russian Black Sea ports when the American Relief Administration again went to the assistance of starving Russians. As in the period immediately following the war, the assistance of vessels of the detachment operating under Admiral Bristol was offered for transportation, mail, and communication purposes. Relief shipments began late in 1921, reached a peak in July 1922, and gradually declined thereafter. Throughout this period destroyers of the detachment made regular tours of the Black Sea, touching at Varna, Constanza, Odessa, Theodosia, Novorossisk, Batum, Trebizond, and Samsun. In the early part of the year the vessels engaged on this duty included the *Childs*, *Fox*, *Overton*, *Sturtevant*, and *Williamson*, and after July the *Bulmer*, *Goff*, *King*, *Lawrence*, *Litchfield*, *Parrott*, and *Simpson*.

The destroyers serving under Admiral Bristol were kept so occupied during much of 1922 in connection with Russian relief activities that visits could be made only at irregular intervals to Mediterranean ports. Through contacts at Mersina and Beirut and from other sources the Admiral kept informed of the progress of the Greco-Turkish war, which was in full force during that year. American warships were not visiting Greek ports any more since the United States had not recognized the return of King Constantine to the throne of Greece. De-

stroyer Division 39, comprising the *Bulmer*, *Edsall*, *Lawrence*, *Litchfield*, *McLeish*, *Parrott*, and *Simpson*, reached the station at the end of June permitting the return to the United States in July of the *Childs*, *Fox*, *McFarland*, *Overton*, *Reuben James*, *Sands*, *Sturtevant*, and *Williamson*.

Apprised of the likelihood of a serious situation developing at Smyrna towards which Greek soldiers and refugees were fleeing as a result of the Turkish offensive during the summer of 1922, Admiral Bristol ordered the *Litchfield* and the *Simpson* to that port early in September and shortly afterwards the *Lawrence* with relief workers, supplies, and his chief of staff, Captain Arthur J. Hepburn, on board. Through the Admiral's efforts a disaster relief committee was formed by American relief and benevolent institutions in Constantinople, and a representative with a medical unit was sent to Smyrna. American sailors were landed at Smyrna on September 6 to protect American lives and property. The Turkish army entered the city on the 9th, and through what Admiral Bristol regarded as insufficient policing allowed a disastrous fire to begin on September 13. Under the command of Captain Hepburn, Americans were evacuated to Athens by the naval forces. Captain Hepburn then undertook the evacuation of more than 250,000 Greek refugees, who had been herded onto the quay by American sailors during the course of the fire. Evacuation continued under the direction of American naval officers, senior of whom after September 16 was Commander Halsey Powell of the *Edsall*. In addition to the destroyers already mentioned, the *Edsall*, *Parrott*, and *McLeish* shared the task of evacuation, guarding American institutions and maintaining a shore patrol.

At the suggestion of the State Department Admiral Bristol attended the first session of the Lausanne conference from November 26, 1922 to February 4, 1923; his colleagues were Richard W. Child, Ambassador to Italy, and Joseph C. Grew, Minister to Switzerland. Although they were only "observers," they took a prominent part in the proceedings. During the Admiral's absence from Constantinople, Frederic R. Dolbeare, first secretary of the American Embassy at Berlin, acted as High Commissioner, while Captain Hepburn took command of the naval detachment. Vice Admiral Andrew T. Long, who had become commander of the United States Naval Forces, Europe in August, arrived at Constantinople on the *Pittsburgh* before Bristol's departure and remained stationed at that place until May 1923. All the destroy-

ers then under his command were serving in the Near East. Numerous foreign warships were also moored in the Bosphorus, for the situation was still tense. Admiral Long issued orders in December for the evacuation of Americans and American forces from Constantinople in case of an emergency. Together with Captain Hepburn he was consulted by Dolbeare concerning matters affecting American interests.

Throughout most of the negotiations at Lausanne the force of twenty American destroyers was maintained in Turkish waters, although, as the Chief of Naval Operations pointed out, the maintenance of so many there was a serious strain on the resources of the home fleet. Nevertheless, the discretion of the officer in command of the station and the opinion of the State Department was allowed to govern the size of the force as in previous years. Admiral Long reported the situation still delicate at the end of November 1922 and likely to become serious if a break should occur in the conference at Lausanne. The conference did break up at the beginning of February, and Admiral Bristol returned to Constantinople, but negotiations were resumed at Lausanne in April, the Admiral not returning. With the approval of the State Department six destroyers including the *Bainbridge*, *Hopkins*, *Kane*, *McFarland*, *Overton*, and *Sturtevant* were sent home in May, and another group of six comprising the *Barry*, *Fox*, *Gilmer*, *Goff*, *Hatfield*, and *King* departed in July. In the former month the *Pittsburgh* also left to visit other European ports. Remaining thereafter were eight destroyers, the *Scorpion*, the *Bridge*, and the *Denebola*. Since the Turco-American treaty was still being negotiated and since the Allies had not yet evacuated Constantinople, these vessels were maintained on the station for a while longer.

Constantinople was to be restored to Turkey, the Straits were to be demilitarized and opened to all nations, according to the Lausanne conventions. The evacuation of Constantinople began on August 4, 1923, the day following the receipt of the news of the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by the Turkish Grand National Assembly at Angora, and was completed without disturbance on October 2 upon the departure of General Harrington, the Allied commander-in-chief, and the last of the Allied troops. Before the completion of the Allied withdrawal, Dr. Adnan Bey, the representative in Constantinople of the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, indicated to Admiral Bristol that it was expected that the American naval vessels would be sent away. At the end of the Allied occupation only the *Scorpion*, *Denebola*, the

Litchfield, and *Lawrence* were at Constantinople, the other destroyers having been sent cruising in the Aegean in order to avoid any embarrassment their presence might have caused. On October 4, two days before the Turks were to enter the city, the last of the vessels were ordered away, the two destroyers being sent to report to the Commander, Naval Forces, Europe.

Thereafter, out of respect for the feelings of the Turks, our naval activities at Constantinople were greatly reduced. Following a conference between representatives of the Navy Department and the State Department, the United States Naval Detachment, Eastern Mediterranean, comprising six destroyers, a subchaser, and the *Scorpion*, was established on November 6. By the spring of 1924 political conditions in the Near East had quieted down, and on the recommendation of the detachment commander, the remaining destroyers, consisting of the *Bulmer*, *Edsall*, *McLeish*, *McCormick*, *Parrott*, and *Simpson*, were transferred to the Commander, Naval Forces, Europe on May 6.

For over three years longer Admiral Bristol remained at Constantinople as United States High Commissioner, performing diplomatic duties. Had the treaty with Turkey of 1923 been ratified, he would have been replaced by an ambassador. In 1925 the State Department was willing to part with his services, but President Coolidge requested him to continue, believing that his influence and experience would be helpful to American interests. Under instructions from the State Department Admiral Bristol arranged in February 1927 for the exchange of notes providing for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. At last he was relieved from his post at Constantinople in the following month and allowed to complete his naval career in an appropriate manner. The assignment which he had expected to endure for only a few months had been lengthened by conditions in the Near East to a period of over eight years. His successor in Turkey was Ambassador Joseph C. Grew.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

The first of a new series of meetings of the American Military Institute was held in the Conference Room of the National Archives on October 21, 1943. In attendance at this meeting, at which President Robert G. Albion presided, were representatives of the historical sections of the War and Navy Departments and civilians interested in the study of military history. Lieutenant Colonel John M. Kemper, Chief of the Historical Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, spoke informally on the work of his branch.

The G-2 Historical Branch is growing apace. There are now some 15 members on the staff, including the newly named Chief Historian, Dr. Walter Livingston Wright, formerly of Robert College, Constantinople; Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, the noted military writer; Major Charles H. Taylor of Harvard; and Major Jesse S. Douglas, former managing editor of MILITARY AFFAIRS.

Among officers presently serving as historians in the Navy Department are Lieutenant (j.g.) J. B. Goodman, Bureau of Aeronautics; Lieutenant C. L. Guthrie, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; Lieutenant (j.g.) J. W. Hurst, Bureau of Naval Personnel; Lieutenant Bernard Brodie, Bureau of Ordnance; R. G. Garrabrant, Bureau of Yards and Docks. Details of the historical activity in the Navy Department are to be found in Dr. Albion's short article on this subject in the present issue.

The Historical Section of the Chemical Warfare Service, commanded by Major Clarke Robinson, has transferred its activities to Baltimore where it is located at 200 West Baltimore Street.

The Subcommittee on Historical Records, Division of Medical Sciences, National Research Council, held its tenth meeting on September 11, 1943. Brigadier General Albert G. Love, Chief of the Historical Division, Office of the Surgeon General, attended the meeting, and gave an account of the formal monthly and annual reports received from the Chief Medical Officers of all theatres of operation,

as well as special reports received from consultants. To foster dissemination of information the *Army Medical Bulletin* has been reorganized on a monthly basis, with the first new number appearing in October 1943. The Air Surgeon's Office will also establish a new journal to be known as *The Flight Surgeon's Bulletin*. Captain W. W. Hall stated that *The Naval Medical Bulletin* is also being changed from a quarterly to a bi-monthly basis.

The historical work in the Transportation Corps is in charge of C. C. Wardlow, with the professional collaboration of Dr. Harold E. Larson, the Senior Historian. Unlike most historical sections this one is in the Executive Office of the Chief of Transportation and not in the Control Division. The staff consists of half a dozen persons of whom three are of professional status. The two main threads of the Transportation Corps are water transport and rail transport, and the historical activity is divided accordingly.

Among the Contributors

Hyman Roudman, associate editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, has appeared frequently in previous issues of the journal.

Dr. Howard R. Marraro is Assistant Professor of Italian in the Department of Romance Languages, Columbia University.

Dr. Henry P. Beers is a member of the staff of the Division of Navy Department Archives, National Archives, now on detail to the Office of Records Administration, Navy Department.

Dr. Robert G. Albion, President of the American Military Institute, is author of numerous books on United States naval history.

Miss Bess Glenn, a member of the American Military Institute of long standing, is on the staff of the Division of Navy Department Archives, National Archives.

Among the reviewers of books in the current issue, Lieutenant Bernard Brodie is serving as historian of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department; Captain Harry C. Baldridge is Curator of the Museum at the United States Naval Academy; Dr. A. C. Davidonis is a member of the Department of History, Princeton University; Barnet Nover is military analyst of the *Washington Post*; Colonel Edward Kimmel is lecturer on military history at the University of Washington; Theodore D. Wagman is on the staff of the Division of War Department Archives, National Archives; Dr. Richard S. West, Jr. is Associate Professor of History at the United States Naval Academy.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

America's Navy in World War II, by Gilbert Cant. (New York: The John Day Company. 1943. Pp. 432. \$3.75.)

This is without question the best general account which has appeared thus far of the operations (to the end of 1942) of the United States Navy in World War II, and as such deserves to be read by everyone. In view especially of the limitations on access to source material under which he labored—certain official combat narratives which would have been of great help to him and which would have saved him several minor errors were obviously withheld by the Navy—Mr. Cant has done a remarkably thorough and competent job. Though less polished and certainly less detached than the same author's excellent *War at Sea*, published last year, the present volume presents a well-told narrative hung together with what is on the whole a balanced and appropriately tentative evaluation of the major strategic and tactical issues involved.

Unfortunately the author gets off to a bad start with a long and not too reasonable excoriation of the Navy's censorship policy. The late Alexander Woolcott once observed that if he had to take sides in a debate on whether a certain notorious American newspaper publisher was a good and altruistic man, he would choose the affirmative—the other side was just too easy. Mr. Cant has chosen the easy side and has pushed it much too hard. In doing so he seems to betray what is simply indignation at his own personal frustrations. The Navy's security policy is sometimes funny, but it rarely warrants such accents of grave foreboding as the author bestows upon it. Naturally, one cannot expect a journalist whose job is to get the story to accept such a view, but Mr. Cant would have done better to confine his protests to a preface and to have made them short.

Once he gets into his narrative, however, Mr. Cant's real abilities become manifest. Even those Americans who have most avidly followed the fortunes of our Navy at war will learn of many significant

incidents which they did not read of in the press accounts and will be assisted by this volume in achieving an ordered perception of the trend of events. Mr. Cant writes well, in a manner that is neither pedestrian nor burdened with rhetorical flourish, and as a reporter he has integrity and courage. He is unafraid to offend not only wearers of gold braid, but—what is much rarer among authors—important prospective reviewers as well.

The author does, to be sure, sometimes betray his lack of grounding in naval history or in modern tactics and materiel. For example, in one place he speaks of a turn by individual ships as "a maneuver so rare that the single well-known instance of its employment, at Jutland by the German fleet, has become a classic in naval tactics." He undoubtedly got the idea from reading Winston Churchill's account of the Battle of Jutland, but in reality the maneuver, especially when confined to a 90 degree turn, which is what is described in this instance, is an utter commonplace. It is simply one of those many maneuvers which is awkward and difficult for a large fleet to perform but easy for a small one. He also repeats the story, which apparently originated with Mr. William L. White, about a torpedoman saving his torpedo boat from terrible destruction by stuffing toilet paper in the propeller blades of a torpedo running hot in its tube, "thus disarming it." Assuming that the blades could be stopped by such an insubstantial fabric (even of the Navy issue variety) and that it could be done without the man losing his hands in the process, which with 300 horsepower and 1,000 r.p.m. is rather doubtful, the fact is that the arming of the exploder mechanism of a warhead has nothing whatever to do with the revolutions of the propellers—and it would be a poorly trained torpedoman who was ignorant of that fact.

More significantly, in discussing the Battle of the Coral Sea the author states that it is "axiomatic that the commander of a superior force did not risk his ships in a night action," and offers as one of the two reasons why Admiral Fletcher did not throw in his heavy cruisers upon discovering the Japanese task force only thirty miles away the fact that he presumed himself to be superior! Though Mr. Cant does not mean to be critical, he is here hurling the gravest charge which Admiral Fletcher's action has yet received, for what he deems "axiomatic" is far indeed from being so. In the other reason offered he states by implication that the U. S. Navy before the war did not, as the Japanese Navy did, undergo "intensive training in high-speed

night actions." The fact is that our Navy has long emphasized training in night actions, and has during this war established a definite edge over the Japanese in night warfare. Admiral Fletcher's decision is likely to be the subject of considerable debate after the war, and this incident, along with the apparent use of a ship like the *South Dakota* as little more than an antiaircraft escort vessel (which Mr. Cant considers significantly indicative of modern usage rather than of misuse) bear heavily on the whole issue of proper coordination of air and surface firepower.

These errors, and others like them, are relatively minor matters, and until professional naval officers begin writing better books than this one they are no reflection upon the author. More serious, however, is his overlooking almost entirely the outstanding tactical revolution of the period which he covers—the tremendous augmentation of the antiaircraft power of our vessels. The importance of that revolution must be read in the light of the events between December 7, 1941, and the Battle of Midway as contrasted with events since that battle. Mr. Cant does note the performance of Captain Gatch's battleship at Santa Cruz (since officially revealed to be the *South Dakota*), and speaks of it as signifying the advent of "the new battleship"; but the revolution in fact completely transcends any one category of ship. In that same battle our two carriers practically equalled the performance of the *South Dakota*, and the three ships between them officially claimed eighty-one planes *certainly destroyed* by their gunfire. Even if that claim be reduced by half, the result is significant. As concerns other than naval vessels, this reviewer knows of one transport which has already shot down twenty-two planes, and has heard nothing to indicate that it is a record for the type. Only a few months after our convoys to Murmansk were taking a terrific beating from the Luftwaffe, the tables were turned—largely if not mainly by increased antiaircraft power—and merchant ships were shooting down as many as seven and eight German planes each in a single voyage. And similar demonstrations were taking place in all the theaters of the war.

Mr. Cant speaks several times of defense by antiaircraft fire being inadequate by itself, which is of course true under certain circumstances and likely to remain so, but the same can be said of defense by fighter planes alone. And neglect to say so leaves a wholly erroneous impression. The fact that our ships at Santa Cruz *were* heavily attacked, and a hundred other instances, prove conclusively that interception by

fighter planes cannot be exclusively relied upon to beat off large-scale attacks. This reviewer knows of one instance in which a group of twelve or more enemy bombers that penetrated our fighter interception were completely slaughtered by the transports they were striving to attack. Not an enemy plane got away and not a transport took a hit. What a changed situation is this from the days when our merchant ships were being knocked to pieces with impunity by enemy aircraft! And for what other reason would our enemies be resorting to such substitute expedients as glider-bombs and the like? Moreover, the fact that our antiaircraft defense is so good means, among other things, that much greater proportions of our naval planes can be used offensively than would otherwise be the case.

These criticisms must not, however, be permitted to obscure the fact that in comparison with the mass of naval literature which is being poured onto the market for the sake of bigger and better royalties this book deserves an eager welcome; and the nation is indebted to Mr. Cant for his labors in providing it. Let us hope that he continues his efforts and offers us at the appropriate time a comparable volume covering the second year of our participation in the war.

BERNARD BRODIE,¹

Lieutenant, USNR

Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Navy Department, by Richard S. West, Jr.
(Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1943.
Pp. 379. \$3.50.)

The crusty old gentleman from Connecticut whom Lincoln called upon to become his Secretary of the Navy was brought up in the hard way of New England emerging as a newspaperman and schooled in the ways of politics but always honest and a fighter for his convictions. It would appear that this sort of training well equips men for this difficult job in time of war which our country always enters unprepared. What a fine job Welles did is told in a most interesting way by the author who is fully equipped to tell it, his previous biography having been that of the *Second Admiral* (David D. Porter).

Welles upon entering office found everything in confusion worse confounded and the other departments of the government were no better off. It was a continual struggle until after the *Monitor-Merrimac*

¹The opinions expressed in this review are those solely of the author, and are not to be construed as reflecting the official attitude of the Navy Department.

action a year later that he finally convinced Seward and Stanton that the Navy Department was not an adjunct of their respective Departments for not only were these Secretaries giving orders to Army officers but to Naval officers as well.

The previous training of Welles equipped him to be a keen judge of men. His selection of Farragut is a case in point for he based his selection not on personal knowledge but upon what he could find out about the man. His selection of Porter for the job on the lower Mississippi and later to cooperate with Grant in the Vicksburg campaign was based upon Porter's performance and Welles' personal knowledge of him; that he selected Porter shows that Welles was not prejudiced for he had had early in the war every reason to mistrust the impetuous Lieutenant Porter who secretly connived with Seward to obtain orders from Lincoln unbeknown to the Secretary of the Navy.

Welles was impervious to criticisms on the conduct of the war (and the usual "investigations"), both from the press and from Congress. He finally got the Department on a business base and was not averse to cutting red tape.

This study of Welles illustrates that in our country, under our form of government, the importance a civilian Secretary of the Navy plays as an administrator; Secretary Baker of the War Department in World War I was another example, and perhaps history will point to another newspaperman versed in politics and honest.

HARRY A. BALDRIDGE,
Captain, USN, Retired

A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy, by Bernard Brodie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2nd edition, 1943. Pp. 306. \$2.50.)

When the first edition of Mr. Brodie's book appeared in August, 1942 it quickly established itself as one of the clearest expositions of the nature, function and use of naval power and its instruments that have appeared during recent years. The present edition, incorporating revisions made for the second and third printings is, therefore, very much to be welcomed. For while the principles enunciated by Mr. Brodie are just as sound today as when they were written the progress of the war has provided illustrative developments which increase the book's timeliness.

Mr. Brodie combines sound scholarship with an admirable gift of clarity which is all important in making naval strategy understandable

to the layman. And the layman is particularly in need of just such a guide because, as a result of the vehement clamor of the air power extremists, the role of sea power in war, including the present war, has been misunderstood. Not so many say, as they did after Pearl Harbor and particularly after the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, that the warship is no longer a match for the airplane and should, therefore, be abandoned. But there are still many who regard fleets as vestigial survivors of an era that is dead but still unburied. How wrong that notion is Mr. Brodie brilliantly demonstrates. He is particularly cogent in describing the evolution of sea power under the impact of industrial development. Without in the least disparaging the airplane, which he calls "an instrument of almost miraculous accomplishments," he shows how air power has modified but has not destroyed the fundamental significance of sea power. His chapters on the various types of warships, on command of the sea, on the tactics of fleet action, and on the men behind the guns provide a mine of authentic and immensely useful information to the harassed laymen seeking to understand the complexities of global war.

BARNET NOVER,
Washington Post

Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations, by Lord Roger T. B. Keyes. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 101. \$1.50.)

Many may dispute Lord Keyes' contention that the English "are slow to learn and quick to forget," but it was with this consideration in mind that the author delivered the Lee Knowles Lectures, and subsequently published them in the book under review. Aimed at the forgetful "younger generation," the book examines a few outstanding combined operations, and points out not only the reasons for success or failure, but also the permanent lessons to be drawn from each action. The thesis is not startling, namely, that all British arms and services must cooperate constantly to secure command of the seas "which always has been, and always will be, the foundation of all British operations, before victory can be achieved." (p. 91.)

In five chapters interlarded with rapid-fire sniping, the author briefly but thoroughly analyzes the capture of Quebec in 1759, allied activity in China during the Boxer Rebellion, the ghastly Dardanelles campaign of 1915, the naval attack on Zeebrugge in 1918, and finally, Commando organization and exploits during the present war. Begin-

ning with the China operations of 1900, Lord Keyes participated, in positions of increasing importance, in each action listed above. Consequently, his observations and criticisms, based on personal knowledge and tempered by hindsight, contain valuable material for the general reader and specialist alike.

Well presented as are the first few chapters, the focal point of interest not unnaturally gravitates towards the fifth, for here the author discusses the principles upon which he organized and trained the Commandos during his fifteen months as Director of Combined Operations. As Commando chief, Lord Keyes was permitted to execute only one sizeable raid in Home Waters, a successful sortie against the Lofoten Islands in March 1941. The Chiefs of Staff Committee severely restricted Commando activities, and the author understandably levels the finger of uncompromising criticism at the pusillanimous "brass hats." Among other things he discloses that a considerable Commando force was prepared to embark for the Mediterranean theater in November 1940, but, vetoed by the Chiefs of Staff, these units reached Egypt months later, in time only to assist in the evacuation of Greece and Crete.

The book contains choice nuggets of information and opinion on such diverse subjects as the "ill-conceived" Dieppe raid, and the shortcomings of a separate air force. Written crisply and concisely it is well worth reading, as much for the sake of enjoyment as for its authoritative comment and pertinent revelations.

A. C. DAVIDONIS

Princeton University

School of the Citizen Sailor, by Louis H. Bolander, William G. Fletcher, and Ralph H. Gabriel. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1943. Pp. 615. \$3.00.)

School of the Citizen Sailor is just what its name implies—a series of chapters designed to inform the citizen sailor and the navy-minded civilian of the history, traditions, organization, administration, and functions of the United States Navy and its auxiliary forces. Included in the survey are accounts of the German, Italian, and Japanese navies and descriptions of their ships, training, and relative strength. The book also explains propaganda with particular reference to that of the enemy.

The book was wisely conceived and well constructed. Total war

demands a complete and supreme expression of national principles. The book is thus arranged to explain our geography, commerce, history, and institutions as an organic background for the development of the Navy and its role in our national life. It also describes in chronological order the rise of aggression and its opposition, or lack of opposition, by what is now the United Nations.

For its purpose *School of the Citizen Sailor* is adequate and suitable in detail, judgment, and comprehensiveness, but for the student of military or naval history it lacks sufficient discrimination. The desire to write a simple and direct story has produced fallacies concomitant with over-simplification. The description of geopolitics is reminiscent of an explanation of the mercantile system in *The Age of Exploration*. Some evaluations are behind the times or obsolete. For example, it is stated that the basic cause of the Civil War was that "... people in the North had become convinced that the institution of human slavery denied the first principle of American democracy. . . ." Important implications are dismissed in short order.

Here is an extensive survey of our Navy for the layman, told in an interesting manner and with many references to our participation in the present war.

THEODORE D. WAGMAN

National Archives

Amateurs at War, The American Soldier in Action, edited by Ben Ames Williams. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 494. \$3.00.)

From the account of a typical fight between Colonists and Indians in 1725 to Ira Wolfert's "A Report from the Solomons," in the present war, the thirty-two stories in this volume present a fine running commentary on some American military traditions and especially regarding the kind of warfare waged by the citizen-soldier. The stories are factual and were originally written by first-hand eye witnesses. Most of them were accounts by actual combatants, ranging in rank from general to private. The last seven form a group from the War Today. Mr. Williams has prefaced this group and each of the other stories by a short statement which outlines the background and setting of the engagement.

Mr. Williams in his editorship has been fortunate in his choice of

subjects and authors. He has avoided the prosaic in the titles used; for example, no one would suspect that "No Whiskey, No Baggage, No Meat" was the story of Valley Forge.

The accounts point generally to the successes of the amateur soldier. Naturally good stories do not arise from failures, and so we do not find mentioned the discreditable performances in land operations during the War of 1812-14, or the futile campaigns waged against the Indians in the Florida War, 1836-41. However, it is fair to say that the weakness of the amateur method rests more often on tragically inept military leadership than on the inexperience of the soldier.

In its military aspects our nationhood was built and for the first 142 years was maintained on the basis of voluntary service. Since 1917, we have accepted the principle of conscriptive service coupled with short, intensive periods of training, but the same amateur spirit prevails in the National Army. In Mr. Williams' opinion the American soldier is confident because he is imbued with the justice of his cause but more than that he is strong and successful for the reason that he does not know when he is beaten, therefore is not beaten.

The qualities which make the citizen-soldier great in an emergency are not necessarily wanting in the professional. One of our greatest commanders, General U. S. Grant, a professional by education, training and experience, had the characteristic of not recognizing defeat, and as a consequence was never defeated.

This book is timely. All good Americans ought to read or re-read the stories spread through the pages of *Amateurs at War* in order to refresh their memories and spirits.

EDWARD KIMMEL

Colonel, USA, Retired

Sea Power in the Machine Age, by Bernard Brodie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2nd edition, 1943. Pp. 458. \$3.75.)

Bernard Brodie's *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, first published in the spring of 1941 and at once recognized as a classic in its field, is now offered in a revised second edition which appraises naval aircraft in the light of Pearl Harbor, the Coral Sea, and Midway.

Dr. Brodie, a scholar with considerable technical training, is tireless in isolating the significant fact, forthright in his generalizations, enthusiastic in presenting his "story of the industrial revolution in the implements of sea warfare and of the effects of that revolution upon

the world equation of maritime power." Each of the basic innovations of the past 150 years—the steam warship, the iron-hulled warship, armor and great ordnance, the submarine, and naval aircraft—brought changes in tactics and strategy, and epoch-making shifts in the power balance between nations. The change from sail to steam propulsion, for instance, reduced the cruising radius of ships, made overseas bases essential, and plunged maritime powers into competition to secure strategically located bases.

In his revised chapter on naval aviation Dr. Brodie plunges into the popular controversy over the relative merits of aircraft and ships. The continuing importance of the latter is indicated by the fact that the Japanese struck *at our battleships* at Pearl Harbor, the fact that a battleship can hurl in one hour a weight of projectiles equivalent to the bombloads of perhaps 800 carrier-based planes, and the fact that the United States and Britain are now rushing the construction of great fleets of modern battleships. The author calls attention to the tactical and strategic weaknesses of planes and carriers but does not minimize the value of these types. The airplane is a "military anomaly in that it can hurl the most elephantine of projectiles and yet be mortally stung by a pebble." The carrier "suffers not only from its own relative vulnerability . . . but also from the vulnerability of its offensive agents." The opinion, however, that either plane or ship may be discarded is based on a "careless or biased reading of the available facts." Both types are rapidly perfecting their measures of defense. Both types are essential. "The combination of the two is bound to be a far more effective and efficient method of winning battles than reliance upon either alone."

RICHARD S. WEST, JR.
U. S. Naval Academy

John Paul Jones, Fighter for Freedom and Glory, by Lincoln Lorenz.
(Annapolis: United States Naval Institute. 1943. Pp. 846.
\$5.00.)

For more than a century, since the publication in 1830 of Sands', *The Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones*, there has not been produced a competent study of the life of our first important naval figure. It is true that biographies of Jones have been written—but too many authors have found in his adventurous career a source for

vague romancing and have signally failed to meet the need for a critical appraisal of the man's work and character.

Lorenz' life of Jones meets the need, and also offers a detailed commentary on the origins of the United States Navy in the narration of Jones' activities in the Revolutionary War. Students of naval history will find here discussions of strategy and tactics, in addition to a thorough treatment of the difficulties which Jones faced in breaking through bureaucratic barriers to attain a command at sea. The *Ranger-Drake*, *Serapis-Bonhomme Richard*, and other contests at sea are rendered in detail, but even more significant is the discussion by Lorenz of Jones' service abroad, especially for Catherine the Great of Russia.

This study of the life of our first great naval hero is a worthy addition to the splendid series of biographies of naval leaders published by the United States Naval Institute. Like other volumes in the series it is a fine example of critical scholarship, based upon an extensive examination of sources here and abroad. The study is further enhanced by a first-rate bibliography and several appendices describing the process of research.

STUART PORTNER
National Archives

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SHORT REVIEWS

The Battle Is The Pay-Off, by Captain Ralph Ingersoll. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1943. Pp. 217. \$2.00.)

Captain Ingersoll states that "the serious objective of this book was to show the connection between the creating and training of an army—an experience in which the whole of the American people share—and what an army is for: battle itself." He has fulfilled his objective and in the process written one of the most valuable books produced so far in the current phase of World War II.

Primarily the author's narrative in *The Battle Is The Pay-Off* is concerned with description of preparation for battle and battle itself—the battle of El Guettar in Tunisia. As an engineer officer with a company of combat engineers, Captain Ingersoll's experience was gained first-hand. Fortunately for soldier and civilian reader alike, his abilities for writing with accuracy, forcefulness, and realism have been fully exploited, making the complex "unrealities" of battle seem real and clear.

There is however, one very important exception to the main narrative of preparation for battle and battle itself. It is Captain Ingersoll's informative explanation of the organization of the army, a subject understood by but a few officers and soldiers let alone the American public in general. In scarcely more than a dozen pages the author outlines the complicated army organism in simple decisive terms so that its fundamental structure is clearly evident.

The fourth part of the book, the conclusions, drives home the fact that this war is far from won, that Americans must not let down on the strength of relatively minor victories won by our forces

on the battle field. Captain Ingersoll rightly insists that ultimate victory may be won only by the expenditure of the utmost physical and spiritual effort by both the armed forces and the equally important and responsible civilians on the "home front."

DAVID S. CRIST¹

Major, AUS

The Sharps Rifle: Its History, Development and Operation, by Winston O. Smith. (New York: William Morrow & Company. 1943. Pp. 138. \$3.00.)

Two years ago the author, as he remarks in his preface, may have been unfamiliar with the history of firearms, but he certainly could not have been unfamiliar with the arts of constructing an historical monograph. The organization of the subject matter of this book, the choice of its illustrations, the liberal addition of charts and appendices, and the workmanlike handling of citations, bibliography, and index suggest the experienced technician. A student with no interest whatever in firearms would enjoy perusing this short volume for the sheer craftsmanship it displays.

Military historians, and especially experts in the field of weapons, will find Mr. Smith's book an outstanding addition to the history of American firearms. As he reminds them, "it appears reasonable to name the Kentucky Rifle, the Colt Revolver, and the Sharps Rifle as being the three most significant firearms in American history, because each definitely established a major development in gun design, and each was closely identified with important periods in our history." This volume is a worthy companion to the studies already published on the first two weapons.

Mr. Smith describes the functioning of the various models in considerable detail. He covers the story of their manufacture and sale, and of their employment by soldier and civilian, principally during the period of the American Civil War. A large portion of the book is devoted to the identification of models, and here there are numerous illustrations and lists of parts and ammunition to assist the collector. The coverage is remarkably complete, although an authority has noted that at least one well-known type of metallic cartridge is not given in the list on pp. 100, 101. Perhaps because the book contains the rifle very little is said about the single shot and the four-barreled metallic cartridge pistols produced by the same concern.

All in all, this is a first-rate study of an important (if relatively small) segment of American military history.

FREDERICK P. TODD¹

Major, AUS

Blitzkrieg: Armies on Wheels, by Lieutenant Colonel S. L. A. Marshall. (Washington: The Infantry Journal. 1943. Pp. 259. \$.25)

Marshall's *Blitzkrieg* is one of the classics on war produced in this age, and the best definition of *blitzkrieg* to come out, not only in theory but in evaluation of practice. Students of war will remember the double title as two books published in 1941-42, the first and among the most intelligent of the estimates on 20th century warfare originating in the United States. A true disciple of Major General J. F. C. Fuller, of broad experience and profoundly educated by that experience, Colonel Marshall writes with conviction and undeniable power. Exposition is always lucid, plumbing to the heart not of one battle or one theatre but of the total theory of war as it is conducted today.

The armies of all nations, Germany included, are groping for an understanding of the inter-arms balance even while every tactic and every weapon are undergoing furious multiplication and improvement. The new elementary axioms derive from:

- ratio of tank striking power to the total depth of the enemy country,
- ratio of airpower and tanks to artillery and infantry,
- ratio of army reserve mobility to sieges of cities or chains of strong points.

¹The opinions expressed in these reviews are those solely of the authors, and are not to be construed as reflecting the official attitude of the War Department.

Moral indoctrination, the tempering of the armored spearhead, is not neglected. However, this subject and its political ramifications deserve a separate book and is somewhat beyond the scope of this one.

It is refreshing to discover in such a study, few footnotes and these abbreviated sometimes to a single word. The whole work forms an harmonious and important contribution to the permanent library of vital military history.

HYMAN ROUDMAN

Asia Unbound, by Sidney Greenbie. (New York: D. Appleton-Century. 1943. Pp. 349. \$3.00.)

Few Americans were ever taught Oriental history in school or college, and today most of us, although realizing our acute ignorance of Asiatic culture, have no time to acquaint ourselves with the history of the Orient. Sidney Greenbie's book, well-written and covering the field in a one volume study, offers a partial solution to this problem. *Asia Unbound* attempts to explain the major post-war conditions which will confront the United Nations in Asia. The problems of Asia's uneducated, passive masses, with their low standard of living, are approached through the Four Freedoms, each one being separately studied as it applies to the Orient.

Of particular note is the treatment of the historical background used to introduce Oriental culture. This discussion gives the reader an outline of the history of Asiatic and island peoples from the Dutch East Indies to Manchukuo, as well as presenting the major post-war problems of the Orient. The book has a danger, however, in that it is too often tainted by personal bias.

RICHARD A. BARTLETT

NOTES

The Navy Reader, edited by Lieutenant William H. Fetridge (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1943. Pp. 443. \$3.75.), although designed for the "newly commissioned" officer has great value for all who wish a background in naval affairs.

Toward a New Order of Sea Power, by Harold and Margaret Sprout (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2nd edition, 1943. Pp. 336. \$3.75), is a thorough review of the Washington Arms Limitation Conference to which it is limited. The basic importance of the book lies in the Anglo-American naval race, in its time quite as significant as the Anglo-German naval rivalry of 1890-1914. Preoccupation with popular as well as official reaction gives to the narrative those qualities welcome in any permanent work, warmth and animation.

One of the most extraordinary examples of the ability of man to endure hardships is to be found in the account of the ordeal of Seaman Basil Izzi and his two surviving companions who spent 83 days on a wooden raft in the South Atlantic in *83 Days, the Survival of Seaman Izzi*, by Mark Murphy. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 124. \$1.75.).

George H. Johnston's *The Toughest Fighting in the World* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1943. Pp. 240. \$3.00.), accurately describes the year-long conquering of New Guinea. Savage jungle warfare and the struggle against the Japanese in the fighting in the Owen Stanley Mountains has been brilliantly and starkly narrated in this first hand account of "War Is Hell."

Blood for the Emperor, by Walter B. Clausen (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1943. Pp. 331. \$3.00.), ably presents the background of Japanese grand strategy and details such battles as Wake Island, Midway, the Solomons, and Guadalcanal. Described in terms of the perspective of the participants, the bitterness of the struggle becomes grim reality.

Howard Handleman, ace INS reporter, has given a running account of operations in Attu in his *Bridge to Victory* (New York: Random House. 1943. Pp. 247. \$2.00.). Students of military affairs will not find here a detailed commentary on the strategy of the Aleutians campaign, nor a penetrating discussion of the tactics employed in this particular operation, but they will be impressed with Handleman's word-pictures of the difficulty of fighting in this theatre.

Out in the Boondocks, by James D. Horan and Gerold Frank (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

1943. Pp. 209. \$2.75.), is a collection of stories narrating the activities of Marines fighting on fronts of the present war. Here are the accounts of Major Harry Torgerson, former New York University football player, who blew the Japs out of their caves at Gavutu; of Corporal Harry Grimes, who killed ten Japanese soldiers; of Sergeant Trull Sidebottom, Private James Hill, and others who served valiantly in the Pacific.

The story of a famous globe circling Flying Fortress is told by the wife of her commander in *The Suzy-Q* by Priscilla Hardison with Anne Wormser (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 170. \$2.00). His duties in the combat areas of Java and on the bombing missions from Australia are vividly described in this stimulating account.

Joe Foss, Flying Marine, the Story of his Flying Circus, as told to Walter Simmons (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 160. \$2.50), tells the life story of fighter pilot Joe Foss who equalled Rickenbacker's World War I highest score of planes destroyed in aerial combat with his total of twenty-six planes shot down over Guadalcanal in the winter of 1942.

Captain Thomas Moore, Marine Corps ace, has written a first rate autobiographical account of his career as an aviator in *The Sky is My Witness* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1943. Pp. 137. \$2.00). Captain Moore seems fully aware of the broader aspects of the present struggle, and that knowledge gives added meaning to the recital of his activities in the fighting in the Solomons.

Two popular brief accounts of the Army and Marines are to be found in *The Marines in Review*, by Norman V. Carlile (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 192. \$2.50.), and *The Army in Review*, by Curtis Erickson (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 218. \$2.50).

"Where's Sammy?" by Sammy Schulman, edited by Robert Considine (New York: Random House. 1943. Pp. 234. \$2.50.), is the story of an ace reporter with a camera who has covered many notable events since 1926. His experiences are highlighted by his coverage of the invasion of North Africa and the Casablanca Conference.

On War, by Karl Von Clausewitz translated by O. J. Matthejs Jolles (New York: The Modern Library. 1943. Pp. 641. \$1.45.), is the first inexpensive and easily obtainable edition of the classic work on the philosophy and strategy of war. In this excellent first American translation, students of any phase of war can find pertinent and stimulating thought.

How the Army Fights, by Captain Lowell M. Limpus (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1943. Pp. 388. \$3.00.), is an excellent reference for junior-grade commanders, rather too complete for easy reading or maximum infiltration of impressions. The author's unique contribution is his chapter on the costs of Pacifism. Others have digressed more or less passionately from addresses on world brotherhood, taxation relief, and "militarism," but Limpus presents a statistical case which strikes the iron. Each integer is a corpse, numbers leap scores of thousands as neglect or fear act on peril.

America in Arms, The Experience of the United States with Military Organization, by Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer (Washington: The Infantry Journal. 1943. Pp. 196. \$.25.), is a Fighting Forces series reprint which makes available to members of the armed services this authoritative critique of our military policy.

In *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, by Sir Edward S. Creasy, edited with nine new chapters and thirty maps by Robert H. Murray (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 620. \$3.00.), is an entirely new edition of Creasy's classic work which has been ably edited and enlarged. Not only has the text been modernized but the excellent maps clearly illustrate the events described. Murray, a well-known newspaper editor and author has made a careful choice of those additional battles which he has so well described. This first revised edition since 1851, makes a distinct contribution to the study of military history.

Mein Kampf, by Adolf Hitler, translated by Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 694. \$2.50.), is an entirely new translation based upon the first German edition. Since care has been taken to give an exact English equivalent of Hitler's highly individualistic

style, it may be considered as the definitive translation of the most important book of the past quarter century.

Meet Mr. Blank, by R. G. Waldeck (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1943. Pp. 179. \$2.50.), is an informative and interesting account of potential personalities and parties that may constitute the directive forces in post-war Germany.

Public Thinking on Post-War Problems, by Jerome S. Bruner (Washington: National Planning Association. 1943. Pp. 36. \$.25.), is the first poll conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research on important post-war issues.

Napoleon and Modern War: His Military Maxims, revised and annotated by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1934. Pp. 158. \$1.00). The maxims of Napoleon which consist of a collection of quotations originally taken from the *Correspondence de Napoleon* and from various reports of dictation by him while at St. Helena and first published as the *Maximes de Guerre* (Paris: Anselin. 1830.) The maxims are annotated by Colonel Lanza by application to military and political events which are in general contemporary.

Weapons for the Future, by Captain Melvin M. Johnson, Jr. and Charles T. Haven (Washington: The Infantry Journal. 1943. Pp. 152. \$.25.). A short account of the evolution of American ordnance, with a brief—as indicated by the sub-title—for “The Case for an American Arsenal of Peace.”

Patriot Battles, by Colonel A. C. M. Azoy (Washington: The Infantry Journal. 1943. Pp. 212. \$.25.). Concise accounts of nine engagements of the American Revolution, from Lexington and Concord to Yorktown.

Army Talk: A Familiar Dictionary of Soldier Speech, by Colonel Elbridge Colby (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. 232. \$2.00.), is an instructive, as well as an entertaining and colorful, contribution to the study of the structure and evolution of the “American” language.

Great Soldiers of the First World War, by Captain H. A. DeWeerd (Washington: The Infantry Journal. 1943. Pp. 206. \$.25.). A reprint by the publisher of an earlier edition of the stimulating and lucid accounts of the following military personalities of the first World War: Schlieffen, Hindenburg, Hoffman, Kitchener, Lawrence, Pershing, and Petain.

The Story of West Point: 1802-1943, by Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy (Washington: The Infantry Journal. 1943. Pp. 282. \$.25.). A brief and readable treatment of the influence of the United States Military Academy on science, education, and exploration in the United States.

Conflict: The American Civil War, by George Fort Milton (Washington: The Infantry Journal. 1943. Pp. 356. \$.25.). This volume, reprinted from a 1941 edition by the publisher, is limited exclusively to a consideration of the military and political aspects of the Civil War, and is written more for the lay reader than for the historian.

The Army Officer's Manual, by Colonel A. C. M. Azoy (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1943. Pp. 396. \$2.50.). A revised edition of a concise reference guide for Army officers on the organization of the Army, the staff, uniform and equipment, drill, military courtesies, pay, court martials, military symbols, and related data pertinent to the staff or line duties of officers.

GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

OTHER RECENT BOOKS

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

Beyond Victory, by Ruth N. Anshen, editor. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1943. Pp. 291. \$3.50.)

Chicago Blueprint, by John L. Balderston. (New York: Alfred Knopf. 1943. Pp. 126. \$1.00.)

The Pillars of Security, by Sir William Beveridge. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. Pp. 248. \$2.50.)

- The End of the Beginning: War Speeches*, by Winston Churchill, compiled by Charles Eade. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. 336. \$3.50.)
- Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, by Edward M. Earle, editor. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. Pp. 564. \$3.75.)
- Marching Home: Complete War and Post-War Handbook for Service Men and Families*, by Richard Hart. (New York: Arco Publishing Company. 1943. Pp. 192. \$2.75.)
- War and Peace Aims of the United Nations: September, 1939-December 31, 1942*, by Louise W. Holborn, editor. (Boston: World Peace Foundation. 1943. Pp. 745. \$2.50.)
- The War for Man's Soul*, by Ernst Jäckh. (New York: Farrar and Rinehart. 1943. Pp. 313. \$2.50.)
- America and Asia: Problems of Today's War and the Peace of Tomorrow*, by Owen Latimore. (Claremont, California: Claremont Colleges. 1943. Pp. 58. \$1.75.)
- United We Stand: the Peoples of the United Nations*, by Basil J. Mathews. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. 379. \$2.50.)
- Psychiatry in War*, by Emilo Mira. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1943. Pp. 206. \$2.75.)
- The United States and its Place in World Affairs, 1918-1943*, by Allan Nevins and Louis M. Hacker. (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company. Pp. 622. \$3.25.)
- What to do With Italy*, by Gaetano Salvemini and George La Piana. (New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce. 1943. Pp. 323. \$2.75.)
- Lessons of My Life*, by Lord Vansittart. (New York: Alfred Knopf. 1943. Pp. 303. \$3.00.)

NATIONAL WARFARE

- My Life in China: 1926-1941*, by Hallett Abend. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943. Pp. 404. \$3.00.)
- My Native Land*, by Louis Adamic. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1943. Pp. 517. \$3.75.)
- Victory in Chains*, by Amyntor. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1943. Pp. 80. \$1.50.)
- The Middle East: Crossroads of History*, by Eliahu Ben-Horin. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1943. Pp. 248. \$3.00.)
- Clemeuceau*, by Geoffrey Bruun. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1943. Pp. 235. \$3.00.)
- The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint*. (New York: Committee on Africa, the War, and Peace Aims. 2nd edition, 1943. Pp. 246. \$1.50.)
- The Russian Enigma*, by William H. Chamberlain. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1943. Pp. 329. \$2.75.)
- The Conscientious Objector and the War*, by Julien Cornell. (New York: John Day Company. 1943. Pp. 168. \$1.75.)
- Jan Smuts*, by F. S. Crafford. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1943. Pp. 333. \$3.50.)
- The Axis on the Air*, by Harold Ettlinger. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1943. Pp. 318. \$2.75.)

- Japan Fights for Asia*, by John A. Goette. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1943. Pp. 248. \$2.50.)
- They Shall Not Have Me*, by Jean Hélon. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 435. \$3.00.)
- Betrayal from the East: the Inside Story of Japanese Spies in America*, by Alan Hynd. (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company. 1943. Pp. 287. \$3.00.)
- Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews*. (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs. 1943. Pp. 311. \$1.50.)
- The Displacement of Population in Europe*, by Eugene M. Kulisher. (Montreal: International Labor Office. 1943. Pp. 175. \$1.50.)
- Fighting Fire*, by Captain Burr W. Leyson. (New York: E. P. Dutton Company. 1943. Pp. 253. \$2.50.)
- Journal de guerre*, by Jean Malaquais. (New York: French and European Publications. 1943. Pp. 331. \$1.50.)
- Pétain: Verdun to Vichy*, by Francis Martel. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 226. \$2.50.)
- I Know Tunisia*, by Dahris Martin. (New York: Ives Washburn Incorporated. 1943. Pp. 282. \$3.00.)
- The Serbs Choose War*, by Ruth Mitchell. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1943. Pp. 271. \$2.75.)
- Our Japanese Foe*, by Jan Morrison. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1943. Pp. 129. \$1.50.)
- American Society in Wartime*, by William F. Ogburn, editor. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1943. Pp. 244. \$2.50.)
- Escape from the Balkans*, by Michael Padev. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1943. Pp. 311. \$2.75.)
- Singapore Goes Off the Air*, by Giles Playfair. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 273. \$2.50.)
- The Hidden Enemy*, by Heinz Pol. (New York: Julian Messner Incorporated. 1943. Pp. 281. \$3.00.)
- Mother America*, by Carlos P. Romulo. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1943. Pp. 250. \$2.50.)
- Highway to Tokyo*, by Joseph Rosenfarb. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1943. Pp. 117. \$1.25.)
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MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, WORLD WAR II

- Mediterranean Assignment*, by Richard McMillan. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 1943. Pp. 342. \$3.00.)
- World War II*, by Major Frank Monaghan. (Chicago: J. G. Ferguson and Associates. 1943. Pp. 547. \$5.00.)
- Springboard to Berlin*, by John A. Parris, Jr., and others. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1943. Pp. 401. \$3.00.)
- Underground From Hongkong*, by Benjamin A. Proulx. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1943. Pp. 214. \$2.50.)
- Here Is Your War*, by Ernie Pyle. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1943. Pp. 304. \$3.00.)

SEA WARFARE

- Semper Fidelis: the U. S. Marines in Action*, by Keith Ayling. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1943. Pp. 194. \$2.00.)
- "Always Ready!": the Story of the United States Coast Guard*, by Kensil Bell. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. 1943. Pp. 342. \$3.00.)
- Leathernecks, Our Marines in Fact and Picture*, by Rolfe Boswell. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1943. Pp. 205. \$2.50.)
- Navy Gun Crew*, by Lieutenant John F. Childs. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1943. Pp. 111. \$1.50.)
- Command at Sea: A Guide for the Naval Officer*, by Captain Harley F. Cope. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1943. Pp. 283. \$2.75.)
- Our Navy—A Fighting Team*, by Vice Admiral Joseph K. Taussig and Captain Harley F. Cope. (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Company. 1943. Pp. 248. \$2.50.)

LAND WARFARE

- The Duke: Being an Account of the Life and Achievements of Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington*, by Richard Aldington. (New York: Viking Press. 1943. Pp. 411. \$3.75.)
- The Framework of Battle*, by Lieutenant Colonel John G. Burr. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company. 1943. Pp. 254. \$3.00.)
- Behind the Battle of France*, by Jacques Lorraine. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1943. Pp. 142. \$1.25.)
- He's in the Signal Corps Now*, by Carl Mann. (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company. 1943. Pp. 192. \$2.50.)
- The Science of Explosives*, by Martin Meyer. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1943. Pp. 463. \$4.50.)
- Hand to Hand Combat*, prepared by the Training Division, Bureau of Aeronautics, U. S. Navy. (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute. 1943. Pp. 228. \$2.00.)
- Scouting and Patrolling*. (New York: Penguin Books. 1943. Pp. 134. \$.25.)
- American Guerrilla, Fighting Behind the Enemy Lines*, by Captain Douglas M. Smith and Cecil Cornes. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1943. Pp. 316. \$3.00.)
- Ambulance in Africa*, by Evan Thomas. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1943. Pp. 185. \$2.00.)
- The Turning Tide: the British Army at War*, by Major General Edward D. H. Tolle-mache. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1943. Pp. 63. \$1.50.)

AIR WARFARE

- The Air Future, a Primer of Aeropolitics*, by Burnet Hershey. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1943. Pp. 258. \$2.75.)
- "Take 'er up alone, Mister,"* by Lieutenant John J. Hibbits and F. E. Richnitzer. (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Company. 1943. Pp. 234. \$2.50.)
- Lightning in the Sky: the Story of Jimmy Doolittle*, by Carl Mann. (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company. 1943. Pp. 256. \$2.75.)
- Unsung Heroes of the Air*, by Arthur H. Narracott. (Forest Hills, New York: Transatlantic Arts. 1943. Pp. 168. \$2.75.)

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE

- "How Britain is Choosing New Leaders," by John Cashel, in *The Cavalry Journal*, September-October 1943.
- "The Navy's History Program," by Captain Dudley W. Knox, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1943.
- "Projets de sécurité collective," by Pierre Ricour, in *Le Canada Français*, October 1943.
- "Swiss Neutrality," by Malcolm Moos, in *The Yale Review*, Autumn 1943.
- "Britain and Russia," by Andreas Dorpalen, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Autumn 1943.
- "Sinews of Empire, 1943," by Roger Shaw, in *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, October 1943.
- "Imperialismus und Grossraumsicherung," by Otto Buchholz, in *Marine Rundschau*, June 1942.
- "A Modern Foreign Policy," by Joseph M. Jones, in *Fortune*, August, September, October 1943.
- "Plano de reforma integral da legislação militar," by Angelo Moniz da Silva Ferraz, in *Arquivo de Direito Militar*, September-December 1942.
- "Japanese Totalitarianism," by Joseph S. Roucek, in *World Affairs Interpreter*, Summer 1943.

NATIONAL WARFARE

- "China's Cadets," by Captain Charles D. Frazer, in *Air Force*, August 1943.
- "Japanese Espionage, Foundation for War," by Fred Henry, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1943.
- "Nanking," by Commander J. M. Sheehan, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1943.
- "Alaska and the Aleutians: Cockpit of the North Pacific," by James K. Eyre, Jr., in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1943.
- "American Experience with Military Government," by H. R. Gabriel, in *The American Political Science Review*, June 1943.
- "Military Occupation and Then What?" by H. Motherwell, in *Harper*, October 1943.
- "People at War—New Industries Make New Men," by John Dos Passos, in *Harper*, August 1943.
- "The Rise of the Junkers in Brandenburg Prussia 1410-1653." Part I, by Hans Rosenberg, in *The American Historical Review*, October 1943.
- "The Russian Railways," by Charles L. Whitworth, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1943.
- "Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere," by A. J. Grajdanzner, in *Pacific Affairs*, September 1943.
- "The Evolution of the Red Army," by Leland Stowe, in *The Foreign Affairs Quarterly Review*, October 1943.
- "Problems of Wartime Freight Movement," by Herbert Ashton, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1943.
- "Problems of War Production Control in Japan," by T. A. Bisson, in *Pacific Affairs*, September 1943.

- "The Lost Captain," by James Henry Gardner, in *The Chronicles of Oklahoma*, September 1943.
- "Notes on an Engagement at Green Springs, near Trevillian Station, Virginia, June, 1864," by F. E. Vandiver, in *The William & Mary College Quarterly*, April 1943.
- "The Army After The War," by Colonel J. R. J. Macnamara, in *The Fighting Forces*, October 1943.
- "Gustav Ratzenhofer, Eine Lebensskizze des Soldaten und Politikers," by Generalmajor D. von Steinitz, in *Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen*, July 1942.
- "General der Infanterie Walther Reinhard zum Gedächtnis," by Oberst G. Scherff, in *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, May 1942.
- "From Bismarck to Hitler," by the Honorable George Peel, in *The Contemporary Review*, October 1943.
- "The Tanaka Memorial," by Martin Wright, in *History*, March 1943.
- "The Japanese Naval Defeat at Shimonoseki in 1863," by Lieutenant Malcolm W. Cagle, in *Shipmate*, October 1943.
- "Von Boulogne bis Brüssel," by Kurt Kölsch, in *Deutsche Kraftfahrt*, September 1942.
- "Die Propaganda als Kriegsmittel," by General V. Ludwig, in *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 31, 1942.

SEA WARFARE

- "The Development of the PT," by Commander W. C. Specht and Lieutenant (j.g.) W. S. Humphrey, in *Yachting*, November 1943.
- "Why Japan's Fleet Avoids Action," by A. Kiralfy, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1943.
- "Ships of the Line," by T. R. Fick, in *The Log*, November 12, 1943.
- "The Destroyer Navy—The Silent Service," by Lieutenant Commander William C. Mack, in *The United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1943.
- "Military Government in the Navy," by Lieutenant William H. Hessler, in *The United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1943.
- "We Model Our Fighting Ships," by C. Lester Walker, in *Harper*, November 1943.
- "Bermuda Base," by Frederick Lewis Allen, in *Harper*, September 1943.
- "Pacific Island Base," by Don Burke, in *Fortune*, August 1943.
- "Assault Across the Water," by the editors of *Fortune*, July 1943.
- A series of seven articles on the U. S. Navy in the Pacific, by Fletcher Pratt, in *Harper*, January-December 1943.
- "Northern Patrol, Story of Lieutenant Lucius D. Campbell," in *Our Navy*, mid-November 1943.
- "The Sky Is The Limit, Story of Lieutenant Commander Clarence M. White, Jr., and His Squadron," in *Our Navy*, mid-November 1943.
- "Great Lakes Today," by Charles M. Hatcher, in *Our Navy*, mid-October 1943.
- "Battle of the Tenaru," by Brigadier General Clifton B. Cates, in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1943.
- "School For Combat," by Lieutenant John H. Gleason and Martin J. Maloney, in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1943.
- "Next Moves at Sea," by Francis McMurtrie, in *The Navy* (British Navy League Journal), October 1943.
- "The Turn of the Tide," by Fletcher Pratt, in *Sea Power*, November 1943.

- "Thunder In The Sky," by Lieutenant (j.g.) Edward H. Jenison, in *Sea Power*, November 1943.
- "To the Shores of Sicily," by Lieutenant Blair Walliser, in *Sea Power*, November 1943.
- "Battle of the Atlantic," by Charles A. Mitchie, in *Sea Power*, November 1943.
- "His Majesty's Submarines," by Walton L. Robinson in *Sea Power*, October 1943.
- "Supplying and Servicing the Fleet," by Rear Admiral William Brent Young, in *Shipmate*, September 1943.
- "So You're Going to Sea," by Lieutenant (j.g.) Leroy W. Vance, in *Shipmate*, September 1943.
- "Geographische Ziele der Kriegführung," by Lieutenant General D. Mundt, in *Militär-Wochenblatt*, July 24, 1942.
- "Die Wehrpolitik und die Seestrategie der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," by Korvetten-Kapitän Jessen, in *Marine Rundschau*, June 1942.
- "Wirtschaftszentrum—Amerikanisches Mittelmeer," by Otto Buchholtz, in *Marine Rundschau*, May 1942.
- "Mit dem 'Seewolf' in britischen Geleitzug," by Wolfgang Frank, in *Die Kriegsmarine*, January 1941.
- "Öl im Pazifik," by Reinhard, in *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 1942, number 3.
- "Blockadebrecher," by Korvetten-Kapitän Bade, in *Lloyd-Flagge*, January-February 1942.

LAND AND AIR WARFARE

Probably at no time previous has there been so much valuable writing along military lines. The area of warfare is world wide. The service journals, following their soldiers over the globe, are now so crammed with fine battle accounts that no attempt has been made to list titles separately. Many articles have no author, ranking as anonymous battle-experience reports from the Army files. The following journals should be given thorough reading:

- Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth *Military Review*, *The Field Artillery Journal*, *The Infantry Journal*, *The Cavalry Journal*, *Army Ordnance*, *Air Force*, *The Military Engineer*, *The Coast Artillery Journal*, *The Quartermaster Review*, *The (British) Army Quarterly*.
- "The Air Quartermaster and the Quartermaster Service with the Army Air Forces," by Col. F. T. McCullough, in *The Quartermaster Review*, September-October 1943.
- "Air-Raid Alarm Circuits," by W. D. Stewart, in *Radio News*, August 1943.
- "Aerial Grasshoppers," by S. A. Iltzky, in *Flying*, August 1943.
- "German Air Power Since 1914," by L. E. O. Charlton, in *Fortnightly*, July 1943.
- "Troop Carrier Command," by Lawrence Babcock, in *Fortune*, October 1943.
- "Into The Jungle," by James Shepley, in *Fortune*, October 1943.
- "The Road to Cape Bon," by Captain Richard Llewellyn, in *The Atlantic*, November 1943.
- "Die Kartenrüstung der Feindstaaten für den jetzigen Krieg," by Generalleutnant Hemmerich, in *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, February 1942.
- "Französische Festungstruppen bei den Kämpfen um die Maginotlinie im June 1940," editorial in *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, May 1942.
- "Kämpferlebnisse aus dem Feldzug gegen Sowjetrussland, 1941-42," editorial in *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, May 1942.

- "75 Jahre Artillerie—Schule," by Oberst Römer, in *Artilleristische Rundschau*, July 1942.
- "Gedanken über die Artillerie im letzten und in diesem Krieg," editorial in *Artilleristische Rundschau*, June 1942.
- "Friedensausbildung und Kriegsbewahrung," by Obertleutenant Reinicke, in *Artilleristische Rundschau*, July 1942.
- "Weather Fights and Works for Man," by F. Barrows Colton, in *The National Geographic Magazine*, December 1943.
- "How Shall We Bomb Japan?" by Major George Fielding Eliot in *Plane Talk*, November 1943.
- "The Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces," by Major General Harold Lee George, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November 1943.
- "What It Takes to Bomb Germany," by Lt. Colonel Beirne Lay, Jr., in *Harper*, November 1943.
- "Advancing the Bomber Line," by the editors of *Fortune* magazine, September 1943.

TECHNICAL

- "How to Keep Well in the Indian Theatre," by Air Surgeon Brigadier General David N. W. Grant, in *Air Force*, August 1943.
- "Life Raft Experiment," editorial narrative in *Air Force*, November 1943.
- "Classification of Military Bridges and Bridge Loads," by Lt. Colonel William Whipple, Jr., in *The Military Engineer*, November 1943. 555-59.
- "High Altitude Rockets for Meteorological Research," by Willy Ley and Herbert Schaefer, in *The Military Engineer*, November 1943.
- "Self-Sealing Cells," by Lieutenant C. G. Wyman and J. E. Nagle, in *Air Force*, August 1943.
- "Blocking Back for a Blitz," by Lieutenant Leonard Levy, in *The Military Engineer*, November 1943.
- "Dead Planes Can Talk," by Captain Robert V. Guelich, in *Air Force*, November 1943.
- "Flight Strips For War and Peace," by Colonel Stedman Shumway Hanks, in *Air Force*, August 1943.
- "The Quartermaster Corps Today and Tomorrow," by Brigadier General H. L. Whittaker, in *The Quartermaster Review*, September-October 1943.
- "Water Supply," by Groff Conklin, in *The Infantry Journal*, October 1943.
- "Some Problems of Water Supply for Troops," by Lieutenant Colonel Jack J. Hinman, Jr., in *The Military Engineer*, November 1943.
- "Water Supply in North Africa," by Lieutenant William J. Diamond, in *The Military Engineer*, November 1943.
- "Organization of American Scientists For the War," by K. T. Compton, in *Science*, July 30, 1943.
- "Weather is no Accident," by Ivan Ray Tannehill, in *Shipmate*, October 1943.
- "The Heart of the Ice," by Godfrey Winn, in *The Navy*, October 1943.
- "Fuel Oil Pressure Control Valves," by Raymond W. Hiteshue, in *The Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers*, August 1943.
- "Surgery Under Fire," by Charles Edmundson in *Fortune*, July 1943.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE NAVY'S WAR HISTORY

BY ROBERT G. ALBION

The Navy has made adequate provision for the recording of its present wartime experience, both afloat and ashore. Compared with the elaborate Army organization, the group entrusted with this work is a modest one from the quantitative standpoint; it is, in fact, really several groups working in close but informal cooperation.

A host of collaborators, moreover, has been provided through the requirement that every naval vessel maintain a "war diary." Such diaries are also kept by many of the shore establishments. The scope of these diaries ranges all the way from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief down to little patrol boats. Their quality and value naturally varies with the aptitude and attitude of the officers charged with such recording. Some are too busy or disinclined to write more than a "Nothing to report" week after week; some, on the other hand, are full-dress critical analyses, such as has been produced by the Eastern Sea Frontier. On the whole, they form a highly valuable supplement to the formal reports.

One historical group was already on hand at the outbreak of the war. This was the Office of Naval Records and Library, a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Under the guidance of Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN (Retired), this office had gathered many of the pertinent operations of the last war, had produced a few brief studies of the naval experience in that war, and had undertaken the publication of source materials on the Quasi-War with France and the Barbary Wars. Early in 1942, Captain Knox began to assemble a group of officers whose primary function has been to examine the operations records of this war, both official reports and war diaries, in order to make available the most pertinent material for those who may later write the history of operations. Much of this material is being microfilmed.

A second step in the operations field was the commissioning of Professor Samuel E. Morison of Harvard, maritime historian and biogra-

pher of Columbus, as lieutenant commander in the reserve, and his appointment by the Secretary of the Navy as Historian of Naval Operations. With one of the most interesting of war assignments, Lieutenant Commander Morison has been present in the actions at Coral Sea, Casablanca, and Kula Bay; has made some convoy crossings; and has already committed to paper several chapters intended for his popular history of operations.

At the same time, the Navy Department has made arrangements for covering the administrative and logistical side of the war experience. The stimulus in this case came from the Bureau of the Budget which, through Professor E. Pendleton Herring of Harvard, has sponsored such administrative studies in all the principal departments and agencies in order that the lessons of the wartime experience may not be lost. In accordance with this program, Professor Robert G. Albion of Princeton was appointed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy to supervise the recording of the administrative experience of the Navy Department. This field included among other things the development of command and control, the organization of the department and shore establishments, and the problems of procurement of men and materials. As part of this program, each of the bureaus has appointed one or more historical officers to handle its particular performance. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in addition, has directed each of its numerous divisions to prepare and keep current the record of its activities.

The directive establishing the recording of the administrative experience included the remark, "It is expected that this work will be of current value as the war progresses." Several special reports on matters of immediate concern have been requested and prepared. In amplification of that work, an Administrative Reference Service has been established, with the Navy Department securing the services of Dr. Henry P. Beers of the National Archives. Both for the Secretary's Office and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, various reports have been prepared or pertinent documents located and made available. Some of these concerned the past war, and some the present, for, with rapidly changing personnel, events of 1940 and even 1941 are fast becoming "history."

A few activities straddle the two fields of operations and administration. The record of the Coast Guard in both fields has been carefully kept from the beginning of the war by Lieutenant Commander Frank

R. Eldridge, USCGR, who has already prepared a number of studies. Similar work is being carried on for the Marine Corps by Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf. At the same time, some remote activities, not included either in naval operations proper nor in the Department at Washington, are being covered. Historical officers have been stationed at Pearl Harbor and at some of the sea frontiers; it is expected that this program will be extended to cover typical examples of all the more important activities.

In the matter of preserving essential records, the various historical officers have received valuable cooperation from the Office of Records Administration, under Lieutenant Commander Emmett J. Leahy, USNR, formerly of the National Archives. This office has performed a highly useful service in the suppression or destruction of useless records, and in the intelligent use of microfilming; it has also endeavored to have the most important documents filed where they will be readily accessible. The Reference Division of the Office of Public Relations, under Miss Helene Philibert, has also cooperated actively in the historical program.

In addition to those various activities already under way, plans are being discussed for a staff history to be written after the close of the war, including both the operational and logistical aspects. While these plans have not as yet been perfected, it is anticipated that the various individuals and groups above mentioned will all participate, together with officers who have been actively engaged in staff capacities at sea. That movement has received valuable advice and support from Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, of the Special Planning Section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Finally, constant liaison has been maintained with the Army historians. Some of this has been informal contact with "opposite numbers"; further opportunity has been afforded by a series of small conferences sponsored by the American Military Institute.

NAVY DEPARTMENT RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

BY BESS GLENN

One of the mystic fairy stories common to all races and ages of mankind concerns the peculiar relations between a person and his shadow, the objective impersonal projection of his physical being. It is perhaps

not too fanciful to say that somewhat this same relation exists between government and its archives. Government—a real, living, changing organism, compounded of human brains and bodies—has a shadowy second existence in the records it creates as the by-product of its day-to-day conduct of business. Sometimes this archival shadow is clean-cut and definite; sometimes it is faint and blurred; sometimes it is grotesquely distorted; and sometimes it does not exist at all.

Within the National Archives in Washington are the archives which held the shadow of the Navy Department; except for restrictions imposed on the use of certain groups of these records, they are available to anyone who wishes to consult them for serious research purposes. In them are to be found the history of the Navy Department and the record of its activities. They are the raw material for the writing of the naval history of the United States, and they are also a fruitful source of information on scientific, economic, social, political, genealogical, and other subjects. It was long a complaint of naval men that, although the administration of the civil functions of the Navy Department was provided for, the organizational structure of the Department did not provide for the efficient administration of its military duties. Ironically, the military history of the Navy has been well recorded by various historians, while the history of the civil branch has yet to be fully set forth.¹ The archives of the Department contain the civil as well as the military record of the Navy.

The Department of the Navy was established by Congress on April 30, 1798.² Previous to that date naval affairs had been administered by the Secretary of War. The administrative history of the Navy Department falls into three main periods. During the first, from 1798 to 1815, the organization of the Department, like that of the other executive departments of the time, was simple, and its personnel was small. It consisted only of the Office of the Secretary, in whose charge were all the functions of the Department. The increase of the Navy and the growing importance of naval administration to national security brought recognition of the necessity for expanding this simple organiza-

¹The articles by Charles Oscar Paullin on the administration of the United States Navy, appearing in the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, are probably the most satisfactory writing on that subject to date, although his development of the history of the civil functions is not exhaustive. See XXXII (September, December 1906), pp. 1001-30, 1289-1328; XXXIII (June, December 1907), pp. 597-641, 1435-77; XXXVIII (December 1912), pp. 1309-36; XXXIX (March, June, September, December 1913), pp. 165-95, 735-60, 1217-67, 1469-1508; XL (January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August 1914), pp. 111-28, 419-29, 673-87, 1059-71.

²1Stat.L. 553.

tion to include persons capable of assisting the Secretary in the performance of his military and civil duties.

The second period began on February 7, 1815, when an act of Congress provided for a Board of Naval Commissioners to be attached to the Office of the Secretary.³ The duties of this Board were to discharge, under the superintendence of the Secretary, "all the ministerial duties of the said office relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials, and the construction, armament, equipment, and employment, of vessels of war, as well as all other matters connected with the naval establishment." The increasing business of the Department and the complications arising from the duality of the civil and military responsibilities of the Commissioners resulted in a reorganization of the Department in 1842.

The introduction of the "bureau system," which remains in effect to the present time, marks the beginning of the third period. An act of August 31, 1842, abolished the Board of Naval Commissioners and created five bureaus: the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repairs, the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing, the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.⁴ During the years that followed these bureaus experienced many organizational mutations, but the five bureaus, three with practically their original names, are still in existence. The functions of the Department have been steadily amplified to keep pace with the growth of the Navy and the developments in scientific and technical knowledge. The Department now consists of seven bureaus: the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the Bureau of Ships, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the Bureau of Ordnance, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Bureau of Aeronautics, and the Bureau of Naval Personnel. There are also the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and various boards. The Marine Corps, a semi-autonomous unit, is under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy. Besides the departmental organization in Washington, the naval establishment consists of the fleets and of various naval districts and shore establishments. Each of these units, in the course of the execution of its duties, creates records.

The work of collecting and preserving the records of the Navy

³Stat.L. 202.

⁴Stat.L. 579.

Department has been done by two archival agencies: the Office of Naval Records and Library of the Navy Department, and the National Archives.

The predecessor of the Office of Naval Records and Library was the Office of Library and Naval War Records. The Library of the Navy Department was established in the Bureau of Navigation on March 23, 1882, by General Order No. 202. For several years previously the work of compiling Civil War records for publication had been carried on in a desultory fashion by the Bureau of Navigation, with various clerks and naval officers assigned to the task.⁵ In June 1882 Professor James R. Soley, head of the department of history and law at the United States Naval Academy, was appointed Librarian. Soley brought vigor and direction to the work of compiling for publication the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*. During this period the clerical force working in the library and that compiling the records for publication were provided for by separate appropriations, but they worked under one head, Professor Soley, and under the designation, Office of Library and Naval War Records. By direction of the Secretary, in October 1889 the Office was transferred to the Office of the Secretary and Soley was given the title of Superintendent of Naval War Records.⁶ It is probable, though as yet no proof of the supposition has been found, that soon after this transfer the Office of Library and Naval War Records was given charge of the archives of the Secretary's Office. Although its archival functions had originally been the gathering and preparation of official records of the Civil War for publication, the archival interests and activities of the Office of Library and Naval War Records broadened in the early 1900's, and it began to draw to itself the old records held by the various bureaus.⁷ With legislative support it collected also the naval records which were held by other executive departments. The Office of Library and Naval War Records, under Charles West Stewart, who served as Superintendent of Naval War Records from 1902 to 1920, urged the establishment of a Naval Records Office with a special building of its own. In forwarding this project it was joined by various historical organizations, including the Sons of the American Revolution.⁸

⁵Navy Department. Office of Naval Records and Library. File ZV, Naval Records (General). Letter from George W. Sumner to the Secretary of the Navy, June 11, 1881.

⁶Navy Department. Office of Naval Records and Library. Correspondence, 1889. File No. 2995.

⁷Navy Department. Office of the Secretary. General correspondence, 1885-1916. File No. 19066.

⁸Navy Department. Office of the Secretary. General correspondence, 1885-1916. File No. 19066-9.

The plan was not fruitful, nor were the other executive departments alacritous in transferring the naval records in their possession.

In 1915 the Office became known as the Office of Naval Records and Library.⁹ On July 1, 1919, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the Office of Naval Records and Library was consolidated with the Historical Section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations;¹⁰ the name Office of Naval Records and Library was continued. Since 1923 Captain Dudley W. Knox, well-known naval historian, has been in charge of the Office.

Immediately after the first World War the Office of Naval Records and Library began a vigorous campaign of collecting the naval records of that war, but at the same time it continued its activities of gathering up the old records of the Department. In 1926 it received from the Bureau of Construction and Repair most of the records of the Board of Naval Commissioners, which, after the abolishment of the Board in 1842, had been distributed among the new bureaus, with the bulk going to the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair.¹¹

In November 1942 the records of the Navy Department through 1910 which were held by the Office of Naval Records and Library were transferred to the custody of the Archivist of the United States.¹² Van Tyne and Leland's *Guide* contains a descriptive listing of this collection as it existed in 1907.¹³

Although most of the records transferred from the Office of Naval Records and Library consist of bound volumes, a considerable part of the records are loose papers which are filed in vertical filing cabinets. The Office of Naval Records and Library has acted upon the conviction that the selection and rearrangement of archival records under subject and geographical groupings is the most practical method of administering archival materials and results in their being more readily productive of information sought by the historian; it has accordingly disregarded the principle of provenance.¹⁴ The bound volumes which it formerly held in custody are arranged chronologically, regardless of

⁹38Stat.L. 1025.

¹⁰Navy Department. Office of the Secretary. General correspondence, 1916-26. File No. 5087-219:3½.

¹¹Navy Department. Bureau of Construction and Repair. General correspondence, 1925-40. File A6-6-(2).

¹²National Archives. Accession file No. 1212.

¹³Claude Halstead Van Tyne and Waldo Gifford Leland, *Guide to the Archives of the Government of the United States in Washington* (Washington, 1907), pp. 176-91.

¹⁴Captain Dudley W. Knox, "The Navy's History Program," in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXIII (September 1943), pp. 1196-1200.

series. The loose papers, many of which were withdrawn from the files of the Bureau of Navigation and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, are filed according to the subject and area classifications devised by the Office of Naval Records and Library.

The National Archives was established by an act of Congress approved on June 19, 1934. The Division of Navy Department Archives was created on January 3, 1938. On September 30, 1943, there were in that Division approximately 59,000 cubic or 93,000 linear feet of records of the Navy Department, dating from 1794 to 1942. In administering the records of the Government placed in the custody of the Archivist, the National Archives has generally adhered to the principles of provenance and *respect des fonds*. Except for correction of obvious disarrangements, the order of the files as maintained by the office which created them is preserved. Through the development of a thorough knowledge of Governmental organization and functions and through an intimate acquaintance with the records on the part of its staff, and by means of efficient finding mediums, the National Archives has sought to make readily available the research materials within the records.

The following pages contain the titles of the most important series of Navy Department records in the National Archives, exclusive of the collection transferred in November 1942 from the Office of Naval Records and Library, as the pressure of other work has precluded even a paper reconstruction of the original provenance of those records for which such reconstruction is practicable. The series are listed under the name of the bureau, office, or other unit with which they have archival relationship. Thumbnail sketches introduce each grouping, as information on the functional history of each organizational unit is essential to the selection of materials for research.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: The act of April 30, 1798 established the Department of the Navy and designated the Secretary as its chief officer. The duties of the Secretary were to execute the orders of the President relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials, and the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of vessels of war. For assistance in the execution of these duties, the Secretary was authorized to employ a principal clerk and such other clerks as he thought necessary and to take over from the War Department the records it had created in its administration of

naval affairs. In 1815 the Board of Naval Commissioners was created to assist the Secretary; in 1842 the Board was abolished and the civil functions of the Department were distributed among the newly created bureaus, with no provision made for professional naval assistance of the civilian Secretary in matters relating to the preparation for and the conduct of naval warfare. Most of the records of the Secretary's Office for the period before 1885 were apparently taken over by the Office of Library and Naval War Records when that Office was transferred to the Office of the Secretary. They consist chiefly of various series of correspondence. The correspondence of the Secretary is continued in the general correspondence files which have been received by the National Archives directly from the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.

General correspondence, 1885-1940, with indexes, 1885-1926. Because of the comprehensive relation of the Office of the Secretary to the whole naval establishment, this file is usually generously productive for research. For the period 1926-30 no index was made for the series; the index for the period since 1930 is retained in the Department.

Press copies of outgoing letters, 1849-93; applications for appointments and commissions, 1812-1910; records of the Disbursing Clerk, 1866-1917; personnel files of civilian employees, 1888-1941; correspondence and other records of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1890-1904; motion picture film showing the meeting of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain in August 1941; photographic reproductions (gelatin color transparencies) of portraits of thirty-seven Secretaries of the Navy, made in the summer of 1943.

BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS: This was one of the original bureaus created in 1842. Its chief function, the construction and maintenance of docking and other facilities at navy yards, had previously been under the administration of the Board of Naval Commissioners. Shore construction at all shore establishments is still the chief responsibility of the Bureau, but its functions have been extended by technical and scientific developments to include such duties as the production of power at yards, modernization of shop facilities, and the improvement of water-front and berthing facilities.

General correspondence, 1882-1940, with indexes, 1899-1925; correspondence, 1839-1880; indexes to correspondence of the Board of Naval Commissioners, 1815-42; estimates for navy yards construction projects, 1836-1934; payrolls and personnel records, 1835-1901; contracts 1842-1938; blueprints, drawings, and plans of navy yard lay-outs and docking facilities, 1877-1925, 1933-40; photographs of buildings and work in progress at shore establishments, 1891-1942.

Records of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, including a "waste book" (record of receipts and disbursements of timber, iron, rum, and money), 1794-1801; letters received

from Naval Commissioners, 1827-31; log books of yard activities, 1841-99; copies of letters sent to the Secretary of the Navy, 1836-52; and commandant's orders to executive officers, 1860-65.

BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR: This Bureau was established in 1842 as one of the original five bureaus of the Department and was first known as the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair. Its duties included the construction, maintenance, repair, and equipment of naval vessels. In 1862, under authority of the act which reorganized the Department, and by direction of the Secretary, all matters relating to the equipment of vessels were transferred to the newly created Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting.¹⁵ The Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair thereupon became known as the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and it continued in existence until June 20, 1940, when by an act of Congress it was abolished and its duties, together with those of the Bureau of Engineering, were taken over by the Bureau of Ships created by the same act. During the long period of its existence this Bureau created a large body of records of historical and technical importance.

Plans for the construction of United States naval vessels, 1794-1910, with index. These are the hull plans of the vessels. A few of the original drawings for some of the first vessels of the Navy are included. Humphreys, Grice, and other famous naval architects are represented in the files. Plans of a few foreign vessels are also included.

Records of the "Iron-Clad Office" in New York, 1862-67. These are the letters and reports sent and received by Admiral F. H. Gregory, superintendent for the construction of iron-clad vessels outside of navy yards. Included also are letter-press copies of letters sent by A. C. Stimers in the "Office of the General-Inspector of Steam Machinery, &C," New York.¹⁶

Letters received and sent, 1862-80 (fragmentary); contracts for the construction of naval vessels, 1861-72; paymasters' records from various navy yards, 1860-65; records relating to the procurement of construction materials, 1896-1940, consisting of specifications, 1886-1939, and contracts, requisitions, and schedules, 1912-40; reports and data concerning the inspection and repair of alien vessels seized by the United States during World War I, 1917-19; general correspondence, 1887-1940, with index and history cards, 1896-1940.

¹⁵Navy Department. Bureau of Construction and Repair. Letters received from the Secretary of the Navy, vol. 15, 1861-63, p. 105. Order of the Secretary to the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, October 8, 1862.

¹⁶Navy Department. Bureau of Construction and Repair. Letters received from superintendents outside of navy yards, vol. 13, 1867. Letter from Capt. J. W. A. Nicholson to the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, May 3, 1867. In this letter Captain Nicholson wrote that these records had been boxed and were being shipped to Washington. One box, he said, was addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the other to the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering. An inventory of the contents of the boxes accompanies the letter. When Van Tyne and Leland were compiling data for their *Guide* they saw these boxes, still nailed up and with their contents inaccessible, stored at the Washington Navy Yard.

BUREAU OF ENGINEERING: This Bureau was established by an act of Congress dated July 5, 1862, as the Bureau of Steam Engineering. Its duties were to design, construct, maintain, and repair steam machinery for the vessels of the Navy. Before 1862 those duties had been performed under the jurisdiction of the Engineer in Chief of the Navy, who was attached to the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair. Functions relating to electrical apparatus and wireless telegraphy were taken over in 1910 from the moribund Bureau of Equipment. Because of the advancements and changes in methods of supplying power to vessels, by legislative act of June 4, 1920, the name of the Bureau was changed to Bureau of Engineering. The Bureau of Engineering was abolished by an act of June 20, 1940, and its duties, together with those of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, were assigned to the new Bureau of Ships.

General correspondence, 1885-1940, with indexes.

Engine room logs, 1845-1940. The logs for 1845-1917 are the original records. Those for 1917-1940 are on microfilm.

Contracts and specifications for steam machinery for naval vessels, 1853-73; reports of inspectors of machinery for iron-clad vessels, and reports of surveys and trials of vessels, 1862-65; plans of ship machinery and electrical apparatus, 1850-1920 (not a complete file, but apparently selected on the basis of the historical qualities of the vessels to which they relate); reports, blueprints, memoranda, and other records of the Radio Division, 1906-30; contracts for materials and supplies, 1914-40.

Reports of tests of machinery and materials, 1910-40.

BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT AND RECRUITING: Created by an act of July 5, 1862, this Bureau took over from the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair the equipment function and from the Office of the Secretary the recruitment function. Its duties were to recruit men for the Navy and to supply ships with sails, anchors, cables, galleys, blocks, and yeomen's stores. By General Order No. 372, dated June 25, 1889, the recruitment function was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation, which also took over the records relating to that function. The equipment function was thereafter carried on by the Bureau of Equipment.

Letters sent, 1862-85; letters received, 1862-86; indexes to letters received and sent, 1862-90.

BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT: By General Order No. 372, of June 25, 1889, the recruiting functions of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation, and some

of its records were also transferred at that time. The Bureau then became known as the Bureau of Equipment. To it at this time were transferred the Naval Observatory, the Nautical Almanac Office, the Naval Inspector of Electric Lighting, and the Compass Office. In 1898 the Hydrographic Office was transferred to the Bureau.

The duties of the Bureau of Equipment consisted of supplying naval vessels with rigging, anchors, electrical apparatus, coal and other fuel, and various other equipment and supplies. It was also in charge of naval wireless stations and hydrographic surveys, and it performed duties relating to the development and supply of navigational instruments. In 1910 the Bureau of Equipment was discontinued on a temporary basis. The Bureau was abolished by an act of June 30, 1914.

General correspondence, 1895-1910.

BUREAU OF SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS: Known as the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts since July 19, 1892, this Bureau is the direct lineal descendant of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing which was created in 1842. In 1910 many of the functions of the Bureau of Equipment were transferred to it. The Bureau is the directive and executive office of the Supply Corps.

General correspondence, 1885-1939, with indexes, 1891-1925; correspondence concerning contracts, 1913-39; correspondence concerning schedules, 1916-39; correspondence, reports, and data on overseas transportation by the Navy Department in chartered vessels during the first World War, 1917-21; contracts, bills, receipts, and related correspondence of Daniel Brodhead, navy agent at Boston, Massachusetts, 1825-48.

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE: As the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, this Bureau was created in 1842. It became the Bureau of Ordnance when all duties relating to hydrography were transferred to the Bureau of Navigation by an act of July 5, 1862. The records relating to hydrography were transferred with the function and are among the archives of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the name by which the former Bureau of Navigation is now known.

General correspondence, 1861-1926, with indexes, 1885-1905; manuscript maps relating to the development of shore establishments in the vicinity of Washington, D. C., 1843-67; telegrams, 1861-1902; contracts, 1843-1935; requisitions for materials, 1843-1932; correspondence relating to patents and inventions, 1917-19; records of inspectors of ordnance materials, 1855-1925; records of the Washington Navy Yard, 1818-1925; general correspondence of the Naval Torpedo Station, Alexandria, Virginia, 1918-23.

BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY: Created in 1842 as one of the original five bureaus of the Navy Department, this Bureau, under the administration of the Surgeon General of the Navy, is charged with all medical matters relating to the maintenance of the health of all naval personnel.

General correspondence, 1842-1925, with registers and index; registers of patients in various naval hospitals, 1863-1917; medical correspondence of various supply depots, training stations, and hospitals, 1918-20; correspondence of the Medical Aide to the Commander in Chief of United States Forces Operating in European Waters, 1918-20; general correspondence of the United States Museum of Hygiene and Naval Medical School, 1882-1909.

BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS: Functions relating to aeronautics were performed in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy as early as 1910, when Captain Washington Irving Chambers was placed in charge of the correspondence of that Office relating to aviation. On September 1, 1921, pursuant to the act of July 12, 1921, responsibility for most of the functions relating to aviation was concentrated in the newly established Bureau of Aeronautics.

General correspondence, 1914-41; contracts and requisitions, 1914-41; aircraft flight log books, 1917-41; aircraft engine log books, 1917-42; reports and correspondence of inspectors of aviation material, 1918-39; trouble reports, 1930-39; plans of airplanes and of airplane engines, 1917-39; gelatin and glass-plate negatives of photographs of dirigibles, aviation construction work, aircraft carriers, planes, and various other aviation subjects; plans, photographs, charts, and reports relating to the Akron, Macon, and other rigid airships; helium plant data, 1919-30; personnel records of inactive employees, 1921-40; records of the Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL: On July 5, 1862, by legislative act, this Bureau was established as the Bureau of Navigation. To it were assigned the hydrographic functions which had previously been performed in the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography. To it also were assigned certain duties relating to naval personnel. By General Order No. 372, dated June 25, 1889, the Secretary of the Navy placed the fleet, including vessels, officers, and enlisted men, and all matters pertaining to training, assignment, enlistment, inspection, and practice under the administration of the Bureau of Navigation. By an act of Congress approved May 13, 1942, its name was changed to Bureau of Naval Personnel. During its long period of activity in personnel matters, this Bureau has created a considerable body of records relating to individual service records.

Deck logs, 1801-1940; service records of enlisted personnel, 1845-1931; record cards of enlisted men who served during the World War, 1917-19; records relating to officers, 1834-1936; service records of inactive officers, 1885-1939; fitness reports of temporary regular officers, 1917-21; fitness reports of officers separated from the Naval Reserve, 1917-41; records concerning midshipmen, 1862-1910; reports of enlistments, 1846-1936; muster rolls, 1860-1938; manuscript charts of movements of the United States and Spanish Fleets at the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898; correspondence and other records of the Training Division, 1917-25; letters sent, 1862-89; general correspondence, 1887-1924; photographs (negatives) of officers, enlisted men, and vessels, 1900-38; motion picture film produced by the Navy during and immediately following the first World War; correspondence and other records of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, 1842-1863. Later hydrographic records are listed under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL: Before 1880, except for a few years during and immediately following the Civil War, the organization of the Navy Department did not provide for fixed responsibility for the discharge of legal duties relating to the business of the Department. The Office of the Judge Advocate General was created in the Navy Department by an act of Congress approved June 8, 1880. An act of April 17, 1900, provided for the creation of the Office of the Solicitor in the Department. This office functioned as part of the Office of the Judge Advocate General for some years, was later separated, and in 1921 was again made a part of the latter office.

General correspondence, 1880-1940, with indexes, 1898-1926.

Records of proceedings of General Courts Martial, 1866-1930, with index; records of proceedings of Courts of Inquiry and Boards of Investigation, 1866-1930; records of proceedings of Examining and Retiring Boards, 1860-1941; Proceedings of Retiring Boards, 1861-1903; Summary Courts Martial records, 1880-1929; deck Court records, 1909-29; records of the Patent Division concerning German war claims, 1929-31; files relating to real estate claims, 1917-40; copies of deeds and other papers relating to land-title disputes, 1915-22; closed contracts, with related correspondence, for propelling machinery and for the construction of naval vessels, 1923-42; correspondence, memoranda, certificates of ownership, appraisals, bills of sale, and other records relating to the purchase of privately owned vessels, 1919-26.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: The establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations by an act of March 3, 1915, with the functions of a naval general staff, finally brought to the Department a permanent body capable of experienced and professional direction of the duties of the Department relating to naval warfare. To this Office were transferred the Office of

Naval Intelligence of the Bureau of Navigation, the Board of Inspection and Survey, and the Naval Communication Service. On April 8, 1942, by Executive Order No. 9126, the Naval Observatory and the Hydrographic Office were transferred from the Bureau of Navigation to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The functions of the Office comprise all matters pertaining to the development of naval strategy and the use of the Fleets in war.

General correspondence, 1915-40, with index, 1915-26; correspondence and other records of the Communication Division (formerly the Naval Communication Service), 1911-28; letters sent and other records of the Inspection Division (formerly Board of Inspection and Survey), 1882-1911; records of the Intelligence Division (formerly Office of Naval Intelligence); records of the Naval Districts Division, 1917-37; correspondence of the Office of Naval Records and Library, 1885-1912.

Records of the Hydrographic Office, 1842-1939.

Records of the Naval Observatory, 1840-1929.

BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND OTHER UNITS: In addition the records of the more or less stable bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, there are also in the National Archives records of temporary boards, commissions, services, military governments, and so forth. Among these are the records of the Naval Advisory Board, 1882-89; Board on Construction, 1889-1909; United States Auxiliary Naval Force, 1898; Naval War Board, 1898; Liquid Fuel Board, 1902-04; Naval Fuel Oil Board, 1916; London Naval Headquarters, 1917-19; Compensation Board, 1917-39; Military Government of Santo Domingo, 1917-24; Paris Naval Board on Claims, 1918-21; London Naval Board on Claims, 1918-22; and Naval War Claims Board, 1925-35.

FLEET: There are only two groups of records of the Fleet in the National Archives. One is the flag files of the Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron for the years 1897-1900, and it contains material of great interest in connection with the Spanish-American War. The other is the flag files of the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, 1906-09, covering the voyage of the around the world.

MARINE CORPS: In 1794 Congress authorized the construction of ships of war for the Navy and the employment of detachments of Marines on board the vessels. The Marine Corps was created by an act approved July 11, 1798. It is under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy but serves as a semi-autonomous unit. The Corps is under the administration of a Commandant, with headquarters in Washington, D.

C. Its main headquarters offices are the Office of the Commandant, the Paymaster's Department, the Personnel Department (known before May 1, 1943, as the Adjutant and Inspector's Department), and the Quartermaster's Department. The Marines have long been vigorously proud of their history, and the historical consciousness of the Corps is reflected in the remarkable completeness of its archives. Although few records of the Paymaster's and Quartermaster's Departments have been preserved, the records of the other administrative offices extend from 1798 to the present. Most of the earliest records up to the period of the first World War are in the National Archives. As late as 1907 the earlier records were inaccessible, being at that time packed in boxes and stored at the Marine Corps Barracks in Washington, D. C. A Historical Section began in 1919 to accumulate the archives of the Corps and to write its history, and some of the Marine Corps records in the National Archives were transferred to it by that Section.

Records of the Office of the Commandant, 1798-1913, including copies of letters sent, 1798-1911; letters received, 1798-1913; letters to the Secretary of the Navy, 1884-1904; and endorsement books, 1839-50, 1877-1903; orders, 1798-1911.

Records of the Adjutant and Inspector's Department, 1798-1935, including letters sent, 1819-26, 1832-1911; personnel records of enlisted men, 1798-1895; records of deaths, desertions, discharges, and retirements, 1809-1935; record cards of enlisted men who served during the first World War, arranged by States; appointments and promotions of non-commissioned officers, 1879-90; personnel records of officers, 1821-1930; muster rolls, 1798-1909; and size rolls, 1798-1901.

Records of the Quartermaster's Department, 1813-1918, consisting of correspondence and other records. This is a small and fragmentary group.

Records of Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces, 1878-1934, including copies of letters sent by the Marine Detachment at Paris, France, 1878-79; journal of a Marine Battalion at Guantanamo, Cuba, 1898; records of Marine Corps operations in Haiti, 1915-34; and records of Marine Corps operations in Nicaragua, 1927-34.

Records of Marine Corps barracks and stations, 1803-1938, including guard reports, reports of Officers of the Day, and order books.

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